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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
SALES TAX ENFORCEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE
ENFORCEMENT METHODOLOGIES AND PATHOLOGIES
by
Philip Cary Christian
Florida International University, 2010
Miami, Florida
Professor Howard Frank, Major Professor
Most research on tax evasion has focused on the income tax. Sales tax evasion
has been largely ignored and dismissed as immaterial. This paper explored the
differences between income tax and sales tax evasion and demonstrated that sales tax
enforcement is deserving of and requires the use of different tools to achieve compliance.
Specifically, the major enforcement problem with sales tax is not evasion: it is theft
perpetrated by companies that act as collection agents for the state. Companies engage in
a principal-agent relationship with the state and many retain funds collected as an agent
of the state for private use. As such, the act of sales tax theft bears more resemblance to
embezzlement than to income tax evasion. It has long been assumed that the sales tax is
nearly evasion free, and state revenue departments report voluntary compliance in a
manner that perpetuates this myth. Current sales tax compliance enforcement
methodologies are similar in form to income tax compliance enforcement methodologies
and are based largely on trust. The primary focus is on delinquent filers with a very small
percentage of businesses subject to audit. As a result, there is a very large group of
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noncompliant businesses who file on time and fly below the radar while stealing millions
of taxpayer dollars.
The author utilized a variety of statistical methods with actual field data derived
from operations of the Southern Region Criminal Investigations Unit of the Florida
Department of Revenue to evaluate current and proposed sales tax compliance
enforcement methodologies in a quasi-experimental, time series research design and to
set forth a typology of sales tax evaders. This study showed that current estimates of
voluntary compliance in sales tax systems are seriously and significantly overstated and
that current enforcement methodologies are inadequate to identify the majority of
violators and enforce compliance. Sales tax evasion is modeled using the theory of
planned behavior and Cressey’s fraud triangle and it is demonstrated that proactive
enforcement activities, characterized by substantial contact with non-delinquent
taxpayers, results in superior ability to identify noncompliance and provides a structure
through which noncompliant businesses can be rehabilitated.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Tax evasion is widely recognized as a significant problem. Estimates of federal
tax revenue lost to evasion, known as the tax gap, exceeded $290 billion for tax year
2001 not including evasion of taxes on illegal activities (Internal Revenue Service, 2006).
State governments publish little information regarding state tax gaps, but indications are
that states have multi-billion dollar tax gaps of their own. For example, California
estimates their tax gap related to the state income tax at $6.5 billion based on the IRS tax
gap (State of California Franchise Tax Board, 2007). Most states that levy an income tax
use federal taxable income as a starting point in the calculation of state taxable income
and the related state income tax liability. Therefore, almost every state that has a
corporate and/or individual income tax will have a tax gap equal to a percentage of the
federal gap. 1 The tax gap related to other taxes, such as the sales tax, is much more
difficult to estimate and such estimates are rarely published. Access to raw sales tax data
for purposes of research is exceedingly rare and the sparse research that exists holds the
assumption that the sales tax is nearly evasion free. I have been granted the opportunity
to study sales tax evasion in the field which not only allows access to raw data, but more
importantly, enables the ability to match tax data to other informational sources. This
level of access allows the development of a typology of sales tax evaders; a clearer
understanding of the true nature of sales tax evasion; the impact of current enforcement
methodologies; and the gaps in enforcement capabilities that can be filled with innovative
new approaches to enforcement.
1

That percentage will generally be state income tax rate adjusted for allocation and apportionment of
income to other states by multi-state tax filers.
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Objectives and Study Focus
The primary objective of my study is to identify improvements in tax compliance
enforcement methodologies with respect to the sales tax. My study indicates that the
amount of sales tax evasion is, contrary to popular belief, large and much greater than
current accounts allow. The existence of this larger tax gap is testament to the partial
failure of existing compliance enforcement methodologies. The scope of the problem is
cloaked by compliance measurement based only on known delinquent taxes 2 and audit
assessments. Political expediency may drive continued focus on these factors at the
expense of acknowledging and addressing the full impact of evasion. While important,
political issues are not the focus of this study. I believe that evasion is a political problem
for the enforcement agency only to the extent the agency ceases to innovate and improve.
If agencies are better able to identify evasion, they may be able to turn potential political
liabilities into assets. Witness now the practice of publicizing arrests and prosecutions of
those caught evading a tax. Such activities are considered successes of the agency
because the illegal activity was discovered and punished. If the agency is able to catch
evasion activities earlier to minimize the impact, or arrest and prosecute more flagrant
evaders, the political impact is positive. So it is not the amount of evasion exposed that
becomes a political issue, but evasion that remains undiscovered that becomes a potential
political vulnerability. It may be perceived that political danger for an agency lies in the
improvement being seen as an indictment of previous policy, but if goals and policies are
geared toward continuous improvement, as many believe they should be, then a need to
2

“Delinquent taxes” means tax that has been reported by the taxpayer but not yet paid or estimated taxes
due on returns that have not been filed and are past the due date. In this respect, delinquent taxes represent
taxes that are known to be due based either on taxpayer reporting or estimates based on previous taxpayer
reporting.
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constantly improve is communicated to stakeholders and improvements will be seen as
the fruits of the positive enforcement culture created by the leadership of the agency. As
a result, research to improve enforcement methodologies becomes politically neutral to
an agency that is constantly striving to improve and that rewards creative approaches and
solutions. My work during this study took place within such an environment. I use a mix
of quantitative and qualitative techniques to evaluate existing enforcement processes and
to test new processes and approaches as they are being implemented.
The Florida Department of Revenue was chosen for this study because Florida is
a large state that has no individual income tax and, therefore, depends heavily on the
sales tax for state revenues. The Florida Department of Revenue is considered a
progressive and well-managed revenue agency. This is demonstrated by the agency
receipt of the Governor’s Sterling Award for Performance Excellence and the
implementation of the Malcolm Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence in each of
its business processes. The American Society for Quality notes that representatives from
other state and foreign governments visit the agency each year to learn more about
Florida Department of Revenue quality programs (American Society for Quality
Research Committee, 2003). Agency leadership is amenable and interested in
knowledge-based efforts to improve enforcement and has provided unparalleled access
with respect to this study, limited only by Florida law related to the confidentiality of tax
data. It must be stressed, however, that the Florida Department of Revenue is in no way
responsible for this study and has insisted that this study not be identified as a study
undertaken by the Department. Any conclusions and interpretations of data are strictly
those of the author and the Department of Revenue may not officially agree with the

3

conclusions and interpretations contained herein. This study is rather narrowly focused
on intelligence, data analysis operations, and field techniques that may be employed at
the local level and may lead to improved compliance enforcement outcomes, and does
not purport to present or evaluate all of the Department of Revenue’s methodologies and
tools currently used for enforcement purposes.

Research Questions
This study addresses the following major questions:
•

How effective are traditional sales tax compliance enforcement efforts,
especially in controlling sales tax theft?

•

What types of innovative enforcement methodologies can be utilized to
improve compliance?

Secondary but potentially very important questions relate to the implications for
the potential implementation of a national sales tax and calls within Florida to replace
local property taxes with an expanded sales tax. Current proposals for the national sales
tax call for the replacement of all federal income and payroll-based taxes and cite the
elimination of the Internal Revenue Service as a benefit of the change process
(Americans for Fair Taxation, 2010) reflecting the conviction that retail consumption
taxes are evasion free. In Florida, replacement of the property tax, which is legitimately
nearly evasion free, with the sales tax could be enormously expensive if the true nature of
sales tax evasion and theft is not properly understood.

4

Significance of this Study
One of the more important tasks in this study was to demonstrate that general
assumptions regarding the sales tax being nearly evasion free are unrealistic. To
determine voluntary compliance, state revenue agencies generally focus on accounts
receivable, which is derived from estimates of delinquent taxes, reported but unpaid
taxes, and amounts found due as the result of audit and discovery campaigns. In other
words, only known delinquent taxes and audit results are considered. These estimates do
not include tax losses from evasion, unidentified unregistered taxpayers, or sales in the
underground economy3 that the revenue agency cannot estimate.
To illustrate, assume a revenue agent is responsible for 100 taxpayers, and each
taxpayer files a monthly sales tax return reporting $1,000 in sales tax collected, for a total
of $100,000 in sales tax. All but one of the taxpayers submits a check with their return
paying the full $1,000 owed. So out of $100,000 in self assessed and reported sales tax
on monthly sales tax returns, only $1,000 is delinquent. An audit is performed on one of
the other taxpayers (representing a one percent audit rate), and that taxpayer is found to
owe an additional $500. Therefore, the receivables identified total $1,500. The state will
represent a 98.5 percent voluntary compliance rate with respect to those taxpayers
($99,000 properly reported and remitted divided by $100,500 total sales tax collected that
should have been remitted).
Imagine now that, in reality, 50 of the 100 businesses actually collected $10,000
in sales tax ($500,000 total), but reported and remitted only $1,000 each ($50,000), and
3

Underground economy refers to businesses that deal in cash or barter or who use other methods to conceal
their true tax liabilities from the government. The term encompasses both legal and illegal business
activities.
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have thus evaded or stolen $450,000 in sales tax collections. The state has no way of
knowing this unless those 50 companies are audited or investigated. Otherwise, their
self-assessments are accepted. So we see that in reality the amount due is $451,500, not
$1,500, and the compliance rate is only 18 percent, not 98.5 percent. While these
demonstration numbers may appear to have been designed merely for shock value, the
present study shows that the ratio of actual tax theft to delinquencies is this large or larger
in at least one large industry, and likely so in many others on the basis of information and
documentation reviewed during the course of this study. The goal of the agency
reporting compliance based on delinquencies and assessments is not to mislead, but
merely to measure what is readily measureable, and to provide information that is
available and verifiable. There is no generally acceptable basis to estimate the total sales
tax gap derived from audit and investigative results because such a tiny percentage of
businesses collecting the sales tax are audited or investigated. Since audits are strategic
in nature rather than random, there is also no basis to generalize audit results to the entire
population. Even the process of estimating delinquencies involves a certain amount of
guesswork. Prior filing history provides an estimation tool that is useful provided the
filer has not historically engaged in evasion behavior beyond delinquencies. The fact that
evasion behavior can distort delinquency and receivable analyses that are generally
viewed as trustworthy is yet another indication of the difficulty in estimating the tax gap
for the sales tax. The significant amounts of tax revenue being lost every year at both the
federal and state levels could balance budgets, reduce overall tax rates, and make funds
available for important programs that currently go begging. An assumption in this study
is that rather than noncompliance rates of two to five percent ($4.8 billion to $12 billion
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nationwide), the actual noncompliance rates for sales tax are a minimum of ten percent
and may be as high as 28 percent. 4 This represents a range of $24 billion to $67 billion
for sales tax theft in the 45 states that administer a sales tax. Full compliance would not
only balance budgets, but it would allow the reduction of tax rates.
The assumption that sales tax is nearly evasion free causes states to focus
enforcement efforts on managing delinquencies rather than catching evaders, resulting in
an allocation of maximum resources to efforts with the lowest yield in terms of additional
revenue. Amounts devoted to combating tax evasion are not insubstantial, but pale in
comparison to resources devoted to resolution of delinquencies and assessments. The
large amounts of tax dollars that are being lost would appear to indicate that devoting
even more resources to enforcement would be worthwhile. It is well established that
audit and investigative activities have a significant direct impact on compliance, and also
generate significant “spillover” effects as taxpayers witness the punitive actions taken
against evaders (Dubin, 2007). Some argue that devoting additional resources to the
problem of tax evasion has been found to be subject to diminishing returns (Alm J. ,
1999) (Mikesell & Birskyte, 2006). While this is undoubtedly true, the real question
concerns where the line of diminishing returns is crossed. Consider that in the example
above, doubling audit and investigative resources might mean auditing two of the 100
companies instead of one. In that example, the improvement might be substantial but not
nearly sufficient. If the size of the problem is as large as the results of this study indicate,
state governments are a long way from reaching the point of diminishing returns with
respect to adding sales tax enforcement resources. An analysis of marginal revenue
4

This assumption is supported by calculations made by the author in a separate study of compliance rates
in Florida, by industry, which is ongoing.
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compared to marginal costs can and should be used to guide the expansion of
enforcement resources to optimal levels. Rather than simply increasing traditional
compliance enforcement capabilities to optimal levels, governments must seek to
improve tax compliance in an ever more cost-effective manner by employing innovative
compliance enforcement solutions that produce better results than traditional methods
without requiring large increases in the overall level of resource dedication. Such
solutions may involve reallocating and refocusing certain existing resources and greater
investments in technology.
The current study demonstrates that current methodologies task 80 percent of
compliance personnel to delinquency management and only 20 percent of compliance
personnel to audit and investigations, resulting in extremely low audit rates and reliance
on reporting honesty alone for compliance with respect to 99.53 percent of all the
businesses in Florida. A level of reporting honesty greater than 99 percent is impossible
even in a tax system with the built-in verification of income and deductions of an income
tax system, or the multiple reporting steps and cross-checks available in a value added tax
system. Such heavy dependence on natural honesty in a retail sales tax system is without
merit and results in much larger levels of evasion than previously thought specifically
because of the lack of verification and cross-checks. Some view the collection of the
sales tax by businesses as the essential third-party participation and reporting that makes
the sales tax nearly evasion free. In the present study it is made clear that the issue with
sales tax is not evasion by the taxpayer, but theft of the sales tax collected by the business
collecting the tax, the collection agent for the state, which is more similar to
embezzlement than evasion.

8

In order to better understand evasion in a retail sales tax environment, I advance a
typology of sales tax evaders that is useful in understanding how and why people evade
and the tools that are best suited to enforcement efforts for a particular type of evader.
Upon examination of the typology, it becomes clear that existing enforcement tools are
too narrowly focused and are ineffective in identifying most types of evader. Contrary to
existing beliefs, this study shows that delinquency status is a poor predictor of evasion in
the sales tax environment.
In the current study I introduce a proactive methodology for addressing the
enforcement gap that exists between delinquency management and audit and that
addresses enforcement with respect to evader types that remain outside the influence of
current methodologies. This approach is the targeted industry enforcement program that
is built on the foundation of current enforcement efforts known as lead development,
discovery operations and campaigns. This enforcement methodology is proactive; is
based on employee expertise and the use of multiple data sources to effectively target
evaders; and does not rely to any extent on the delinquency status of a particular
company.

Outline of the Chapters
The documentation of this study and the results obtained are presented in this
paper as described in the following paragraphs.
In Chapter 2 the existing tax evasion literature is examined, which is heavily
focused on the income tax, and the impact of third-party reporting on compliance in an
income tax system is demonstrated. Through an analysis of the Principal Agent Model
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my study shows that high levels of sales tax theft should not be surprising, but rather
ought to be expected because of the structure of the sales tax; heavy dependence on
honesty; lack of incentives for the agent; and inability of states to properly manage the
principle agent relationship because of the number of agents involved and the inability to
control adverse selection.
Chapter 3 advances a theoretical framework that is based on Cressey’s Fraud
Triangle for understanding the environment conducive to theft of the sales tax collected
by the agent; and on the theory of planned behavior to understand the individual decision
to steal a portion of the sales taxes collected. This framework suggests appropriate
enforcement approaches that include activities designed to affect the evader’s degree of
perceived behavioral control over the decision to evade without discovery. Chapter 3
also includes my typology of sales tax evaders and a discussion of the appropriate
enforcement tools for each type of evader.
Chapter 4 is an introduction to the environment for the study: sales tax
enforcement within the State of Florida by the Florida Department of Revenue. Chapter
4 provides a description of Florida’s approach to enforcement, the resources dedicated to
enforcement, and a summary of the results of enforcement activities.
Chapter 5 provides the methodologies and statistical tools utilized in the quasiexperimental analysis of the targeted industry enforcement program in Chapter 8 and
related processes covered in Chapters 6 and 7.
Chapter 6 covers an evaluation of the Department of Revenue’s Criminal
Investigations Process task force participation and its impact on enforcement results. The
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review in Chapter 6 is preparatory to the introduction of alternative task force structures
utilized in the targeted industry enforcement program.
Chapter 7 offers an evaluation of revenue agent observation and intuition as a tool
in the identification of fraud indicators within an industry. Utilizing a sample of 369 used
car dealers, the ability to identify sales tax evaders based on the completion of an
observational survey and review of filing history is tested.
Chapter 8 provides an analysis of a complete cycle of a targeted industry
enforcement program as it was executed with respect to 192 used car dealers in MiamiDade County, Florida, who were identified as likely evaders during the data analysis
portion of the project. These 192 dealers were responsible for more than $21 million in
sales tax theft yet had only $302,000 in delinquent sales tax identified and outstanding.
Chapter 9 provides a qualitative analysis of the project and how the results
comport with the theoretical framework and typology of sales tax evaders advanced by
this study.
Chapter 10 offers a discussion of how enforcement efforts can be strengthened
through the addition of targeted industry enforcement programs to the arsenal of
enforcement tools and its integration with existing tools and methodologies. Also
provided is an estimate of the marginal cost and estimated marginal revenues associated
with such programs.
Chapter 11 contains concluding comments and directions for future research.

11

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Deterrence Model
One of the most enduring theories of tax evasion was set forth by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) and is known as the deterrence model, criminal deterrence model, or the
economics of crime argument (hereafter, “deterrence model”) and is based on expected
utility theory. Allingham and Sandmo theorized that the choice by a rational person to
evade taxes is based on the expected gains or losses associated with the decision to evade,
an argument that sets forth the objective of the evading taxpayer as maximization of
utility through the decision to evade. In the deterrence model the gain is represented by
the money saved through evasion and the loss is the penalty attached to getting caught. If
the probability of getting caught is high and the penalties are severe, the utility
maximizing taxpayer will not attempt to evade taxes. The deterrence model is an
extension of the theory set forth by Becker (1968) with respect to crime in general, and
presents a simplified and straightforward approach to tax evasion. The deterrence model
became the underlying premise for nearly all approaches to tax evasion for decades and
remains in wide use in practice even though it has been somewhat discredited in theory
consistent with general criticisms leveled against expected utility theory with respect to
rationality. People generally do not behave as rationally as the deterrence model would
predict in that taxpayers do not fully understand their alternatives or the related
consequences of their actions (Tanzi & Shome, 1993). Taxpayers do not know the
probabilities of getting caught and generally do not know the penalties involved. The
deterrence model also ignores non-pecuniary costs of evasion activities such as loss of
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self-esteem, embarrassment, and loss of reputation and social status (King & Sheffrin,
2002). Perhaps the most important criticism is that the deterrence model would predict
much lower rates of compliance than presently achieved given low audit levels and the
very small probability of getting caught evading taxes. For this reason, the deterrence
model is deemed a very poor predictor of evasion activities (Jones, 2003; Mikesell &
Birskyte, 2006; Korobow, Johnson, & Axtell, 2007). Results of surveys and experiments
suggest that most taxpayers would never consider tax evasion even though the
probabilities of audit are tiny (Long & Swinjen, 1991). Varma and Doob (1998) found
that penalties are ineffective in controlling tax evasion and the size of legal sanctions is
not important if people believe they will not get caught. However, they found that
deterrence had an impact if people could be convinced that the probability of getting
caught was high. They also found that whether the consequences of evasion were
criminal or not clearly matters and that compliance may have more to do with individual
personal beliefs such as a moral obligation to be honest.
Sociological models of deterrence, as opposed to the economic model, begin to
add psychological and sociological considerations, particularly ethical considerations, to
the deterrence equation and contemplate a taxpayer’s attitudes toward social obligations
and self-image to be important factors in deterrence. In the sociological model of
deterrence, ethical considerations act to set bounds on the choices available to the
taxpayer (Reckers, Sanders, & Roark, 1994) and account somewhat for compliance above
the levels that would be predicted by the econcomic deterrence model.

13

Competing Theories
To address the perceived shortcomings in concepts of tax evasion based on the
deterrence model, researchers have proposed alternative theories to guide evasion
research efforts. Equity theory posits that when the system of taxation is considered fair,
compliance will be high, or at least higher than when the system is considered unfair
(Thibalt, Fredland, & Walker, 1974; Smith & Kinsey, 1987). Equity theory looks to the
horizontal equity of the tax system and presumes the taxpayer will be satisfied as long as
his burden is fair when compared to other taxpayers. Exchange equity theory moves the
equitable comparison from other taxpayers to the mode of what the taxpayer receives in
return for their tax dollars and holds that individuals evaluate the fairness of their tax
burdens based on the benefits they receive from the government. Exchange equity theory
also posits a link with the popularity of the public goods purchased with taxpayer’s tax
dollars (Kinsey, Grasmick, & Smith, 1991).
Prospect theory models evasion decision making in terms of gains and losses
similarly to deterrence theory. However, the framing of the tax evasion decision
becomes more important than under the deterrence model, equity theory, or exchange
equity theory (Chang, Nichols, & Schultz, 1987; Robben, et al., 1990). Under prospect
theory, a decision to evade is framed in terms of gains and losses with respect to a
particular reference point, such as the taxpayer’s withholding position, rather than an
overall decision to evade tax as in the deterrence model/expected utility theory. Prospect
theory predicts that when individuals are faced with a loss, they will be encouraged to
adopt more risk-seeking, noncompliant behavior. For example, when taxpayers are in a
situation where their withholding is insufficient and tax is due with the return, taxpayers
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will be more noncompliant than when they find themselves in a refund position. The
withholding position becomes the referent point in the taxpayers framing activities
(Blanthorne, 2000).
King and Sheffrin (2002) experimentally compared evasion under equity theory
using a framework of prospect theory with the deterrence model and found that criticisms
of expected utility theory were valid, but that prospect theory was not superior in terms of
predictive value in a scenario of inequity. They instead found support for expected utility
theory in scenarios depicting inequity. Results were generally not consistent with equity
theory. They found that responses to control questions were consistent with prospect
theory but the responses to framed questions were not. They noted that none of these
theories were particularly robust and none faired any better than the others in their
testing.
Nwogugu (2005) criticizes both prospect theory and expected utility theory for
failure to address the real process of decision making. He posits that decision making
involves the evaluation of many factors and is a multi-dimensional process that cannot be
accurately portrayed by imposing rigid models on the process. Instead, he recommends
studying decision making through the analysis of completed real life decisions on issues
that have several dimensions, such as situation contexts and risk/loss management
capabilities, and over several time frames. In his opinion, expected utility theory and
prospect theory are derived from questionable experiments, limited in dimension and the
nature of the questions asked.
In the continuing search for a robust theory of tax evasion, researchers have built
upon the deterrence model and evaluated cultural, administrative, and individual factors
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that act as potential determinants of evasion behavior. Among these factors are the
quality of services provided by the government, the existence of high tax rates, the
complexity of tax laws, social norms, morality, tax amnesty policy, income levels, size of
businesses, tax ethics, and source of income (Madeo, Schepanski, & Uecker, 1987;
Reckers, Sanders, & Roark, 1994; Alm J. , 1999; Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee,
& Torgler, 2004; Torgler & Murphey, 2004; Christian & Frank, 2006; Hyun, 2006).
These determinants can be thought of as contributors to tax morale, defined by Torgler
and Murphy (2004, p. 4) as “the intrinsic motivation one has to pay their tax.” All of
these determinants have been empirically shown to have a statistically significant impact
on tax evasion.
Alm (1991) stated that theoretical models of individual choice are too simple to
adequately address the decision to evade taxes. He notes that the Internal Revenue
Service had, at that time, listed 64 factors that may affect the reporting decisions of
taxpayers, but theoretical models are not capable of including very many of these factors
in a single analysis, which limits their explanatory power. Many other factors have been
added to the list of potential determinants since then, as noted in the previous paragraph.
Alm’s calls for broader, theory-based approaches to the problem obviously were not a
deterrent to investigating every conceivable factor for its impact on the evasion decision
process.
Behavioral decision theory examines how decisions related to compliance are
affected by the way in which the risks of noncompliance are presented or are otherwise
perceived. Behavioral studies focus on the way people subjectively evaluate and choose
among risks but reject the rational choice methodology in favor of a more boundedly
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rational approach. In an application of behavioral decision theory in an experimental
setting, Casey and Scholtz (1991) found that the design of compliance strategies to
provide for variation in the probability of getting caught adds ambiguity to taxpayer
assessments of audit chances and increases compliance. Greater confusion about
detection activities leads to more compliance in situations where deterrence is actually
relatively weak, but to less compliance where deterrence is relatively strong. Sheffrin
and Triest (1992) found evidence that taxpayers who perceive a higher probability of
detection are less likely to evade taxes and that the perceived probability of detection may
be more important than the actual probability of detection. Collins and Plumlee (1991)
note that theoretical models of compliance generally assume that individuals face a fixed
random probability of audit, whereas the Internal Revenue Service determines audit leads
partially based on the information supplied by the taxpayer on their tax returns. As such,
audits are not fixed or random, but rather are strategic, and studies have shown that
strategic audits significantly affect individual taxpayer behavior and lead to more
compliance with reporting requirements. Therefore, strategic audit schemes can have the
capability of creating within the taxpayer a belief in a higher probability of audit than
actually exists.

The Theory of Planned Behavior
The theory of planned behavior evolved from the theory of reasoned action
developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and
posits that intentions to engage in behaviors of different kinds can be predicted with
accuracy from attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral
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control (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen, 1988; Ajzen, 1991). In an investigation of the application of
the theory of planned behavior to tax evasion, Bobek and Hatfield (2003) equated the
beliefs held by the taxpayer about what would occur if they engaged in evasion as the
attitude; the influence of referent groups or individuals as the subjective norms; and the
degree of control an individual perceives he or she has to engage in the evasion activity
as the perceived behavioral control. An additional variable was added for the impact of
moral obligation, which the authors thought would be a moderating influence. Control
beliefs relate to the individual’s beliefs about the presence or absence of resources and
opportunities, or obstacles and impediments to their performance of the specific behavior,
in this case evasion. The authors note that this includes perceptions regarding income
visibility and the probability of detection. They found that moral obligation alone was
not sufficient to reduce evasion behaviors to zero but that subjective norms and perceived
behavioral control were consistently significant. Bobek and Hatfield note that the theory
of planned behavior does not refer to how easy it is to cheat in general, but applies to
specific behavioral choices and how much control an individual has to carry out that
choice, such as taking an unauthorized deduction. More importantly, they note that
perceived behavioral control must exist before any other construct can exert influence on
behavior. If an individual does not believe that the behavior is within their control, then
subjective norms, attitudes, morality, and ethics are immaterial. An individual who
believes the government is unfair; believes taxation is unconstitutional; has friends and
relatives who perpetually cheat on their taxes; and who is generally immoral and
unethical; will satisfy the subjective norms and attitude constructs but still will not
engage in tax evasion if he or she believes they do not have enough control of the activity
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and ability to engage in the behavior without getting caught. Therefore, it would appear
that an individual’s perceived behavioral control would be a primary target in the taxing
authority’s efforts to enforce compliance.
In another study utilizing the theory of planned behavior, Blanthorne (2000)
found that taxpayers that have the opportunity to underreport income actually
underreported more income than taxpayers lacking such an opportunity, affirming the
impact of perceived behavioral control but finding that subjective norms were not
significant. The author also used an ethical beliefs component in the study which was
found to be the strongest indicator of the intention to underreport income and the actual
underreporting behavior.

Opportunity to Evade
Madeo, Schepanski, and Uecker (1987) found that taxpayers were three times
more likely to evade taxes with respect to income not reported to the Internal Revenue
Service. Klepper, Mazur, and Nagin (1991) found that tax compliance increases with
respect to items of income that are unambiguously defined, such as wages, and decreases
with more ambiguously defined items such as employee business expenses. Work by
Erard (1993) provided further support for the correlation between the opportunity to
evade taxes and the act of evasion, finding that tax compliance was not dependent on the
level of income but on the source of income. According to King and Sheffrin (2002), the
Internal Revenue Service estimates that 99 percent of wage income is correctly reported
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but less than 70 percent of income from unincorporated businesses is properly reported. 5
It is exceptionally difficult to evade taxes on income reported to the tax authorities by
third parties, since mismatches between income reported by the third party and income
reported on the individual’s tax return are electronically matched and flagged for review
without human intervention. Taxpayers understand that attempts to evade tax on income
reported by third parties yields a high probability of detection and are much more likely
not to report income they believe cannot be traced (Madeo, Schepanski, & Uecker, 1987).

Differences between the Income Tax and the Retail Sales Tax
The preceding discussion highlights a critical point about sales tax evasion: sales
taxes are not subject to third-party verification of amounts collected. Third parties collect
as agents of the state and are trusted to remit. Thus, the potential to evade sales taxes
relative to income taxes is much greater. In fact, the issue is not evasion at all, but rather
theft of the sales tax collected by the agent from the actual taxpayer. The question must
be asked whether research on income tax evasion provides any basis at all for
understanding sales tax evasion. Watrin and Ullmann (2008) found significantly lower
compliance rates with respect to consumption taxes versus income taxes, and noted
significant differences in reactions towards changes in detection probabilities based on
the results obtained from an experimental multi-stage game. Specifically they found that
individuals react more strongly when detection probabilities are increased with respect to

5

A portion of the income of unincorporated businesses is also subject to third-party reporting on Form
1099, so the actual amount of unreported income from unincorporated businesses that is not subject to
third-party verification is likely even higher.
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consumption taxes than when the detection probabilities are increased with respect to the
income tax.
It was previously noted that the deterrence model has lost much of its credibility
because most people appear to be honest and, if the theory underlying the deterrence
model were correct, evasion would be far more common than it actually is. However,
when it is considered that most work on tax evasion has been with respect to the income
tax, and that it is extremely difficult to evade taxes on income that is subject to thirdparty verification, compliance might not be nearly as universal as some studies might
claim.
A review of the data contained in the Internal Revenue Service Source of Income
Bulletin for each filing year provides insight into the impact of third-party reporting on
tax compliance. Utilizing the data from 2007 (Internal Revenue Service, 2007), the
following analysis was performed to demonstrate the percentage of taxable income that
was subject to third-party verification and the results obtained are summarized in Table
2.1. The details of the analysis are included in Appendix 1.

Table 2.1 Percentages of Individual Income Tax Income and Deduction Items
Subject to Third-Party Verification
Category
Income items
Deductions for
AGI
Other deductions

Total
$8,793,560,693,000

Verifiable
$7,262,331,438,000

Percentage
82.59%

$122,922,183,000
$2,930,389,570,000

$89,313,528,000
$1,597,353,028,000

72.66%
54.51%

The analysis of Internal Revenue Service data demonstrates that a large majority
of the items that compose adjusted gross income, the “income items” and “deductions for
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AGI” in the table, are subject to third-party verification. Further, since a substantial
number of returns utilize the standard deduction rather than itemizing deductions, more
than half of the amounts claimed as deductions are also not at issue and not subject to
evasion because they are statutorily defined.
Other research bears out the theory that compliance may be less than universal. It
has been found that there is a positive correlation between under-withholding of income
tax and a subsequent underreporting of the tax liability based on the 1982 Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) audit data (Chang & Schultz, 1990).
Martinez-Vazquez, Harwood, and Larkins (1992) observed that people with liquidity
problems were less likely to pay commercial debts and theorized that liquidity problems
may have the same effect on the behavior of taxpayers. In two sets of experiments they
found that if the possibility of evading taxes in a safe manner existed, a near-majority of
people would take that chance, and the proportion of individuals choosing to evade who
were in an illiquid position was significantly larger. Blanthorne (2000) found that
taxpayers who have the opportunity to underreport income actually underreported more,
in both frequency of underreporting and in the amount underreported, and had lower tax
reporting ethics than taxpayers who did not have the opportunity to underreport. Carnes
and Englebrecht (1995) found that tax compliance increases as the visibility of income to
the taxing authority increases. Antonides and Robben (1995) found that the probability
of tax evasion was related to the opportunity available to the taxpayer to conceal income.
Given that the sales tax is not subject to any third-party verification, these preceding
findings portend dire consequences for compliance under a sales tax regime. Yet Watrin
and Ullman (2008) note that their work is the first to explicitly focus on the behavioral
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differences between compliance in the realm of income tax versus compliance related to
consumption taxes. The lack of specific research related to tax evasion in a consumption
tax environment is surprising given the core differences between how income taxes and
consumption taxes are administered and given the lack of third-party controls in a
consumption tax system. It should also be noted that Watrin and Ullman (2008) found
that in their review of the literature, none of the models developed for the analysis of the
usefulness of consumption taxes and optimal mixes of taxation regimes have even
allowed for the possibility of tax evasion in a consumption tax setting, and there has
never been a model that allows for evasion in income tax and consumption tax regimes at
the same time. To set this glaring omission in its proper context, it must also be
understood that research related to evasion in value-added consumption taxes (VAT) are
inapplicable to this study since VAT regimes are more easily enforced because the tax is
collected at multiple stages during the production process. If the tax is not collected at
one stage, it can still be collected at a subsequent stage of production. Additionally, the
VAT calculations at each stage of production leave a paper trail that makes it easier to
find and prove evasion, and provides an incentive for proper reporting because of the
built-in credit structure (Garner, 2005). This verification and incentive structure does not
exist with a retail sales tax.

Fraud Theories
Donald Cressey (1953) developed a conceptual context known as the “fraud
triangle” on the basis of research findings from the study of several hundred instances of
internal fraud. Three factors were present in each case he studied: the perpetrators felt
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perceived pressure from financial needs; they had access to funds; and they had the
ability to rationalize their illegal behavior. While tax evasion is not internal theft or
embezzlement in the traditional sense of the crime, the theft of sales tax is virtually
identical to embezzlement. As mentioned earlier, with respect to the sales tax, the
taxpayers are not the businesses that collect and report the tax, but the customers of these
businesses. It is not the taxpayers per se who evade the tax, it is rather the agent of the
state, the business that collects the tax, which retains the funds for their personal use and
thereby commits the crime. It is literally the same as embezzlement, skimming, or any
other of a number of frauds employees perpetrate on their employers by taking money
before their employers realize it has been collected. In fact, in 1978 the Florida Statutes
addressed theft of sales tax by providing that then Section 812.10, relating to
embezzlement by state, county, or municipal officers, would apply to every person who
collected sales tax on behalf of the state. 6 The statute was amended in 1979 to provide
separate specific penalties for theft of state funds by those who collect sales tax on behalf
of the state. With respect to the sales tax, the business collecting the tax has access to and
control of the funds, so all that is needed is a reason to take the money (the perceived
financial pressure) and a rationalization to do so for the fraud triangle framework to be
applicable.
A portion of Cressey’s (1953) study dealt with “independent businessmen” who
were in business for themselves and received and converted deposits entrusted to them by
customers or others to their personal use. These businessmen typically explained and
excused their conversion of funds by asserting that they were merely “borrowing” the
6

Florida Statutes Section 212.15(1), Fla. St. 1978, Supp.
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money, or that the funds were really theirs and they could not steal from themselves
(Wells, 2005). The situation described and the excuses provided mirror the situation of
the businessman caught stealing tax dollars collected as an agent of the state.
The fraud triangle concept was formally adopted by the auditing profession in
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2002). This pronouncement
was issued after the accounting scandals at Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Adelphia and
the levying of criminal charges against the accounting firm Arthur Andersen & Co. that
increased pressure on the accounting profession to identify fraud in the corporate
financial statements they audit. The fraud triangle is generally recognized as a useful tool
in indentifying potential fraud by the accounting profession and fraud examiners
(Albrecht & Wernz, 1993; Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004; Sacchetti, 2005; DeFatta, 2005;
Murdock, 2008; McNeal, 2009; Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2009).

Agency Theory
Since the sales tax is administered by utilizing retail businesses as collection
agents for the state, agency theory yields additional important insights in the analysis of
sales tax compliance enforcement. Two concerns addressed by agency theory are the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Droege & Spiller, 2009). Adverse
selection occurs when a principal selects an inappropriate agent because of false or
inaccurate information. Moral hazard refers to the situation where the agent does not
provide appropriate effort to achieve the goals of the principal. Agency theory assumes
adverse selection can be controlled if the principal has access to all available information,

25

and that the required information can be obtained for a price. The principal must balance
the cost of acquiring the information needed with the potential gain from selecting an
appropriate agent. Moral hazard can be controlled through either behavioral contracts
designed to control the activities of the agent, or through outcome-based contracts which
are designed to align the goals of the principal and agent and allow the principal to
monitor specific outcomes produced by the agent rather than the agent’s activities
(Droege & Spiller, 2009).
Both adverse selection and moral hazard are problems encountered by the state in
its dealings with its collection agents, but the state has several unique problems that must
be addressed:
First, the state cannot choose the collection agents it wishes to work with. If a
business meets the minimal requirements to obtain a sales tax license, they become an
agent of the state. There are few reasons for disqualification and even new businesses
owned by known tax cheats or their family members cannot be denied a license. As a
result, the state is guaranteed an adverse selection problem regardless of the information
available to it.
Second, agency theory assumes a direct relationship between the principal and the
agent that makes it possible to either monitor the agent’s activities, or require specified
results based on contract specifications. Since all retail businesses engaged in the sale of
tangible personal property become agents, there are too many agents for the state to
devote direct monitoring to each one. Outcomes cannot be predicted or planned for with
respect to sales taxes since sales tax collected will be proportional to the sales the
business is able to make and the mix of taxable and exempt items sold. Setting quotas for
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tax collected would be poor public policy given such a policy’s similarity to organized
crime protection schemes. The agent’s duty is simple: collect the tax on all sales of
taxable items, and account for and remit the total amount of sales taxes collected on sales
of taxable goods. To ensure that the agent carries out this duty, the state must either
allocate the resources required for direct monitoring, or develop methodologies for
predicting outcomes at the single-business level for use in direct monitoring by
exception.
Third, agency theory assumes that the agent will perform well for the principal
based on incentives provided by the principal. In Florida there is a minor collection
allowance given to the sales tax collection agent for his efforts that is a small percentage
of the tax collected and is capped at $30 per month. The result of this provision is that
the agent has no incentive at all. In fact, the payment of the collection allowance may be
counterproductive and contribute an inducement to skim. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
found that adding compensation for an activity that has a motivation of its own, such as a
sense of duty to the community, may replace and reduce the intrinsic motivation
associated with the activity. In experiments designed to test this hypothesis, they found
that where money was offered, higher monetary rewards resulted in greater efforts, but
that overall, subjects offered monetary rewards did not perform as well as those offered
no reward. They did acknowledge that subjects paid a small fixed amount regardless of
performance did not show a reduction in intrinsic motivation, which suggests the use of a
collection allowance may do no harm, but it is certain that the collection allowance does
not provide an incentive to the agent to do a better job. Additionally, Miller and
Whitford (2006) point out that incentives large enough to induce an appropriate level of
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effort in the agent are prohibitively expensive for public agencies, who rely more on
coercive monitoring and sanctions.
Fourth, agency theory presumes that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is
risk averse, which speaks to a dynamic that does not exist in the sales tax principal-agent
relationship. The risk presumptions of agency theory assume the agent is being
incentivized under the contract in a manner that takes into account the fact that the risk of
failure in the subject matter of the contract is borne by the principal, who has a wide
enough portfolio to absorb the risk of failure. In the sales tax collection contract, the
agent has no incentive at all, other than possibly the incentive to steal as much tax money
as possible. The agent bears no risk from subpar sales tax collections and only
encounters risk in any form if the agent decides to steal tax monies. That risk, of course,
is the risk of civil or criminal sanctions. The principal is not risk neutral because,
especially in Florida, the sales tax collection process is the life blood of the state. The
state has few other sources that are capable of replacing lost sales tax revenue.
Finally, the premise that information is a commodity where all information can be
known and purchased is simply unrealistic in the sales tax collection principal-agent
contract since the state must deal with nearly a million separate retail establishments.
The cost of acquiring the level of information required to effectively monitor every agent
would be cost prohibitive as is indicated by the reliance of tax agencies on audit regimens
rather than contract management activities to enforce compliance.
These problems might be interpreted to mean that agency theory is only
contingently valid in the case of the sales tax collection principal-agent relationship, and
it is apparent that major presumptions of the theory are, indeed, invalid in this
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relationship. But agency theory is instructive nonetheless in that agency theory will
predict very poor results for the state as principal for the reasons discussed above.
Indeed, an analysis of the state’s position in the sales tax collection principalagent relationship using agency theory provides ample reasons why compliance is
significantly lower with respect to retail consumption taxes versus income taxes, where
third-party verification removes the opportunity to evade with respect to a large portion
of taxable income. Agency theory is designed to assist the principal in the design of
contracts that control adverse selection and moral hazard, but in the instant case, it is
impossible for the principal to follow that guidance. Agency theory provides the warning
that in the sales tax collection process, the agency must find alternative means to monitor
and enforce compliance because standard methods of controlling adverse selection and
moral hazard will be of little use.
The Principal Agent Model (PAM) has been criticized because of its implicit
assumption that the agent is dishonest, but this assumption contributes to the theory’s
power to predict poor results for the principal when the principal’s control over agent
dishonesty is not perfected (Bohren, 1998). It is difficult to acknowledge that so many
people will choose to evade or steal tax monies when faced with the opportunity to do so,
but the research on evasion presented in this chapter continually points to the fact that
this is so regardless of the theory or determinant of evasion under study. The corporate
world takes a more realistic view of opportunistic crime and commits vast sums of money
each year on internal controls, corporate security, employee screening, and outside
consultants in an attempt to control employee theft or embezzlement. In spite of these
efforts U. S. organizations still lose almost five percent of their revenues to fraud, an
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estimated $652 billion in 2006 (Ramamoorti, 2007). In the private sector it is deemed
reasonable to assume that many will choose to steal and to be forthright in accepting that
premise and take steps to minimize the damage from theft. For unknown reasons we
expect our citizens, who are the same individuals corporations pay to protect against, to
be much more ethical and honest in their dealings with the government. In government,
we audit less than one percent of accounts each year for compliance, and at the state
level, audit activity is so low that it is almost nonexistent. How can government agencies
assume that fraud will not occur? In an environment where there are no third-party
controls to help enforce remittance of sales taxes collected, how can we assume that theft
will not be rampant? It is my hypothesis that we cannot.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY
The theoretical framework for this study of sales tax evasion has been derived
from Cressey’s fraud triangle and the theory of planned behavior, a blending of
components to form a complete model of the sales tax evasion process. The fraud
triangle provides the overall structure of the theft process while the theory of planned
behavior provides the understanding of the specific decision to steal sales tax funds in a
given month, and perhaps the decision not to steal in another. The fraud triangle is
particularly robust with respect to understanding sales tax theft because of the similarities
between sales tax theft and embezzlement. Under the fraud triangle, sales tax theft by an
agent of the state will exhibit three characteristics:
1. The individual or business committing sales tax evasion/theft will have access to
the funds of the state. This is a physical truth with respect to sales tax since the
agent collects the tax from the taxpayer as an agent of the state. Further, there is
no third-party verification of the tax funds collected, so the state must rely on the
honesty of the agent to remit the correct amount of sales tax collected 7.
2. The individual or business will have a financial incentive to retain the state’s
funds and conceal the theft by underreporting their revenues and the amount of

7

Third-party data can be obtained for use in verifying amounts reported as sales for sales tax purposes, but
such records are obtained only if a taxpayer is selected for audit or investigation. These records, such as
merchant account credit card sales data or purchases of items for resale from vendors, are not available
unless requested or subpoenaed with respect to a particular taxpayer. Additionally, after such request or
subpoena results in the production of such records, the process of compiling these voluminous records and
comparing the results to reported data is extremely time consuming and can be carried out for only a small
percentage of taxpayers. Contrast this with the 100 percent availability of a Form W-2 for every employee
in the nation resulting in an ability to match data 100 percent without the need for a records request,
subpoena, or labor-intensive compilations of data.
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sales tax collected. The financial incentive may be a financial strain such as
needing money to pay bills, or it may be a social strain, such as needing more
money to retain or improve social status, or as Cressey describes it, status-seeking
or status-maintaining activities (Cressey, 1953).
3. The individual or business will have a rationalization or justification for retaining
the sales tax and filing fraudulent returns to conceal the theft. Rationalizations
will generally be internal, designed to deflect guilt, but may be voiced if the
perpetrator is caught. For example, a business may rationalize the theft with the
reasoning that it serves society for the business to remain open because it employs
others or provides a valuable service, and if it did not retain the sales tax funds it
would no longer be in business and society would suffer.
While the fraud triangle offers a framework for understanding sales tax theft, it
does not immediately recommend a solution to fraud other than cutting off unrestricted
access to funds, which is impossible in the sales tax principal-agent relationship. The
theory of planned behavior works in complementary fashion with Cressey’s fraud
triangle. The fraud triangle describes the characteristics most universally associated with
theft or embezzlement. The theory of planned behavior addresses an individual’s
intention to engage in a particular behavior, in this case theft, through three independent
determinants of intention: attitude, social norms, and perception of behavioral control
(Ajzen, 1991). The fraud triangle charts the beginning of the process by providing a
“need” element not addressed by the theory of planned behavior. From that point, the
theory of planned behavior’s perception of behavioral control aligns with and strengthens
the understanding of the fraud triangle’s access to funds leg; and the theory of planned
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behavior’s subjective norms and attitude components helps to illuminate the decision
process and provide additional explanatory power to the fraud triangle’s rationalization
leg.
The “need” function in the fraud triangle is an important component not
specifically addressed by the theory of planned behavior, where need might be assumed,
but is not explicitly provided. A need can cause an otherwise honest and ethical person
to steal available funds, and can increase the likelihood of “borrowing” funds to cover
near term shortages. Sales taxes are collected monthly and remitted in the following
month. When sales taxes collected become due, other liabilities may be more pressing,
such as a mortgage payment, or payments to a vendor who is a major supplier to the
business, or payroll. Since sales tax liabilities are reported on the honor system, amounts
due to vendors and employees are much more difficult to avoid. A missed payroll means
employees may walk out. A missed vendor payment may mean lost access to products to
sell. A missed mortgage or rent payment, and the business premises may no longer be
available. Furthermore, these results occur quickly. If the business underpays the sales
tax liability it is highly probable that no one will notice since the audit rate is extremely
low. Therefore, if funds are short, the sales tax is more likely to remain unremitted, or
under-remitted, than other payments. B. F. Skinner (1953) would assert that this is an
example of the theory of operant conditioning. The dire consequences of missing
payroll, vendor, rent/mortgage payments and other expenses absolutely necessary to
continued business operations condition the business owner to pay those expenses above
all others. Likewise, the lack of consequences for underpayment of sales tax liabilities
emboldens the business owner to continue that behavior when necessary. However, it is
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important to remember that “need” can mean many different things to different people.
Need does not always mean deciding which bills not to pay, because some evaders have
sufficient funds to pay them all. Need also arises from a desire to further improve one’s
lifestyle or social standing or, in some cases, just to increase profitability or horde money.
Many scholars have studied and written about the factors that influence tax
evasion as discussed in Chapter 2. Many of the social and psychological factors
identified, such as grievances against the government, for example, represent
rationalizations in the fraud triangle and subjective norms and attitudes in the theory of
planned behavior. There have always been ethical arguments in favor of tax evasion,
from the extreme of “all government is illegitimate” to a milder view that evasion may or
may not be ethical depending on the circumstances. For example, if government lies to
the people, government has breached its contract with the people and the people no
longer have the obligation to tell the truth to the government (McGee, 2006). Therefore,
even generally honest people can find a rationalization for tax fraud or be negatively
affected by subjective norms that subtly inform their attitudes toward evasion.
Some researchers have chosen to explicitly declare an additional component to
the theory of planned behavior to account for ethics or moral obligation. Attitude and
social norms probably can be conceived to include these determinants and this study
assumes they do. Additionally, the rationalization leg of the fraud triangle represents
consideration of an ethical or moral response to the issue, albeit a response to justify a
departure from ethical or moral behavior. On the basis of the preceding analysis, the
guiding theory for my study becomes the theory of planned behavior incorporated into
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the framework of Cressey’s fraud triangle (See Figure 3.1). In this model, an agent of the
state who chooses to steal state funds can be characterized as follows:
1. The agent develops an intention to retain state funds collected from taxpayers
based on need.
2.

The attitudes of the agent related to retaining state funds are favorable because of
experience, views of government, perceptions of tax inequities, and other factors
that have been empirically shown to influence tax evasion behaviors. Ethical and
moral considerations are part of the agent’s attitude toward evasion and are
countered by rationalization that helps reduce tension and enable the act of theft.

3. The agent is under no pressure from social norms to avoid the illegal behavior. It
is likely that members of his peer group, particularly those in the same industry,
are also engaged in the illegal conversion of state funds. In some industries,
members share information on how best to cover their theft of sales tax. Some
accountants actively train businesses in the finer points of avoiding detection.
These factors, too, have been empirically shown to impact tax evasion.
4. The agent perceives that he or she has the opportunity and resources necessary to
successfully convert state funds to their use without discovery, i.e., they have
behavioral control over the decision to retain state funds. They may have
operated for years without interventions by the state; may have been successfully
involved in sales tax theft for many years; and/or may have knowledge of others
who are successfully engaging in sales tax theft. They perceive that they
understand how to report and remit taxes in such a way as to “fly under the radar”
and avoid detection.
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Figure 3.1 Sales Tax Theft Model
Access to
Funds

Perceived
Behavioral
Control
Decision
to Steal

Need / Financial
Pressure

Rationalization

Subjective
Norms
Attitude

Cressey’s Fraud Triangle

Theory of Planned Behavior

The model depicted in Figure 3.1 has the advantage of incorporating much of the
existing research on the drivers of tax evasion into a decision model that comports with a
well-accepted framework for understanding fraud found in Cressey’s Fraud Triangle.
When considering this model it becomes obvious that the access to funds, as viewed
through the agent’s perception of behavioral control, should be the primary target of
enforcement efforts. While the business collecting the sales tax as an agent of the state
does, in fact, have physical access to the funds, enforcement operations must be designed
to cause the subject to perceive that behavioral control does not include the ability to
retain those funds for their own use without discovery. Social norms and attitude can
also be important targets of enforcement efforts because they not only help in explaining
why a taxpayer might decide to steal tax funds and justify doing so, but can be targeted
by taxpayer education initiatives that might help mold the attitudes and impact social
norms in a more positive manner. Such education efforts should be a component of even
the more punitive enforcement actions. This model responds to Alm’s (1991) call for
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broader, theory-based approaches to the problem of tax evasion and compacts the too
numerous identified drivers of evasion activity into the components of attitude and
subjective norms.
The present study is not modeled after the deterrence model, but the explanatory
power of that model cannot be dismissed. A greatly increased probability of detection of
evasion is an important element in the effectiveness of deterrence policy, and of great use
in impacting the subject’s perception of behavioral control. Deterrence activities and
schemes thus become a tool for use in managing the subject’s perception of behavioral
control and his or her choice to evade. Ben-Akiva, et. al. (1999) assert that choice
behavior can be thought of as a decision process that is influenced by perceptions and
beliefs and by emotional state, psychological tendencies, goals, and preferences.
Compliance enforcement interventions must impact this decision process to be effective
in reducing tax evasion. The present study shows that increasing taxpayer awareness of
the certainty of detection, or alternatively increasing the perception that the probability of
getting caught is high even when it is not, is a proper approach to compliance
enforcement. Since deterrence activities are always limited by available resources, such
activities should be highly visible and designed to appear as though the state has far more
resources allocated than are actually available. The present study posits that one of the
better ways to impact the subject’s perception of behavioral control is the utilization of
business intelligence by experienced enforcement personnel to strategically identify
potential enforcement targets, and then increase contacts with those targets and require
justification for identified weaknesses in reporting or explanations related to indicators of
fraud. The increased contact also allows the agent to address attitudes and social norms
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by using the enforcement process as an opportunity to teach and influence. This yields
two hypotheses which can be stated in the alternative form as:
H1: The effectiveness of compliance enforcement efforts will be improved if
active, well-informed enforcement activities characterized by substantial contact
initiated by the agents of the state are substituted for passive or reactive activities.
H2: Agent intuition applied to intelligence data yields effective identification of
candidates for targeted enforcement efforts beyond audits and general collection
activities.
Increasing compliance enforcement activities, especially in times of budget crises,
can be a costly proposition. Police and other law enforcement agencies are generally
impacted less by budget constraints than regulatory agencies. 8 To the extent other law
enforcement agencies have interests in targets identified for tax enforcement activities,
the pooling of efforts and resources can result in significant magnification of perceived
enforcement capabilities on the part of the taxing authority. This becomes the third
hypothesis which can be stated in the alternative form as:
H3: Joint investigations with other federal, state, and local agencies result in
improved enforcement outcomes, including greater restitution for the same level
of resource output.
The development of a model that aids in understanding sales tax evasion and the
identification of improvements in enforcement methodologies are both important goals
and contributions of the present study. Perhaps of more importance is the use of

8

While this premise is generally true under all conditions, it has become more so because of increased
Homeland Security funding of first-responder agencies.
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qualitative data obtained through this study to gain more insight into why people seek to
evade taxes and the characteristics shared by these people.

Sales Tax Evader Typology
Generalized theories of tax evasion, including adaptations of behavioral, decision,
and rational choice theories, are often too simplistic to adequately address what
enforcement officials encounter in the field. The quest for parsimony in the explanation
of the multi-dimensional decision to evade taxes naturally results in this flaw upon
application; a flaw that must necessarily be applicable to the theoretical framework of my
study as set forth in the previous section. It is necessary to understand that evasion is not
one-size-fits-all, and that people evade for different reasons and in different ways. Many
are noncompliant with no overt intent to evade. It is necessary to expand the theory to
understand that different tools are required to address different formulations of
noncompliant activity. To address these theoretical shortcomings, I have devised a
typology of sales tax evaders to guide the appropriate choice of enforcement measures
that is based on the results of my study, on my previous personal experience in the field,
and on communications with collectors, auditors, and investigators responsible for
compliance enforcement. An analysis of this typology provides a basis from which a
realistic evaluation of current and proposed methodologies can be based. A summary of
this sales tax evader typology is presented in Table 3.1 and is followed by a discussion of
each type of evader and the current methodologies and tools utilized with respect to each
type of evasion.
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Table 3.1 Sales Tax Evader Typology
Type
Delinquents
Incompetents

Survivors

Negligent
Evaders

Borrowers

Hardcore
Evaders

Proficient
Evaders

Subtype

Description
The most recognized type. Delinquents are the current
referent group for calculations of voluntary compliance.
Inadequate These individuals exhibit a lack of understanding of at
training
least some portion of their responsibilities for sales tax
collection and remittance.
Poor
These individuals run their business from a checkbook,
business
i.e., “if there is money in the account, I must be
skills
profitable.” They maintain no, or very poor, sales
records, resulting in poor reporting compliance and
under-remitted sales tax.
Illness of
Reporting and remitting of sales tax suffers because of
the owner the extended medical problems of the primary
responsible party.
These individuals do not want to evade, but do so to
remain competitive with other companies who are
deriving economic benefits from evasion. This group is
a victim group in reality.
Absentee
Those who trust others to manage their business but do
owners
not institute adequate internal controls to prevent theft or
evasion.
Poor
Those who allow others to use their business name,
control
licenses, and other resources for a fee, but do not
over
maintain required control over tax reporting. This group
associates essentially allows non-qualified people to operate a “subbusiness” from within their organization.
These individuals do not intend to steal, but reduce
remittance of sales tax to “tide them over” until their
financial condition improves, at which point their intent
is to make up payments in arrears.
This group has learned, through experience or
counseling, to “fly below the radar” to conceal their sales
tax theft. They conceal the theft by appearing to comply
by always filing a sales tax return and paying the reduced
tax reported. When caught, they will generally become
compliant for a time.
Similar to the hardcore group, this group makes every
effort to conceal their theft of state funds, and have
become quite proficient at eliminating all indicators of
fraud. This group is the most difficult to catch evading,
and when caught, will adjust their methods rather than
become compliant.
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Delinquents
When a business fails to file a sales tax return, or files a return and does not remit
the taxes reported with the return, they are termed delinquents, and failure to file or pay: a
delinquency. These evaders are identified easily because they are registered businesses
that are required to file periodic sales tax returns. The absence of a sales tax return, or
absence of a payment accompanying a return, is instantly flagged. This type of evader is
the most recognized and best understood, and is the only type generally considered by tax
agencies when they calculate voluntary compliance with respect to the sales tax. Agency
collections personnel are in constant contact with delinquent taxpayers until
delinquencies are resolved through proper reporting and collection of the tax due or
through the filing of tax liens to protect the interests of the state. More extreme action
may be taken when required, including revocation of the license to collect sales tax,
seizure of property to recover the tax, or referral for criminal prosecution.
Audit assessments that are not timely paid can also be considered delinquencies
and are dealt with in similar fashion.
Current enforcement methodologies are adequate for addressing this type of
evader and generally result in favorable outcomes.

Incompetents
There are several subtypes of incompetents. Some have inadequate training in
maintenance of the records required to properly report and remit sales tax, or problems in
determining what is taxable and what is exempt. Others have a far more basic problem,
with little understanding of how to operate a business and no understanding of
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bookkeeping or tax reporting. Operating their business utilizing only a checkbook, sales
records do not exist to allow adequate reporting of sales tax collected. Some suffer from
incompetence as a result of medical issues that render the primary responsible party
unable to properly account for the results of their business operations or sales tax
collected.
Sales tax evasion because of incompetency is generally discovered only when
delinquencies occur as a result of the incompetency or an audit is performed on the
business. Agency educational initiatives properly applied can counteract evasion as a
result of lack of knowledge of the sales tax rules and can, in some cases, provide enough
information to the more generally incompetent business owners to allow them to at least
maintain sales records that allow compliance with sales tax law even if they cannot
perform simple bookkeeping. The major obstacle to the success of such initiatives is that
they must be requested by the taxpayer and are generally not required as a condition of
obtaining a sales tax license.

Survivors
Survivors do not necessarily set out to evade sales taxes. They do so to compete.
A business stealing sales taxes in Florida gains a six to seven and a half percent profit
advantage over their competitors. In many low profit margin business models this
advantage results in doubling profit or better. Such increases can make it possible to
force compliant competitors out of business. Business owners do engage in intelligence
gathering and often know when these unfair situations exist and must decide whether to
compete by becoming noncompliant themselves or by taking alternative action. In other
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situations, an unfair tax advantage may not be specifically identified by the compliant
competitor, but the competition may nevertheless force the same choice. A complete
example of such a situation is offered in Chapter 4.
The preferred tool for ensuring compliance among survivors is the fair application
of the law to everyone. If it becomes impossible to fairly apply a specific statute, then it
is imperative that the statute be changed so that it can be enforced. A lack of fair
enforcement causes distortions in the market and damages the tax morale of compliant
businesses, making them more likely to be noncompliant.
Additionally, compliant businesses should be encouraged to file complaints
against businesses taking unfair advantage by retaining sales tax collections rather than
becoming noncompliant themselves. For this strategy to work, the agency must be able
to immediately take action against lawbreakers or risk further reducing tax morale and
sending a message that the agency is powerless to enforce compliance.

Negligent Evaders
Negligent evaders are typically absentee business owners that do not institute
appropriate internal controls to control sales tax theft by those hired to manage the
company. Numerous cases have been reviewed where owners found themselves facing
very large sales tax liabilities, penalties, and interest, as a result of managers operating a
side business within the structure of the owner’s enterprise. Because these additional
sales that benefitted only the manager were consummated in the name of the owner’s
business, the owner remains liable unless positive proof can be provided to implicate the
manager. In this scenario, the manager prepares a sales tax return reporting only sales the
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owner is aware of, and presents it to the owner who unknowingly signs and files a
fraudulent return.
In some cases, the owner knows of the additional business activity taking place
within the structure of the enterprise, and receives a fee or a profit share for allowing the
associate to use his or her business resources. In some cases, the owner may actually
report the sales taxes collected from the sub-business, if they are properly accounted for
by the associate. In other cases, the owner ignores that aspect of the enterprise and likely
understands that the associate is not reporting the sales tax. When caught, however, the
owner is charged with the responsibility because evidence of the additional sales and tax
collections will normally exist within his or her books and records. There was one
arrangement identified during this study where a used car dealer allowed up to 48
individuals at any one time to use his Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
dealer’s license to purchase and sell cars. The owner received $250 per car sold by these
associates. None of the sales transactions or sales tax collected by these 48 individuals
was reported.
The negligent evader is normally discovered only when an audit or criminal
investigation is undertaken. Even if the negligent evader becomes delinquent, collections
activity will generally not be sufficient to identify the additional tax due. When pressed
to file a return or provide sales and tax information, the owner will provide information
with respect to his sales only, not those of his associates, and those sales will likely be
consistent with prior filings, ending any further inquiry on the part of collectors.
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Borrowers
Borrowers do not begin with the intent to steal sales taxes collected. They are
usually confronted with severe cash flow problems that force them to make a decision
between paying the rent, making payroll, or sending in the full amount of sales taxes
collected during the previous month. They “borrow” the money from the state, mentally
pledging to repay the taxes when financial conditions improve. In rare cases the
borrower may actually repay the borrowed tax money. In most cases, if they are not
caught they will simply keep the money. In the worst cases, they learn from not getting
caught and begin “borrowing” some of the tax money every month, making the
transformation from Borrower to Hardcore.
Borrowers keep only a portion of the sales tax collected and retain a portion of the
sales tax collected only when financial pressures require. They continue to file a sales tax
return every month reporting less sales tax collected than actual for those months where
borrowing occurs, and send in a check or make an electronic payment equal to the
amount of tax they report. There are no delinquencies to raise alarms. If analysis of the
account is performed, it may be noted that sales tax collections decrease periodically,
sometimes dramatically, which might contribute to selection for audit if other indications
of potential fraud are also evident.

Hardcore Evaders
Some evaders have learned through experience or counseling that filing a return
every month, reporting a reasonable amount of tax collected, and paying that tax with a
check or electronic transfer that is not dishonored by the bank virtually guarantees that
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the business will escape scrutiny. They understand that delinquencies receive instant
attention and should be avoided. They also understand that the majority of agency
personnel are tasked with resolving delinquencies. These evaders are betting against
being selected for audit as long as the amounts they report are relatively reasonable, i.e.,
they are playing the “audit lottery.” Generally their theft is only discovered if they are
selected for audit or criminal investigation based on other indications of fraud or a
criminal complaint initiated by a third party. When caught, these evaders will likely
become compliant for a period of time but will return to evasion activities when they
perceive the agency’s attention has been turned elsewhere.

Proficient Evaders
Proficient evaders are an advanced version of the hardcore evader, but are careful
to cover every potential indication of fraud. In that respect, they are hardcore evaders
who have become very adept at sales tax theft. They understand how to use the laws to
their advantage and generally limit their exposure to misdemeanors rather than felonies
by manipulating the types of evidence available if they are caught. For example, in many
cases they will raise prices and refuse to charge sales tax, a misdemeanor, rather than
charging the sales tax and retaining it, a felony. The company receives the same amount
of money from the customer but structures the transaction to manage the risk. When
caught, proficient evaders do not become compliant; they adjust their methods and
continue to steal sales tax. Proficient evaders frequently close businesses that have been
in operation for several years and open new business entities owned by relatives,
understanding that closed corporations pose more difficult enforcement scenarios for tax
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authorities and helps to bury the audit trail. Many Proficient Evaders also operate
businesses that deal with substantial amounts of cash, and use cash to pay bills rather than
depositing cash into bank accounts that leave evidence of greater sales.

Enforcement Tools
The general enforcement tools available to state tax agencies can be summarized
as follows:
1. Collections staff who instantly address failures to file returns or failure to pay
amounts reported as due on returns received without payment.
2. Audits of companies identified via a strategic lead development operation that
utilizes data from a variety of sources to identify potential fraud and evasion.
3. Criminal investigations of companies suspected of fraud or sales tax theft derived
from referrals from collections, audit, and lead development processes, or derived
from complaints received from outside the agency.
4. Discovery operations and campaigns designed to identify companies that are not
registered with the agency for the tax obligations related to their business
operations.
Collections efforts are adequate with respect to Delinquents and many
Incompetents. Discovery operations are effective in identifying Delinquent evaders that
fail to register. However, in most cases audit and criminal investigations resources are so
limited that the chance of identifying Survivors, Negligents, Borrowers, Hardcore
Evaders, and Proficient Evaders is extremely small. This gap in enforcement coverage is
discussed more specifically in Chapter 4. The proactive methodologies introduced in the
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present study are designed to address these types of evaders. In the framework
introduced here all strategic lead development activities will be directed into targeted
industry enforcement programs. It is also recommended that a substantial portion of
audit activities be redirected from strategically developed leads to a completely random
audit process designed to identify those evaders who have been successful in eliminating
outward signs of fraudulent activities that would result in identification utilizing other
methods, primarily the Proficient evaders. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the
recommended tools for each type of evader.

Table 3.2 Enforcement Tools by Evasion Type
Evasion Type
Delinquents
Incompetents
Survivors

Negligents
Borrowers
Hardcore
Proficient

Current Tools
Collection activity;
discovery operations
Collection activity; strategic
audits
Strategic audit; criminal
investigations

Proposed Tools
Collection activity;
discovery operations
Collection activity; targeted
industry enforcement
Law changes; successful
enforcement efforts against
other types of evaders;
targeted industry
enforcement

Strategic audit; criminal
investigations
Strategic audit; criminal
investigations
Strategic audit; criminal
investigations
Strategic audit; criminal
investigations

Targeted industry
enforcement
Targeted industry
enforcement
Targeted industry
enforcement
Random audit; criminal
investigations

The goal is to find an optimal mix of enforcement methodologies that produces
the greatest gain in compliance with minimal increases in additional resources. The
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implementation of targeted industry enforcement programs accomplishes that goal.
Targeted industry enforcement programs are similar to current discovery and campaign
operations, but are planned and executed wholly at the local level by local employees,
and represent a continuous process rather than an isolated compliance exercise that may
not be repeated for several years. The employees given responsibility for a particular
industry will not approach their responsibility as a linear process of research, target
identification, and intervention, but as one of continuous research and target
identification simultaneous with engagement. The approach is one of consistent
compliance pressure on the industry utilizing a minimum amount of resources prepared
with the maximum amount of knowledge and information. The key is activity informed
by intelligence that is accurate and actionable.

Why People Evade
A large percentage of sales tax revenues are collected in spite of fairly large gaps
in compliance enforcement capabilities. There are two primary reasons for this. First,
larger companies tend to have strong internal controls that act to limit evasion activities.
Evasion would require collusion among many employees from different departments
within the organization and management would have to be convinced none would ever
break ranks. Large companies utilize expensive legal and accounting services to exploit
any loopholes or gray areas in the law, but outright evasion is rare because the potential
impact on corporate reputation would be much more expensive than any state sanctions.
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Second, as noted in the literature review, there are a substantial number of
business owners who would not evade taxes under any circumstance because of moral
and ethical considerations.
Based on my review of existing research, previous experience, review of
hundreds of case files, communications with enforcement agents in the field, and the
results of this study, it is clear that, aside from these two groups, substantial numbers of
small- to medium-sized businesses do engage in tax evasion and sales tax theft. The
evidence indicates that Survivors, Negligents, Borrowers, Hardcore, and Proficient
evaders ultimately steal sales tax collections simply because they can. In terms of the
theory of planned behavior, they steal because they perceive that they have behavioral
control in the decision process. The circumstances that lead them to the decision point
are certainly different, and many times based on some form of need. Some need the
money to survive; others to maintain a lifestyle. Regardless of the circumstances that
lead them to the decision to evade or their original intent, they would not steal if they did
not strongly believe that they can retain sales tax monies collected from their customers
without suffering consequences. They understand the criteria currently used to identify
tax cheats to varying degrees, but each type of evader understands it well enough to know
their chances of getting caught are minimal. Many also understand that getting caught is
not the end of the story; they may still be able to offer explanations that mitigate the
consequences or hide evidence to confound investigations. Under present conditions, the
risks associated with sales tax theft are acceptable and manageable, if not nearly
irrelevant.
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While perceived behavioral control is a necessary precedent to sales tax theft,
subjective norms and individual attitudes are no less important as targets for enforcement
action. There exists substantial anger toward governmental institutions, and politicians
often fan the flames for their own ends. Anger leads to rationalizations that sales tax
theft is not immoral and peer groups tend to strengthen such beliefs. There needs to be a
realization that government serves a fundamentally required function in society and that it
must be properly financed to be effective. Tax agencies must address this anger with
increased taxpayer education and more focus on less punitive measures to enforce
compliance, at least in the case of first-time evaders who are not of the Hardcore or
Proficient variety. It is my belief that an emphasis on proactive engagement with the
taxpayer contributes to changing attitudes and subjective norms. It is important that
noncompliant taxpayers are approached with an understanding and helpful attitude
throughout the enforcement process as long as the taxpayer is cooperating and making an
effort to become compliant and resolve prior obligations. My main critique of the
specific application of the deterrence model in tax enforcement is that taxpayers are
immediately subjected to harsh treatment (guilty until proven innocent) and massive
penalties with few good options available for rehabilitation. The deterrence model does
not require the immediate application of draconian punishment against offenders without
first the application of more reasoned measures, but this concept seems to have been lost
when deterrence theory was conceptually applied to taxation. Few deterrence model
economists conclude that punishment is the single best social response to crime and
instead view deterrence as only part of the model of society’s response (Palmer, 1977).
More often the not, the result of the application of the deterrence model in tax matters is

51

personal ruin. If there is an opportunity to effectively rehabilitate the taxpayer, it lies in
engagement rather than punishment. More severe penalties and punishment should be
reserved for Hardcore and Proficient evaders who resist rehabilitation. An approach
based on engagement should allow rehabilitation of nearly all Survivors, Negligents, and
Borrowers.
The targeted industry enforcement program introduced and tested in my study
provides a method of identifying evaders that escape detection under the current
enforcement paradigm and engages them in a process designed not only to bring them
into compliance with the tax laws, but to provide education and understanding of the tax
law and agency enforcement efforts that may help change attitudes and prevent
recidivism.

Importance of This Study
Existing tax evasion research is focused primarily on the income tax with
international studies related to the value-added tax a step behind. There are, in fact, few
studies that deal primarily with sales tax issues, and most of those do not address evasion.
Evasion is never addressed in any fashion differently than evasion in the case of the
income tax. One possible reason for this is an assumption that the study of tax evasion
can be equally applied to different types of taxation, and this may be true to a certain
extent, but the sales tax creates an agency relationship between government and business
that is not present in income taxes. A second reason is that a number of researchers
believe that there is less evasion with the sales tax than with the income tax even though
there are no data to support this assumption. As noted previously, evasion is three times
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more likely when there is no third-party reporting of income (Madeo, Schepanski, &
Uecker, 1987). With sales tax there is no third-party reporting; the business collecting
the tax has unrestricted access to the funds; and there is no structure or process to
guarantee proper reporting and remittance other than honesty. As a senior tax
administrator with the Department of Revenue admitted, it is estimated that up to 60
percent of small businesses in Florida engage in sales tax theft. The experiences of tax
collectors, auditors, and criminal investigators in the field bear out that estimate. The
aforementioned administrator drew an allegory to speeding: if you drive on the interstate
in Florida at the speed limit, you will be the slowest car on the road by far. Unless there
are state troopers positioned at regular intervals on the highway, everyone will speed
(Anonymous, 2006). Department of Revenue agents must be just as visible as those state
troopers on the roadway to prevent open season for sales tax theft. Sales tax evasion is
fundamentally different from income tax evasion, represents a very large portion of lost
state revenues, and deserves dedicated research.
In Florida, there has been much discussion of lowering, or even eliminating,
property taxes and compensating with an increase in the sales tax. Ignoring the
regressivity of such a proposal in an already regressive, narrow, and outdated tax
structure, it must be noted that the property tax is truly nearly evasion free. Undoubtedly
those who propose such a change do not understand the true cost of the proposal in terms
of increased sales tax theft and rate increases far in excess of those envisioned if revenue
is to remain stable.
Perhaps more importantly, at least one proposal for a national sales tax calls for
an elimination of the Internal Revenue Service under an assumption that the sales tax is
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evasion free, even though, as mentioned previously, substantive research does not exist to
support this assumption. Talk of eliminating the Internal Revenue Service is likely no
more than rhetorical “red meat for the masses” but may be a political liability if
consumption tax evasion assumptions are erroneous. Furthermore, under most economic
theories, either rational or boundedly rational, the increase in the sales tax rate to a
combined federal and state rate that exceeds 30 percent would increase the benefits
related to evasion to the point where the risk of getting caught and the penalties involved
would have to be enormous and especially serious to have any deterrence impact at all
(Tait, 1988). Mikesell (1997) also notes that considerable enforcement resources would
be required to supplement existing state administrative capacities because of the much
higher evasion rewards that would exist with a high national sales tax rate. But even
though Tait and Mikesell understand the issues with evasion as the sales tax rate rises,
they still appear to believe, as most others do, that evasion at the lower rates levied by the
American states is inconsequential. It is my hope that this study will cause researchers to
reexamine that belief and begin to question some of the assertions made by state agencies
regarding voluntary compliance rates 9.

9

Calculation of an evasion rate for sales tax is very difficult. Using the theory that large companies are
generally compliant and the estimate of 60% noncompliance to some degree on the part of most small
companies, an estimate of sales tax theft and evasion in Florida would be likely within a range of $2.1
billion to $6 billion annually (10% to 28%). The size of the range is indicative of the difficulty in
determining an appropriate cutoff between large and small companies, since the real issue is not size, but
the extent to which appropriate internal controls exist. Even at the low end of the range, 10%, the impact of
evasion greatly exceeds the popular estimates of 2% to 5% and represents $24 billion in annual sales tax
theft nationwide.
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CHAPTER 4
TAXATION IN FLORIDA
The Florida Department of Revenue
The current study reviews and analyzes tax compliance enforcement activities
within the Florida Department of Revenue (“DOR”). There are three major functional
groups called Programs within DOR: Child Support Enforcement, Property Tax
Oversight, and General Tax Administration (GTA). The GTA program is structured
functionally into the following Core Processes: Account Management, Compliance
Determination, Compliance Support, Receivables Management, Resource Management,
Return and Revenue Processing, Taxpayer Aid, and Taxpayer Services. Each Core
Process consists of Business Processes that focus on different functions. My study
focuses on specific Business Processes within the Compliance Determination and
Receivables Management Processes that relate directly to the enforcement of sales tax
laws and identification of evasion, which can be generally and simply described as, and
will be referred to throughout this study as audit, collections, and criminal investigations.
Audit includes tax enforcement campaigns and lead development. Lead development
involves the strategic analysis of data to identify taxpayers for audit. Campaigns are
likewise derived from strategic data analysis but are focused on enforcement problems
within a particular industry or with respect to a particular issue. The Collections Process
includes enforcement operations, which include the filing of liens, property seizures,
license revocations, and similar activities. A partial organization chart for the Florida
Department of Revenue is presented in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 DOR Partial Organizational Structure
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Source: Florida Department of Revenue (2010)

According to the 2006-2007 annual report (Florida Department of Revenue,
2007), GTA administers 33 taxes and fees, and more than $39 billion in taxes annually,
including almost $23 billion in sales tax. Other major taxes and annual amounts are: fuel
related taxes and fees, $3.2 billion; documentary stamp taxes $3.1 billion; corporate
income and excise tax, $2.4 billion; communications services tax, $2.4 billion; and
unemployment tax, $1 billion. Florida has no state individual income tax.
At June 30, 2008, GTA had 2,278 employees, and this number has declined
almost ten percent over the previous six-year period. The GTA program processed more
than 9.4 million returns during the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008, and issued 11,580
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Notices of Proposed Assessment worth $421 million, issued one million bills for $315
million, and issued more than 900,000 delinquency notices. Enforced tax collections
were more than $770 million and 876 criminal cases were closed resulting in 137
prosecution referrals and 286 Tax Collection Enforcement Diversion Program referrals to
State Attorney’s Offices. There were 3,679 sales and use tax audits during the fiscal year
carried out by 410 auditors resulting in an average assessment of $6,900 (General Tax
Administration, 2008).
In administering the sales tax, DOR relies on businesses that collect the tax from
their customers. The taxpayers are the individuals who purchase from the businesses that
collect the tax as agents for the State. Businesses file a Sales and Use Tax Return each
month (generally) 10 to report the amount of sales taxes collected and remitted with the
return. The return for the previous month is due on the first day of the following month
and is delinquent after the 20th day of the month following the month during which the
tax was collected. For example, sales taxes collected during May 2009 must be remitted
with a return filed by June 20, 2009. If the 20th day of the month falls on a holiday or
weekend, the due date shifts to the next business day. So continuing the example, June
20, 2009 is a Saturday, so the return and payment are due by Monday June 22, 2009.
Taxpayers are required to file and remit taxes electronically if their annual tax liability
exceeds $30,000.
Most businesses report and remit taxes on time. The percentage of unpaid taxes
at June 30, 2008 was 1.63 percent. This percentage is the outstanding receivables divided
by the total tax due as reported on returns filed plus estimated delinquent amounts and
10

Companies collecting smaller amounts of sales tax on an annual basis are allowed to file quarterly, semiannually, or annually depending on the amount of sales tax collected in the previous year.
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amounts determined through audit and discovery activities. Even though the percentage
is small, the amount exceeds $500 million. It is important to note that this figure
accounts only for self-reported sales tax that has not yet been paid, estimated
delinquencies of businesses that file late, and audit assessments that have not been paid.
Estimates are based on amounts generally reported by the business. The outstanding
receivables used in this calculation do not include an estimate of tax evaded or stolen and,
to the author’s knowledge; no such estimate is produced by DOR.
When a business does not file their return and pay the taxes on time, collections
personnel start the collection effort by contacting the delinquent taxpayer in an attempt to
bring them into compliance with the law. In some cases, the taxpayer continues to be
delinquent and may not file returns for an extended period of time. When taxes remain
outstanding and collection efforts have failed, a tax warrant (lien) will be filed at the
courthouse in the county in which the business operates, or in multiple counties if
applicable. This lien works best if the business owns real property that cannot be sold
with clear title until the lien is cleared. In those cases the buyer may insist on the lien
being paid or modifications to the purchase contract, such as reserves held in escrow for
the payment of the liability, before completing the purchase. Where the business does
not own real property, the lien can attach to personal property but, from a practical
standpoint, DOR would have to contact the buyer to inform them of the lien and potential
levy and execution of the levy on the property. In practice, however, DOR will rarely be
aware of any potential sale of personal property or the name of the potential buyer. The
DOR has the authority to seize and sell personal property to satisfy the lien, but seizing
and selling property is rarely done, except in the case of bank accounts, which are
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frequently frozen pending the levy and ultimate seizure of funds up to the amount of the
tax liability, penalties, interest, and fees.
Except when real property is involved, tax warrants are generally not much of an
incentive for delinquent filers to file and remit the taxes owed. In the fiscal year ending
June 30, 2008, only 8.67% of tax warrants filed were cleared, paid in full, or subject to a
payment agreement within 90 days of filing, and 39.52 percent were deemed
uncollectible (Florida Department of Revenue, 2008). Taxes are deemed uncollectible
when, for example, the business owing the tax has closed or declared bankruptcy and
neither the business nor the shareholders have any assets that can be levied.
Collectors have a very heavy workload. In December 2008, the Service Centers
around the state had 236,074 cases open representing more than $589 million in
receivables. In South Florida, where this study takes place, the workload is heavier than
in other areas with 68,278 cases in Miami-Dade County alone out of a total of 152,852
registered businesses. This represents a staggering 44.67 percent of all businesses in
delinquent status as opposed to an average of 20.46 percent for the rest of the state. The
result is that collectors have very little time to spend on any given delinquency since the
ratio of open delinquencies to collectors is 785 to one in Miami-Dade County.
Businesses that are chronically delinquent and show little interest in compliance
may also be subjected to a revocation hearing. If their sales tax registration is revoked,
they are essentially out of business since it is illegal to operate the business without a
certificate of registration. Revocation is used as a last resort, after virtually all other civil
collection efforts have failed. Specific guidelines exist and must be followed if a
revocation is attempted. At the revocation conference, the business may present a case
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for why their registration should not be revoked; they may enter into an agreement to
bring their business into compliance; or the result of the conference may be a
recommendation that the certificate of registration be revoked.
Collectors and their supervisors may decide to refer a particular taxpayer for audit
or for criminal investigation if the facts and circumstances warrant such a
recommendation. Audit selection is performed centrally in Tallahassee and selected
cases are assigned to the local Service Centers, so a referral for audit may or may not
result in an actual audit being performed. Criminal investigation referrals are evaluated
locally and accepted if there is probable cause that a crime has been committed. If
probable cause exists and certain other policy requirements are met, the Criminal
Investigation Process is required to open an investigation.
Auditing remains an efficient and effective means of discovering additional tax
liabilities for DOR based on the return on investment of additional budget dollars
allocated for audit. Currently, 76 percent of audits yield an assessment of additional
taxes due to the state, a fact recognized by the Florida Legislature when they approved an
additional 50 audit positions in the midst of deep cuts required to balance the fiscal 2009
budget. The problem with auditing in Florida is the same as it is at the federal level:
there are so few auditors that the percentage of audits in a given year is very low. As
noted previously, there were 3,679 sales and use tax audits in Florida during the fiscal
year ended June 30, 2008. As of December 31, 2008, there were 972,977 registered
businesses in the state. That represents an audit rate of .38 percent (.0038). While the
literature states that there are diminishing returns to additional enforcement expenditures
(see Alm, 1999 and Mikesell & Birskyte, 2006), it would appear that Florida has much
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ground to cover before experiencing diminishing returns since the audit effort would need
to almost triple to reach a one percent audit rate. The state has been doing the opposite
with the number of auditors dropping from 585 to just over 400 over the past eight years.
The decision in the current budget year to add 50 audit positions because of serious
budget shortfalls is an indication that the cost effectiveness of auditing is recognized. It
is also an indication that prior year reductions were based on ideology rather than a belief
that additional audit resources would be a poor investment.
The Criminal Investigations Process has seen a drop in resources as well, though
not as steep as the decline in audit resources because the process is smaller to begin with
(34 investigators at December 2008). In Miami-Dade County there are four investigators
with two support staff and the region’s Investigations Manager is located there. A review
of data from the Criminal Investigations Case Management System revealed that at
month end December 2009 the four investigators had 154 criminal investigations in their
case inventories. Assuming an average investigation requires 200 person hours, 11 that
case inventory represents approximately four person-years of work per investigator. An
additional 15 to 30 criminal complaints are received each month that must be evaluated
with an average of 14 of them qualifying for investigation. Even though the statute of
limitations for sales tax theft is five years rather than the normal statute for civil
enforcement of three years, these data mean there are legitimate criminal investigations
that simply cannot be carried out within the statute of limitations period given current
resource levels and current policies.

11

In addition to cases averaging 200 investigative hours, investigators in Miami-Dade County are
frequently involved in larger cases requiring 2,000 hours or more that span fiscal years.
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Technology
Resource limitations at all levels cause the DOR management team to be very
interested in efficiency improvements, and particularly improvement spurred by
technology. The implementation of SUNTAX (System for Unified Taxation) was begun
by DOR in 2001 to replace the various antiquated mainframe programs accessed through
DOS- or UNIX-based client systems in use at that time. The SUNTAX system is now
integrated with web-enabled applications that allow taxpayers to register, file reports, and
pay tax bills online. Additionally, electronic data interchange (EDI) and electronic funds
transfer (EFT) capabilities are integrated that allow the Department to support electronic
filing requirements mandated by the legislature. For employees, rather than consulting a
separate computer program, with a separate login, for each tax administered by DOR,
SUNTAX allows a DOR employee to review all taxes to which a business is obligated
from one system, and receive a status overview of all the taxes on a single screen.
The Department has expanded the SUNTAX system to include the use of MySAP
Customer Relationship Management in the call center and SAP Business Intelligence
technology to identify gaps in compliance patterns across industries and regions. This
data-warehousing technology has now been expanded to provide management staff with
real time data reporting capability that enhances the management of day-to-day
operations. As a result of this technology integration and reengineered administrative
procedures, GTA has saved more than $96 million in cumulative budget allocations
during the past five years. It is further estimated that SUNTAX has produced $848
million in increased revenue as a result of efficiency gains, improved audit and discovery
leads, and identification of unregistered taxpayers (Florida Department of Revenue,
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2007). During the first six months after the data warehouse was brought online, DOR
recovered more than $30 million in unpaid taxes from unregistered commercial rental
properties with a continuing impact of $10 million per year.
The SUNTAX system is currently the nation’s largest (in terms of dollars
administered and the range of taxes involved) integrated tax-administration system based
on enterprise resource planning software and was featured in an article published in
eWeek Magazine (Chen, 2005). According to the article, the Department has hosted
representatives from other states and 24 foreign governments who look to the Florida
system as a model for their own technology efforts.

Business Strategies
The DOR has invested heavily not only in technology, but in the development of
strategic initiatives and the restructuring of the organization along business process lines.
Each strategic initiative is decomposed into specific goals and tasks. Each initiative is
assigned to a team given the responsibility of evaluating the tasks required to accomplish
strategic goals and to constantly monitor DOR’s progress toward achievement of these
goals. The strategic planning process is continual and fluid, with goals and objectives
being updated as conditions dictate.
Performance accountability measures are monitored on a monthly basis and the
annual results are shared with the legislature as part of DOR’s negotiations for positions
and funding. Performance accountability measures are coupled with quarterly strategic
planning sessions to continuously evaluate organizational performance and develop
strategies needed to achieve organization goals. The accountability process provides
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DOR’s leaders with information that is used to deploy resources effectively and
efficiently, and to select key strategic initiatives to make significant improvements to
processes and performance.
The department has initiated a comprehensive leadership development system
designed to recruit and hire talented people, train all managers in proven management
techniques, provide cutting-edge feedback and evaluation tools, and make management
decisions based on facts and organizational performance data. Feedback and evaluation
is provided using 360-degree feedback surveys for supervisory employees, climate
surveys to monitor employee beliefs and opinions regarding DOR, and Employee
Evaluation and Development Plans (EE&Ds).
Most DOR employees will tell you that their work is meaningful and satisfying.
In the 2009 Climate Survey, almost 79 percent of employees stated they were proud to
work for DOR, 77 percent were satisfied with their job, and more than 93 percent stated
that their job was important to the success of DOR.
As in any successful organization, the people of DOR are one of its most
important strengths. Its management team is sophisticated and technically capable
measured in terms of the interest in DOR’s quality programs on the part of other states
and foreign countries and the awards garnered by the agency they manage. Management
has developed and nurtured an excellent relationship and reputation with the Governor,
the Cabinet, and the legislature over the last 20 years indicating the management team is
politically savvy as well. The DOR won a Sterling Award in 1998 and used the Baldrige
Criteria for Performance Excellence as the basis for development of DOR’s vision,
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mission and core values statements, in the development of DOR strategic initiatives, and
the restructuring of business processes within the organization.
As a group, the employees of DOR are dedicated to DOR’s mission, vision and
values, and are well-matched to the positions they fill. World-class technology and
management accomplish little without the willing and committed participation of
employees who understand the tasks assigned to them, have the training and abilities to
perform efficiently and effectively, and believe in the goals and objectives enumerated by
management.

The Compliance Enforcement Environment
The DOR is well organized and generally well-positioned to function as a truly
world-class tax administration organization. But for all the technological advantage and
human capital available to DOR, the probabilities are solidly stacked against DOR when
it comes to stopping tax evasion and sales tax theft for one simple reason: the system is
built on trust and has too few verification tools built in.
As noted in the discussion of theory, it is vital to understand that the sales tax
functions differently from the income tax. The business remitting sales tax to DOR is not
a taxpayer: it is an agent of the state in a principal-agent relationship. There are no thirdparties involved to supply information to DOR that could be used to verify the amounts
of sales tax reported and remitted to DOR on any given monthly return. The DOR must
rely on the filing business to honestly report and remit the tax. As long as a business
does not become delinquent, they are generally left alone except for the .38 percent that is
audited each year. Many business owners understand that if they file a return every
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month, on time, and pay the sales tax they report, they are unlikely to ever receive a call
or notice from DOR. In 2005, DOR prosecuted an accountant who facilitated a $2.3
million sales tax theft by a used car dealer. As part of his plea agreement the accountant
spoke with members of the DOR Criminal Investigations Process frequently and admitted
that he advised his clients to pay whatever they wanted to pay each month, but warned
them to file on time and make sure the check did not bounce (the Hardcore Evaders in my
typology). Criminal investigators have documented this same pattern on numerous
occasions in investigations covering many different types of businesses. Small business
owners and the accountants and bookkeepers who serve them are intimately familiar with
the concept and benefits of “flying below the radar.”
Accountants and tax preparers who coach their clients on how to evade taxes is
not a problem isolated to Florida. In late 2007, the Criminal Investigations Division of
the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance launched an initiative to
determine to what extent tax professionals assisted their clients in the commission of tax
fraud. Investigators were sent undercover posing as taxpayers who hired more than 170
tax preparers to prepare income or sales tax returns. The result was that 31 percent of the
preparers, including some licensed Certified Public Accountants, engaged openly in fraud
by coaching their new “clients” on how to evade state and federal taxes. Suggestions
ranged from maintaining two sets of books to not keeping records of all cash receipts and
skimming those proceeds not recorded. Part of the solution in New York will be a push
to regulate all tax preparers and enact standards of conduct and continuing professional
education requirements for all tax preparers (Commiskey, 2010). In a similar initiative to
combat tax fraud perpetrated by tax preparers at the federal level, the Internal Revenue

66

Service has just announced their intention to expand preparer regulation to those tax
preparers who are not currently regulated (Internal Revenue Service, 2010).
In some cases the boldness of the evader is striking. In a detailed review of more
than one thousand registered businesses, a significant number of them were found
reporting exactly the same amount of sales tax collected every month, which is virtually
impossible in a retail environment where customer purchasing patterns and customer mix
are random. Numerous convenience stores were found reporting varying amounts of
gross sales each month, but the exact same percentage of exempt sales every month
carried to two decimal places. These examples are frequently noted and identified by
those within DOR who develop audit and investigation leads, but the vast majority of the
resources available to DOR are targeting delinquencies rather than analyzing reporting
patterns that might indicate fraud.
It is my opinion that this problem is caused by the mindset that equates sales tax
enforcement to income tax enforcement. Sales tax enforcement operations are
administered and structured in the same manner as income tax compliance systems. The
same trust placed in voluntary income tax reporting is erroneously granted in the setting
of the sales tax, even though the sales tax does not enjoy the same reporting verification
that exists, primarily through use of Forms W-2 and 1099, in an income tax system.
Sales tax enforcement bears more resemblance to a contract management function than to
income tax enforcement. Contract management-type enforcement efforts would mean
more departmental contact with non-delinquent business filers and much more attention
paid to the indicators and evidence of fraudulent reporting gleaned from intelligencegathering operations. Such a replacement of reactive responses to perceived
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noncompliance with proactive action would represent a sea change in how DOR and
other state revenue agencies approach enforcement. The questions become whether such
a change would be effective and, considering the current state of the budget, how could
such a change actually be effected?
It is my opinion that the needed approach is relatively inexpensive in that it pays
for itself and does not require the addition of a large number of personnel. Rather, it
requires a change in focus to recognize and account for the boundaries of the sales tax
gap. With respect to Florida, the change in focus takes the form of an expansion and
modification of programs already in place that rely on the expertise and experience of the
agency’s employees supplemented by available technology.

Knowledge-Based Enforcement
Teaching its managers to use knowledge effectively in the performance of their
assigned duties and to share that knowledge with their assigned personnel is an important
priority for DOR. All managers are required to engage in formal Knowledge Based
Learning (KBL) projects. I had the opportunity to assist in the KBL project carried out
by the Investigations Manager of the Southern Region. The results of this study are
illustrative of how field expertise can be applied to a problem to develop potential
solutions. It is also an example of the difficulties involved in measuring compliance and
how widespread noncompliance can be.
On the basis of an increasing number of business owner complaints, it became
apparent that the sale of telephone calling cards represented a problem with respect to
collection of the sales tax. Business owners complained that none of their competitors
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were charging tax on the sale of the calling cards. As a result, customers were refusing to
buy the cards from these compliant businesses, accusing them of attempting to “rip them
off” since “no one else charged tax” on the cards. It appeared that customers had become
convinced that calling cards were nontaxable. A review of numerous investigation files
confirmed that failure to collect tax on the cards was common.
On its face, it might appear that calling cards might represent an immaterial
amount of tax revenue to the state. It is true that many stores sell only $100 to $200
worth of cards per month. However, DOR identified many thousands of stores statewide
that were likely to sell the cards. Additionally, some stores sell a large quantity of cards.
South Florida in particular is home to many people of foreign nationality who frequently
call relatives outside the country, and rely on telephone calling cards to do so at
discounted rates. There are also smaller stores that have developed a solid business by
relying on sales of calling cards to the crews of cruise ships at ports throughout the state.
In an attempt to arrive at an estimate of phone card sales in South Florida,
investigations personnel obtained the sales records for several major wholesalers in the
area and sales were traced to their customers. Many of the customers were wholesalers
themselves. The total wholesale cost of telephone calling cards sold in 2005 identified
through this process was $323,425,517, with a retail value of $404,281,896. Not all sales
of telephone calling cards in South Florida were identified through this process since the
study focused on only a few wholesalers, but it did provide some perspective on the
scope of the potential problem. The sales tax on these sales would be $24,256,913.76 for
the year 2005. The project was not conceptualized as a scientific endeavor with a
representative sample of wholesale dealers for generalization of the results, but rather a
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selection of some of the larger independent dealers to arrive at a reasonable estimate
based on volume. On its face, the amount of sales tax represented by the sales reviewed
during this study is significant.
To estimate compliance, a representative sample of businesses was selected
from those in Miami-Dade County that sell calling cards, concentrating on grocery stores,
convenience stores, and gas stations with convenience stores. Investigators were
dispatched to each location in the sample to answer two key questions:
1. Does the store sell prepaid calling cards?
2. If so, does the store collect sales tax on the sale of prepaid calling cards?
Investigators visited each store in the sample and purchased a telephone calling
card from each store that sold them, obtaining 127 usable responses after eliminating
businesses that had closed and those with invalid addresses. The overall confidence
interval for the sample results was +/- 8.41 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.
The actual confidence interval related to a specific response varies based on how skewed
the response level is and is noted in the results below. The overall results of the survey
were as follows:

Table 4.1 Prepaid Calling Card Sales Including Chain Stores
Percentage of businesses selling prepaid calling cards a

85.0

Percentage of businesses collecting tax on prepaid calling cards b

20.4

Percentage of businesses that were part of major store chains

12.6

a Confidence interval +/- 6.00 percent
b Confidence interval +/- 6.77 percent
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All of the major chain stores collected sales tax on prepaid calling cards. The
estimation of the total sales of calling cards in South Florida was based on wholesalers
who did not sell to major chain stores. Therefore, a separate analysis was performed on
the responses of those stores that are not part of a major chain. There were 111 valid
responses from stores not part of a major chain. The overall confidence interval for this
group is +/- 9.03 percent at the 95 percent confidence level. Again, the actual confidence
interval related to a specific response varies based on how skewed the responses were and
is presented below. The results of this analysis are as follows:

Table 4.2 Prepaid Calling Card Sales Excluding Chain Stores
Percentage of businesses selling prepaid calling cards a

82.9

Percentage of businesses collecting tax on prepaid calling cards b

6.5

a Confidence interval +/- 6.80 percent
b Confidence interval +/- 4.45 percent

The preliminary conclusions of the study were that major chain stores are
properly collecting sales tax on the sale of prepaid telephone calling cards, and only a
small percentage of independent stores are collecting tax on the sale of prepaid telephone
calling cards.
When these results were combined with the estimate of the retail sales value of
prepaid telephone calling cards sold in Miami-Dade County by the wholesalers reviewed,
the study concluded that only $1,576,699 of $24,256,913.76 of potential annual sales tax
on prepaid telephone calling cards sold in Miami-Dade County is being collected. It was
conservatively inferred that total sales tax lost statewide on an annual basis is
approaching the $80 million to $90 million range.
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The next step in the project was to evaluate potential responses to the problem
identified. Florida Statutes Section 212.05(1)(e)(1)(a) makes it clear that prepaid calling
arrangements, including recharge of a prepaid calling arrangement, is taxable at a rate of
six percent. There are no gray areas, planning opportunities, or legal challenges related
to this statute, yet it is routinely ignored by a large majority of businesses to which it
applies. When confronted with the illegality of not charging the sales tax on prepaid
calling cards, many business owners decided not to sell them at all, citing the fact that if
they charge the tax, they will not make the sale. Businesses that have complained to
DOR cite that not collecting the sales tax gives their competitors an unfair advantage over
businesses that prefer to obey the law, and that is precisely what makes this situation so
serious. When businesses begin competing by not collecting the tax to gain a pricing
advantage and are not penalized for doing so, subsidizing their profit margins by keeping
a portion of the taxes they do collect becomes attractive. The state loses credibility when
it cannot enforce the law, so corrective action is critical, but what options are available?
Some business owners decided to sell the calling cards and pay the taxes
themselves. However, Florida Statutes 212.07(2) and (4) require the tax be added to the
purchase price and prohibits the dealer from holding out to the public, in any manner, that
the dealer will absorb or pay the sales tax. While it may be admirable that certain dealers
are honest enough to pay the tax themselves, it is poor public policy to count on dealers
to break one law in order to comply with another.
In certain cases where it is not practicable for a dealer to add the amount of tax to
the purchase amount, DOR is granted the authority by Florida Statutes 213.07(2) to
establish an effective tax rate for that industry. Common examples are alcoholic drinks
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sold in a bar or goods sold through vending machines. Rather than calculate the tax and
add it to the selling price, an effective tax rate is applied to the sale to determine the
amount of tax collected that must be remitted. While this could be an option for the
prepaid calling card industry, it would require adjustment of the cost and profit structure
within the industry, and would probably result in either the tax being absorbed, which is
against the law, or the tax being avoided by not reporting the sales, which is common
under current law.
The legislature could decide to make prepaid calling cards exempt from tax. This
would effectively forfeit the state’s claim to the $80 million to $90 million in additional
revenue that would result from these sales. Given that more than 60 percent of the dollar
amount of transactions in Florida is already exempted from tax, with the amount
exempted increasing annually, (Florida Department of Revenue, 2010) it could be argued
that the state needs fewer exemptions, not more. However, it may be better to forgo the
additional revenue than to maintain a law that cannot be enforced for reasons already
discussed.
A logical question at this point is: why not just enforce the law? The answer is
simple: the cost will exceed the benefit. In determining the estimated sales tax revenue
from prepaid calling card sales, only data from convenience stores, gas stations, and
independent grocery stores were used. There were approximately 16,000 of these in the
state at the time the data were gathered. But prepaid calling cards are sometimes sold in
beauty salons, drug stores, dollar stores, restaurants, coffee shops, and many other types
of general retail stores. This expands the number of businesses that sell the cards to
more than 100,000. It is not possible to tell if a business is reporting their calling card
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sales by reviewing their Sales and Use Tax Return. The return contains no detail. The
only way to know, and therefore to enforce, the collection of tax on the sale of the cards
is to audit the business or otherwise obtain records in a criminal investigation. Either
solution is costly and would require personnel expansions that could not be justified from
increased calling card tax revenues alone. Recall that DOR’s 410 auditors carried out
3,679 audits in 2008. Resources simply do not allow auditing these 100,000 businesses
to make sure they are collecting the tax on calling cards.
It has been hypothesized that a better approach to the problem might be obtaining
the records of the wholesalers and tracking those sales to the retail stores to make sure the
sales are reported. But many of a particular wholesaler’s customers are also wholesalers,
who sell to other wholesalers. Once transactions are traced through the wholesale chain
to the ultimate retail dealer, the lack of detail on the Sales and Use Tax Returns submitted
by the retail dealers makes it impossible to determine if the sales of the calling cards are
actually included. For example, assume you trace the sales records from a wholesaler to
a retailer and determine that the retailer purchased $200 worth of calling cards for resale
during the month. The retailer is a convenience store and also sells beer, cigarettes, soda,
snack foods, and household items. The retailer reports $70,000 in sales for the month.
How do you determine if the $200 of calling cards is included in the $70,000 of sales
reported? You cannot without auditing or otherwise reviewing the retailer’s sales
documentation to determine what is included in the $70,000 reported. Unfortunately the
card sales are individually immaterial but have cumulative potential for large revenue
losses.
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While tracing the sales from wholesaler to retailer to the sales tax return will not
solve the problem, an approach at the wholesale level may still be the answer. Years ago
Florida had similar compliance problems with fuel taxes on the sales of gasoline. The
state solved this problem in 1996, as many other states have done, by beginning to collect
all taxes on fuel “at the rack.” In other words, when delivery tanker trucks bring the
gasoline to the retail gas station, the tax has already been paid. The dealer has no returns
to file to report fuel taxes and does not need to collect the taxes from their customers
since they are included in the price of a gallon of gasoline. The same could be done with
respect to prepaid calling cards. If the tax is collected at the wholesale level for all
calling cards distributed or recharged within Florida, the state gets its sales tax revenues
and the retailers no longer have an issue with unfair competition. Auditing becomes
easier because there are now only a few larger wholesale businesses collecting the tax
rather than tens of thousands of smaller retail businesses.
By utilizing the expertise of employees, as in this example, and channeling that
expertise into a targeted focus on the tax enforcement gap that exists between “chasing
delinquencies” and full audits and investigations, the gap can be attacked using
intelligence-gathering techniques and existing enforcement tools to identify issues and
problems and determine the appropriate enforcement approach to use. Employees of
DOR have exhibited the ability to successfully engage in this type of activity. Employees
participate in discovery operations and campaigns that function in a similar manner, an
example of which is the aforementioned commercial rental project that produced $30
million in new tax revenue from unregistered landlords. In order to expand these
operations sufficiently to attack the tax gap, DOR must reallocate time and resources, but

75

it is unlikely that large numbers of additional employees or enforcement infrastructure
expenditures will be required. Employees already have access to a wide array of
intelligence tools and enforcement mechanisms and some have the expertise and
experience required to perform the extended functions. The task is not one of expanding
the bureaucracy, but one of re-tasking a portion of the existing enforcement capabilities
of the Department to an expanded role for discovery and campaign-type operations at the
local level and changing their character from one-time compliance efforts to continuous
enforcement.
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary hypothesis in this study is that the effectiveness of compliance
enforcement efforts will be improved if active, well-informed enforcement activities,
characterized by substantial contact initiated by agents of the state, are substituted for
passive or reactive activities. This hypothesis recognizes the very large gap in
compliance that exists in the current enforcement regime as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The
bulk of enforcement activities are reactive in nature: a business fails to file a return and
receives a contact from a collector. Proactive discovery operations, audits, and criminal
investigations constitute a minute percentage of enforcement efforts. As a result, the
compliance gap has the potential to be enormous with more than 99 percent of all
businesses in the category of trust without verification.
Figure 5.1 Focus of Sales Tax Enforcement Efforts in Florida
Collections & other
non-verification
activities – 80% of
personnel

THE GAP
TRUST WITHOUT
VERIFICATION

Audit & Criminal
Investigations – 20%
of compliance
personnel

968,422 businesses out of
972,977 – 99.53%
Delinquencies $500 million/yr
– Discovery $50 Million/yr

Estimated 60% of small
businesses noncompliant to
some extent
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.38% of
businesses
audited, .08%
investigated

The methodology employed in this study involves a preliminary study of the
current enforcement regime in Florida, which was presented in Chapter 4; followed by an
analysis of two enforcement tools that the author believes are critical to the success of the
design; and finally the conduct of a quasi-experimental project applying the tools and
concepts of discovery operations to a targeted industry enforcement program. The
proposed enforcement design is summarized in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Proposed Enforcement Design for Closing the Tax Gap
Other
Agencies

Public
Data

Task Force
Operations
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Referral

DOR
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Industry
Evaluation

Industry
Target ID &
Engagement

Immediate
Compliance
Collections
Referral

Proprietary
Data

Criminal
Investigation

The enforcement design works as follows:
1. A DOR employee or employees with industry experience evaluate the target
industry utilizing available public and proprietary databases to create a profile of
the individual businesses within the industry. The data in the profile include tax
filing history, property information, related businesses, rental data, location data,
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customer traffic information, and other financial and nonfinancial information
related to cost and profitability.
2. On the basis of the business profiles, the employee evaluates the businesses
within the industry to identify targets for possible enforcement action. For
example, a business that appears to be extremely profitable but reports very low
gross sales per month.
3. The employee engages the business to determine compliance. The engagement
may take the form of a site visit, a letter, or a phone conversation. Multiple
contacts serve the dual purpose of beginning the compliance process with respect
to the individual companies contacted and alerting the industry in general that the
state has the ability and the will to enforce the tax laws.
4. On the basis of the results of engagement, the employee must determine what
additional action is warranted: referral for audit, referral to collections after the
identification and documentation of the liability, referral for criminal
investigation, or enlisting other interested agencies in a more comprehensive
compliance effort if indicated. In some cases the result of engagement will be
immediate compliance.
5. The evaluation and engagement cycle is continuously applied to the industry.
The end result of the industry enforcement activities is assumed to be greater
compliance industry-wide than what would be achieved using only traditional
enforcement tools, i.e., audit and collection activities. The impact of the industry
enforcement activities is reinforced as news of the enforcement activities is
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communicated through both formal and informal channels. The continuous looping of
the process prevents recidivism.
This design is very similar to current discovery and campaign operations carried
out by DOR. The main difference is that the proposed targeted industry enforcement
program is planned and executed wholly at the local level by local employees, and is a
continuous process rather than an isolated compliance exercise that may not be repeated
for several years. The employee or employees given the responsibility for a particular
industry will not approach their responsibility as a linear process of research, identify
targets, and engage, but as one of continuous research and target identification
simultaneous with engagement. The approach is one of consistent compliance pressure
on the industry utilizing a minimum amount of resources prepared with the maximum
amount of knowledge and information. The key is activity informed by intelligence that
is accurate and actionable.
There are two tools that are indispensible to the efficient success of this process:
the intuition of the employee performing the research and analysis function, and the use
of task force structures to expand resources at little or no cost. The presentation of the
author’s proposed methodology includes an analysis of the effectiveness of task force
operations; an exercise utilizing an observational survey to measure the effectiveness of
intuition in identifying noncompliance; and finally, an analysis of a complete cycle of a
targeted industry enforcement program.
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Baseline Activities
Interviews of DOR field personnel were conducted and current and historical
management data, reports, and other relevant documents were reviewed to construct a
baseline for compliance activities currently carried out by DOR personnel. This provided
an understanding of the current enforcement paradigm. Much of the information
contained in Chapter 4 was gleaned from these interviews and document reviews, and
information from this work will be referenced throughout the discussions that follow.

Analysis of the Effectiveness of Task Force Utilization
In this section the impact of the Region 5 Investigation Unit’s participation in task
forces composed of multiple federal, state, and local agencies on coordinated large case
efforts is evaluated. The results of task force utilization versus the results of regions that
do not utilize task force operations are evaluated using descriptive statistics comparing
investigative hours required to complete cases, cost to complete cases, and tax, civil
liabilities, and restitution realized per case. Means, mean differences, and significance
tests are presented using the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) format. 12
Investigative hours per case, cost per case, and the amount of tax, civil liabilities
and criminal restitution were obtained from the Criminal Investigations Process (CIP)
Case Management System for each case. Cases that are investigated as part of a task
force with at least two other federal, state or local agencies are classified as task force
cases, while cases that are originated in-house and worked in-house with only minor
outside assistance from no more than one outside agency are classified as standard cases.
12

The data gathered is an enumeration of the entire population of data rather than samples and significance
testing is unnecessary. ANOVA tables are used for reporting convenience.
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Tax Evasion Predictors from Industry Samples
To build comfort in the level of sales reported on a sales tax return, it is possible
to develop a “feel” for the business and the level of sales it should be reporting. This
process is highly subjective, but could be developed into a systematic ritual for evaluation
of potential sales tax theft. To test this hypothesis, I began with the data accumulated for
the targeted industry enforcement study discussed in the next section. These data include
reporting and compliance information for 192 used car dealers that have been identified
as targets for compliance enforcement activities. Since these data included only dealers
where sales tax theft was probable, an additional 238 dealers selected at random were
added and any overlap with existing data was eliminated to provide the study with a
number of dealers not involved in sales tax theft. An observational survey was
completed for each dealer within the sample. The survey contained twenty-four
characteristics designed to measure the robustness of the business environment. The
survey was designed as a proxy for the judgment DOR personnel should use to identify
leads when reviewing industry data. Additional data on property rentals, property
ownership, community demographics, and corporate ownership was obtained from public
databases and added to the data obtained through direct observation.
A dichotomous tax evasion construct was developed for use as the dependent
variable in binary logistic regression analysis. Tax evasion is indicated for any dealer
where the tax reported and remitted is less than 90 percent of the sales tax collected.
With respect to car dealers, tax evasion at the rate of ten percent can be very substantial,
and a number closer to five percent would be preferable. However, the observational
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survey as designed is a blunt instrument and is not sensitive enough to provide for a
smaller threshold.
The survey responses have been operationalized as constructs representing cost
structure, profit structure, and management and are the primary independent variables in
my analysis. Two additional independent variables were added to measure the impact of
prior participation in an amnesty program in 2003 and to test whether businesses that
were chronically delinquent were higher risks for sales tax theft than those who were
more compliant than chronic delinquents.
The cost structure construct is developed from the evaluation of survey responses
for neighborhood type (wealthy to poor), high-rent area versus low-rent, customer
activity (customer traffic) at the site, and whether they offer in-house financing. For
example, a dealership near middle-class neighborhoods, in a relatively high-rent business
area, with lots of customer activity, and that internally finances its sales represents a large
fixed cost structure. The final independent variable for cost structure derived from the
survey responses is dichotomous and is judgmentally derived from a review of observed
characteristics. It indicates the extent to which the cost structure suggested by these
factors is consistent with the level of sales reported on a monthly basis.
The profit structure construct is developed from the evaluation of survey
responses for the condition and type of cars sold and the cleanliness and maintenance of
the facility. A business selling late model cars that are in good condition from an
immaculate lot indicates a profitable business. The profit structure variable is
dichotomous and is judgmentally derived from a review of observed characteristics. It
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indicates the extent to which the profit structure suggested by survey responses is
consistent with the level of sales reported on a monthly basis.
The management construct is developed from the evaluation of survey questions
related to a history of filing sales tax returns with “round” numbers, a history of filing
returns with incomplete data, and a history of late-filed sales tax returns. Historically,
these are factors that have been deemed to indicate a business that is underreporting gross
sales and sales tax collected. If any of these three factors is present, the variable is
assigned a dichotomous value that indicates “poor reporting history,” and therefore likely
evasion activity.
Filers who are chronically delinquent are identified as those who were delinquent
or had returned checks in more than ten percent of the periods for which returns were
required of them.
Prior amnesty participants were identified through research in the System for
Unified Taxation, which denotes participants but provides no additional data relating to
the amnesty claim.
Binary logistic regression analysis was used to test the predictive ability of the
observational survey and, by proxy, the potential value of observational judgments by
Revenue employees when appropriately channeled.

Targeted Industry Enforcement Program Analysis
This section evaluates my proposed compliance enforcement design, which is
supplementary to current enforcement activities. As a result of budgetary restrictions, it
is necessary to find new techniques to magnify the resources available for enforcement
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and achieve more with less. One approach is to target a specific industry and focus
enforcement efforts on the basis of combined intelligence from a variety of sources. This
approach represents a strategy derived from the theory of planned behavior to impact the
perception of behavioral control by increasing the perceived probability of being caught
evading taxes. The industry targeted for this coordinated effort was the used car industry.
A review of the history of collections, audit, and criminal investigations indicates that
compliance in this industry has been consistently low and tax theft cases are normally
large in terms of tax dollars stolen. It is notable that this is an industry regulated by
another state agency that cooperatively collects data that can be used to verify whether a
dealer has remitted all of the sales tax it collects. Even given this ability to check thirdparty records, my review indicates dealers still commit sales tax theft with astonishing
regularity while reporting correct data to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles. It is also notable that cross-checking methodology for this interagency data has
not been automated. An important caveat to this verification process is that if this crosscheck indicates that all sales tax collected has been remitted by a dealer, it does not
necessarily mean that dealer has not converted sales tax collected to personal use. It
simply means that if that dealer has stolen sales tax, he or she was diligent enough to
cover their tracks by making sure the amounts reported to the Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles was consistent with amounts reported to the Department of
Revenue, i.e., they are Proficient Evaders.
Vehicle sales transaction data are provided quarterly by the Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) on compact disks that include all sales
transactions for which Florida titles were issued during the quarter. Currently, the
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number of transactions is approximately three million per year by more than 12,000
dealers. Since these databases include new car sales, RV sales, mobile home sales, lien
maintenance transactions, and other transactions outside the scope of this study, the data
have been edited and the quarterly databases compiled into a single database containing
only used car transactions for the periods July 2003 through May 2008. This database
contains more than 3,200,000 individual transaction records. Additionally, this new
database has been divided into five separate regional databases so that analyses can be
carried out on a region-by-region basis. Cross reference tables were created that match
the DHSMV dealer numbers with DOR taxpayer identification numbers for Miami-Dade
County dealers. Individual sales transactions and the associated sales tax collected were
accumulated and the results compared with the sales tax returns filed with DOR for all
dealers located in Miami-Dade County. Sales tax return data was exported from DOR’s
System for Unified Taxation (SUNTAX) and matched with the sales transaction data
dealer-by-dealer for Miami-Dade County to identify the total amount of potential sales
tax theft and the amount of potential theft by dealer. This process is diagramed in Figure
5.3.
The potentially tax evading dealers in Miami-Dade County were selected from the
analysis above. For policy reasons, companies that were currently under audit, were the
subject of active collection activity, or were under criminal investigation were excluded
and removed from the analysis. Companies that were closed or inactive were also
removed.
Companies that exhibited very large amounts of potential sales tax theft or very
high percentages of sales tax theft were segregated for full criminal investigation. These
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are companies where the discrepancy between the amount of sales tax reported to
DHSMV and the amount reported to DOR was so large or so great a percentage of total
taxes collected that the possibility of mistake or other good explanation would appear to
be implausible. For example, the top company in this group shows possible tax theft in

Figure 5.3 The Auto Dealer Tax Return to Title Application Comparison Process
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excess of $2.7 million and actually remitted less than $1 million of the total $3.7 million
collected. Another shows possible sales tax theft of $69,000, but only remitted about
$2,000. These dealers were assigned to a special group designated the “Major Case”
group. As noted previously, Southern Region CIP frequently participates in task force
activities to leverage the resources available for criminal investigation and prosecution.
The Major Case group was designated to be worked in task force fashion by combining
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forces with a South Florida task force dedicated to auto theft, dealer fraud, and similar
crimes related to the auto industry. Working these cases in task force format is an
extension of techniques successfully applied to large groups of related companies to large
groups of similar but unrelated companies.
The remaining companies exhibit significant amounts of potential sales tax theft,
but the amounts and percentage of total taxes not remitted were low enough to potentially
be the result of errors, repossession credits that were not properly documented, or
otherwise subject to reasonable explanation that might preclude criminal prosecution.
These remaining dealers were randomly assigned to one of seven groups. Because of the
nature of the subject matter and the requirements for fair application of the law,
development of an experimental model for this portion of the study based on random
assignment was not possible. However, the groupings were maintained to enable
working with only as many entities at one time as resources would allow. The activities
carried out during this phase of my study were carried out solely within CIP which, at the
time of the study, had only four investigators for all of Miami-Dade County and only one
that could be assigned part-time to this project.
The targeted industry enforcement program analysis was implemented as a quasiexperimental time series design involving pretesting and post-testing one group of
subjects at various times to determine the effect of enforcement interventions over time.
While random assignment to groups was used, the design is not experimental because the
treatments between the groups could not be varied and, while a control group existed for
comparison between the application of the first intervention and the first measurement
date, it was not possible to shield the control group from “spillover” effects of
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enforcement activities on the first wave of interventions. The control group was also
subject to interventions at a later date.
The final intervention study group was composed of 110 dealers with potential
sales tax theft of $6,371,914.18, or 22.31 percent of the total taxes collected by these
companies.
The Major Case group was composed initially of 43 dealers with potential sales
tax theft of $14,164,214.64, or 60.44 percent of the total taxes collected by these
companies.
There were an additional 34 dealers with total potential tax theft of $606,016.
This group was dubbed the “Low Theft” group. The amount of potential theft by each
dealer was small enough that the decision was made to monitor this group throughout the
study and apply interventions to them last if it appeared that the potential theft amount
was growing or had not been resolved by timing differences.
Five dealers with potential tax theft of $279,167 were removed from the study
because they were identified for criminal investigation, audit, or other enforcement
activities during the preparatory stages of the study.
Each of the dealers in the intervention study group was contacted by the
investigator to obtain an explanation and reconciliation of the differences between the
amount of sales tax reported to DHSMV and the amount reported to DOR. As a result of
the serious nature of the potential tax crime being investigated, all dealers were subject to
the same treatment, both because it is fair and because it is required by DOR policy. The
only difference in the initial intervention approach is that dealers subsequent to the first
wave received a letter that emphasized the potential criminal nature of the investigation
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because a significant number of the dealers contacted in the first wave ignored the letter.
While it was done for practical reasons that had nothing to do with this study, this change
did offer the opportunity to gauge the difference in response when it is made clear the
potential ramifications are criminal rather than civil. The difference in response between
the two treatments was analyzed using a one-way ANOVA.
An immediate indication of success of the intervention is the collection of tax
evaded in prior periods as a result of the intervention, but the longer term success of the
contact with the taxpayer is of equal importance. It has been hypothesized that the
dealers will become newly compliant and more compliant in the future if they believe
their reporting is being monitored and that the opportunity for sales tax evasion or theft is
not available. The longer term success of these interventions is determined by applying
repeated-measures ANOVA to measures of the amount of sales tax theft in lagging
periods after the intervention. For the second wave of interventions, only one
measurement period after the intervention is available at the time of this writing, so a
paired samples t-test was used to evaluate the impact of the intervention at the
measurement date. One would expect compliance improvement during the short term
following the intervention with the possibility of a return to evasion activities in the
longer term if contact is not maintained in some way. The indirect impact of
interventions on companies not subject to direct intervention was also measured using
paired samples t-tests.
The construct to be measured is compliance with the sales tax laws as measured
by the amount of tax theft on a monthly basis by each car dealer within the study group,
both before and at various points after the interventions. The monthly tax theft

90

compliance measure was used as the dependent variable in the repeated-measures
ANOVA and in paired samples t-tests.
The overall success of the interventions with respect to the entire pool is
determined by comparing the results obtained through the application of the interventions
to the proforma results had the interventions not been applied using one-way analysis of
variance.
Additionally, the interactions with dealers during the intervention process have
been documented and qualitatively analyzed to gain insight on the motives and needs of
the dealers that led to noncompliance, attitudes with respect to compliance, and peer
support structures within the industry that contribute to subjective norms.
Search warrants were drafted, approved, and executed on the companies
comprising the Major Case group by a newly formed task force comprised of DOR
investigators, members of the Auto Theft Task Force of the Miami-Dade Police
Department, representatives from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles, and representatives from the Miami-Dade County State Attorneys Office. The
results of the handling of the Major Case group were subject to qualitative analysis
regarding the efficiency of applying large related-group task force techniques to a large
group of unrelated companies within the same industry.

Reliability and Validity
According to Neuman (2003), reliability and dependability are achieved when the
results produced by the indicators utilized do not vary because of the characteristics of
the measurement process itself. All constructs utilized in this study were clearly
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conceptualized and are easily measured and subject to precise measurement, with the
exception of the observations reflected in the predictors of tax evasion survey. The
survey was specifically designed to represent the judgment and analysis processes of
experienced DOR personnel rather than a precise measurement of the subject matter. The
measurements, computations, and tests presented in this study are easily replicable and
are designed specifically with replication in mind since the methodology is intended for
constant-cycle utilization in compliance enforcement operations.
Internal validity refers to the “approximate truth about inferences regarding causeeffect or causal relationships” (Trochim, 2006). Internal validity has been addressed
through the use of random samples to supplement the data in the survey portion of this
study and random assignment in the quasi-experimental portion of this study. Perhaps of
greater importance, the subjects in this study to which interventions are applied and
causal relationships are assumed represent the entire population of tax evaders within the
industry chosen and not a sample. As a result, the statistics offered are descriptive of the
population and threats due to sampling errors are not relevant. Social interaction threats
are also not threats to validity in this study because the study relies on social interaction
as part of the stimulus to achieve the desired change in behavior. The theory of planned
behavior specifically includes components for social norms and attitude which are also
targets of the enforcement methodology being tested here. Rather than controlling for
and attempting to eliminate social interaction as a causal effect, this study attempts to
exploit social interaction as a component of the compliance enforcement effort.
All access to government documents, reports and personnel required to complete
this study were permitted; all data required to complete this study were made available;
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and Department of Revenue personnel were cooperative throughout. All data utilized in
this study were accumulated specifically with this study in mind, so there were no issues
with appropriate units of analysis, theoretical definitions, lack of control over how data
were collected, or changes in definition over time. Statistical procedures were chosen
based on how well they addressed the specific issues and questions under consideration
and all assumptions of specific statistical procedures were met. All statistical operations
were carried out using SPSS statistics software. External validity, in the sense of
generalizing the results of this study to other settings, is enhanced by these same factors
and by the very salient fact that the study was centered within the active enforcement
operations of a state revenue agency.
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CHAPTER 6
TASK FORCE UTILIZATION: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Since 2004, DOR Southern Region Investigations has been actively participating
in task force operations. In this study, “task force” refers to coordinated enforcement
efforts with two or more other agencies that have enforcement interests with respect to
the same businesses or individuals. As homeland security issues have become more
important after the events of September 11, 2001, local law enforcement agencies have
been tasked with greater security and first-responder responsibilities and, likewise, have
seen their budgets augmented with federal funds for homeland security that can indirectly
benefit DOR’s enforcement efforts. 13 Further, federal agencies, primarily the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), often have an interest in foreign-born U. S. businessmen
who transfer or carry large sums of money from U. S. business operations out of the
country, particularly when those funds are traced to locations associated with terrorist
activity. The businesses or individuals who attract such interest do not do so simply
because they transfer money outside the country: there are generally other factors that
identify these individuals and their activities as suspicious. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) may also have an interest because workers are sometimes brought
into this country illegally to work in otherwise legitimate businesses for what amounts to
slave wages. While the transfer of monies overseas or using illegal immigrants to work
in U. S. businesses is not within the purview of DOR employees, it has been noted that
these same businesses are usually involved in sales tax theft as well. In fact, in several
recent cases investigated by DOR Southern Region Investigations, a substantial portion
13

As a state regulatory agency, DOR does not qualify to directly receive Homeland Security funding and
grants.
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of the “profits” from local businesses transferred overseas was, in fact, stolen Florida
sales tax. This adds a homeland security interest to sales tax enforcement. Therefore it
becomes doubly important for DOR to be involved in these cases, first because
significant amounts of sales taxes are being stolen through these illegal operations, and
second, because stolen sales tax in these cases not only allow the illegal businesses to
gain a competitive advantage over legitimate businesses, but those advantages are
accruing to and financing those who seek to harm our country. It is clear that DOR has a
vested interest in these cases which, in itself, is enough to justify participation. It is
likewise true that other federal, state, and local agencies involved in homeland security
have broad resources to bring to the table and are keenly interested in doing so.
Frequently, the state tax charges are more easily proven and provide the shortest route for
law enforcement to shut down these illegal operations and gain valuable insight and
intelligence.
Southern Region Investigations has found that participation in these task forces
leads to less expensive investigations because other agencies cover much of the cost by
providing surveillance and intelligence and by paying for information obtained through
third-party subpoenas. Moreover, the entities that are the targets of these investigations
are generally larger and, in theory, yield much higher revenue recoveries per investigative
hour than non-task force cases. On the other hand, task force cases can take longer to
develop because of the diverse interests in the case. Participation requires an
acknowledgement that other agencies have their own interests to pursue which may
require additional time. However, in addition to cost savings and larger recoveries, task
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force participation generally allows action against much larger entities and groups of
entities than DOR would otherwise be able to manage.
A recent example of this was the February 2009 execution of 30 separate search
warrants, statewide and simultaneously, on a single day that involved more than 200
federal and state agents. The search warrants were part of a case that had evolved over
more than a year with involvement of the FBI, ICE, the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, local State Attorneys, the Office of Statewide Prosecution, and local law
enforcement agencies statewide. Other agencies assumed more than $30,000 in direct
subpoena costs, provided hundreds of hours of surveillance and intelligence gathering,
and supplied the manpower that made it possible for DOR to have all 30 search warrants
executed simultaneously. Working alone, DOR would have been able to execute only
five of those search warrants on that one day and the other 25 targets would likely have
immediately destroyed any useful records.
To determine the impact of task force participation, data from all cases statewide
that were approved for prosecution over the last six years were reviewed. All cases
covered by the Tax Collection Enforcement Diversion Program (TCEDP), which are
essentially an extension of collection activity and are part of a program jointly managed
by DOR and local participating State Attorney’s Offices, were excluded. Because not all
regions participate in this program and because the cases within this program are
collections-oriented rather than criminal in nature, their inclusion in the analysis would
skew the results. There have been 1,424 cases in this program representing $26,565,419
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dollars in delinquent sales tax.14 Statewide cases other than TCEDP cases approved for
prosecution over the last six years are as indicated in Table 6.1. Region 5 is the Southern
Region which includes task force cases.
A few definitions are required for an understanding of the data in Table 6.1. “Tax
Liability Identified” is the sales tax liability only, with no interest, penalties, or
investigative costs added. This is the actual amount of sales tax theft. “Total Civil
Liability Identified” is the sales tax, regular late filing and late payment penalties,
specific penalties for fraudulent return filing, interest, and investigative costs. “Criminal
Restitution” includes the sales tax, interest, and investigative costs. 15
The data in Table 6.1 shows that Region 5 had fewer prosecution cases but those
cases were, on average, larger and generated greater amounts of sales tax theft, civil
liabilities, and restitution identified per investigative hour. To determine how much of
this difference is due to Region 5 task force participation the data for Region 5 was
decomposed into non-task force and task force case data as reflected in Table 6.2.
The results of Region 5 activities were compared to Regions 1 through 4 using
one-way ANOVA. 16 Region 5 results showed higher civil tax theft identified (M =
119,406.36, SD = 289,009.34) than Regions 1 through 4 (M = 58,544.61, SD =
133,373.70). This difference (M = 60,861.75) was significant, F(1, 721) = 12.182, p =
.001.
14

This program is used for certain types of delinquency cases and is not available for cases involving sales
tax theft. The program allows certain delinquent taxpayers who meet strict qualifications to make
arrangements to pay their tax liabilities and avoid criminal prosecution for offenses other than theft.
15
It should be noted that only about one in six criminal investigations result in referral for prosecution. The
remainder may be closed, for example, with a civil collection of tax due based on a finding of no intent to
commit a crime, or closed because of a finding that no tax is due and no violation was committed.
16
The means and mean differences presented here are population parameters that have been evaluated
using standard financial analysis techniques to compare. While significance testing is not required, it is
nonetheless a familiar and convenient way to present the data.
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Table 6.1 Summary of DOR Criminal Prosecution Cases 2003 - 2009
Number of
Prosecutions
Approved
Tax Liability
Identified
Total Civil
Liability
Identified
Criminal
Restitution
Mean Tax
Liability
Identified Per
Case
Mean Civil
Liability
Identified Per
Case
Mean
Criminal
Restitution Per
Case
Mean
Investigative
Cost Per Case
Investigative
Hours Per
Case
Tax Liability
Identified Per
Investigative
Hour
Civil Liability
Identified Per
Investigative
Hour
Criminal
Restitution Per
Investigative
Hour

Region 1

Region 2

Region 3

Region 4

Region 5

130

207

130

150

105

$7,884,088

$11,695,303

$6,482,774

$10,059,859

$12,537,668

$13,590,964

$22,969,254

$10,371,302

$17,417,015

$25,341,780

$10,329,900

$14,645,478

$8,050,095

$13,121,638

$15,561,245

$60,647

$56,499

$49,867

$67,066

$119,406

$104,546

$110,963

$79,799

$116,113

$241,350

$79,461

$70,751

$61,924

$87,478

$148,202

$3,928

$2,940

$2,717

$5,052

$5,155

187.71

141.61

166.36

228.27

209.36

$323.09

$398.98

$299.75

$293.80

$570.34

$556.95

$783.58

$479.68

$508.67

$1,152.80

$423.32

$499.62

$372.23

$383.22

$707.88

Data Source: DOR Criminal Investigations Case Management System (2009)
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Table 6.2 Breakout and Analysis of Region 5 Task Force Cases and Comparison to
Means for Regions 1 through 4
Region 5
Regions 1-4
Region 5
Non-Task
Region 5
Means
Total
Force
Task Force
Number of
Prosecutions
Approved
154
105
95
10
Tax Liability
Identified
$9,030,506 $12,537,688
$5,420,588
$7,117,080
Total Civil Liability
Identified
$16,087,134 $25,341,780
$9,171,803 $16,169,977
Criminal Restitution
$11,536,778 $15,561,245
$6,736,777
$8,824,468
Mean Tax Liability
Identified Per Case
$58,545
$119,406
$57,059
$711,708
Mean Civil Liability
Identified Per Case
$104,293
$241,350
$96,545
$1,616,998
Mean Criminal
Restitution Per Case
$74,793
$148,202
$70,913
$882,447
Mean Investigative
Cost per Case
$3,615
$5,155
$3,708
$15,394
Investigative Hours
Per Case
180.99
209.36
159.82
679.98
Tax Liability
Identified Per
Investigative Hour
$323.47
$570.34
$357.02
$1,046.66
Civil Liability
Identified Per
Investigative Hour
$576.24
$1,152.80
$604.09
$2,378.01
Criminal Restitution
Per Investigative
$413.25
$707.88
$443.71
$1,297.75
Hour
Data Source: DOR Criminal Investigations Case Management System (2009)

The Region 5 results also showed higher total civil liability identified (M =
241,350.29, SD = 716,219.10) than the Region 1 through 4 results (M = 104,292.60, SD
= 251,986.28). This difference (M = 137,057.69) was significant, F(1, 721) = 13.125, p <
.001.

99

The Region 5 results also showed higher restitution identified (M = 148,202.33,
SD = 351,639.34) than the Region 1 through 4 results (M = 74,792.72, SD = 173,580.62).
This difference (M = 73,409.61) was significant, F(1, 721) = 11.081, p = .001.
The analysis presented in Table 6.2 makes it clear that task force cases in Region
5 drive the entire difference between the overall prosecution results of Region 5 activities
and the other regions because:
1. The liabilities identified in the ten task force cases exceed the liabilities
identified on the remaining 95 cases combined, and
2. The means for non-task force cases in Region 5 are similar to the means for
Regions 1 through 4.
The clearest indication of the benefit of task force participation is the increased
liability and restitution identified per investigative hour. The primary goal of criminal
investigations is deterrence and not necessarily the collection of tax dollars. However,
the total civil liabilities identified will nonetheless be secured by a lien against the
taxpayer’s property, and criminal restitution amounts will be payable under court order
and, generally, as a condition of probation if such is granted. Task force participation has
resulted in an additional $576.56 per investigative hour of civil liability identified
($1,152.80 vs. $576.24) and an additional $294.63 per investigative hour of criminal
restitution identified ($707.88 vs. $413.25) when compared to the means of the other
regions. The more important point is that these increases are achieved at no additional
cost to DOR due to the leverage obtained from utilizing the resources of other agencies.
To determine the impact of task force cases on Region 5 results it is necessary to
compute proforma statistics for Region 5 activities by converting investigative hours
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spent on task force cases (6,799.80) to equivalent non-task force cases at the mean rate of
159.82 hours per case. This calculation yields an additional 43 cases which are assumed
to produce the same mean tax liability, civil liability, and restitution amounts as the
historical non-task force cases. The summarized proforma results of investigations
activities computed in this manner are presented in Table 6.3.
Results of Region 5 activities were compared to the proforma results using oneway AVOVA. 17 The Region 5 results showed higher actual civil tax theft identified (M =
119,406.36, SD = 289,009.34) than the proforma results (M = 57,058.88, SD =
46,032.22). This difference (M = 62,347.48) was significant, F(1, 241) = 6.223, p = .013.
The Region 5 results also showed higher total civil liability identified (M =
241,350.29, SD = 716,219.10) than the proforma results (M = 96,545.20, SD =
80,959.89). This difference (M = 144,805.09) was significant, F(1, 241) = 5.555, p =
.019.
The Region 5 results also showed higher restitution identified (M = 148,202.33,
SD = 351,639.34) than the proforma results (M = 70,913.30, SD = 55,886.24). This
difference (M = 77,289.03) was significant, F(1, 241) = 6.461, p = .012.
The results of the proforma calculations and comparison to Region 5 historical
results indicates that investigative hours devoted to task force cases yielded better results
than what could have been achieved if those same resources had been applied to
additional non-task force cases. It is particularly pertinent to note that while 33
additional cases could have been investigated by abandoning task force operations, total
17

As noted previously, the means and mean differences presented here are population parameters that have
been evaluated using standard financial analysis techniques to compare. Significance testing is not
required but the ANOVA presentation provides a familiar way to present the data.
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Table 6.3 Summary of Region 5 Criminal Prosecution Cases 2003 – 2009 with
Proforma Results Excluding Task Force Cases
Region 5
Proforma
Difference:
(Memo)
Region 5
without
Proforma Region 5
Actual
Tax Force
Actual
Task Force
Number of Prosecutions
Approved
105
138
33
10
Tax Liability Identified
$12,537,688
$7,848,272
$(4,689,416)
$7,117,080
Total Civil Liability
Identified
$25,341,780 $13,279,438 $(12,062,342) $16,169,977
Criminal Restitution
$15,561,245
$9,753,843
$(5,807,402)
$8,824,468
Mean Tax Liability
Identified Per Case
$119,406
$57,059
$(62,347)
$711,708
Mean Civil Liability
Identified Per Case
$241,350
$96,545
$(144,805)
$1,616,998
Mean Criminal
Restitution Per Case
$148,202
$70,913
$(77,289)
$882,447
Investigative Hours Per
Case
209.36
159.82
(49.54)
679.98
Tax Liability Identified
Per Investigative Hour
$570.34
$357.02
$(213.32)
$1,046.66
Civil Liability Identified
Per Investigative Hour
$1,152.80
$604.09
$(548.71)
$2,378.01
Criminal Restitution Per
Investigative Hour
$707.88
$443.71
$(264.17)
$1,297.75
Data Source: DOR Criminal Investigations Case Management System (2009)

civil liability and restitution identified would have decreased by $12,062,342 and
$5,807,402, respectively, representing a permanent loss of the potential ability to
recapture that revenue. On the basis of this analysis, the null hypothesis is rejected and
the alternative set forth in Chapter 3 is accepted:
H3: Joint investigations with other federal, state, and local agencies result in
improved enforcement outcomes, including greater restitution for the same level
of resource output.
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The purpose of this analysis is not to suggest that DOR criminal investigations
units should pursue every case in the task force format; but to suggest that where
possible, and where it enhances efficiency for all agencies involved, cooperative
enforcement activities allow leveraging of resources and allow DOR to expand its
capabilities to larger cases that provide higher recovery per investigative hour. To date
the task force methodology has been utilized for groups of companies related by common
ownership, but it will be demonstrated in Chapter 8 that this concept can be expanded to
include cases that are related by industry or other subject matter and not just by
ownership.
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CHAPTER 7
PREDICTORS OF TAX EVASION: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
One of the best tools an auditor or investigator has is intuition based on
experience and expertise. A tax agency employee is beset with mountains of data
provided by hundreds of thousands of tax filers. Information provided on a sales tax
return, unlike federal income tax returns, is minimal, providing little information to frame
the data being reviewed. If business A reports $100,000 in gross sales for the month, an
agent cannot readily determine if that amount is reasonable without learning more about
the business. Filing history may indicate the return is consistent with prior filings, but
consistency does not equal accuracy. The majority of the enforcement employees of
DOR are dedicated to resolving delinquencies: the failure to file a return or pay the tax
due on the return. These employees are collections personnel, or collectors, and are not
tasked with determining whether the filings are accurate, but just that they are filed. It
must be stressed that verifying the correctness of returns is not in the job description for
this group of employees. The assumption is that the amount the tax filer reports to the
state is correct. It is left to a small group of auditors and investigators to determine if
what was filed was accurate or if sales tax theft occurred. As a result, the odds of
catching those filing inaccurate returns or stealing sales tax dollars are enormously
against DOR with the probability of any company in Florida becoming subject to an audit
or investigation equal to approximately .0046 (odds 213:1 against) 18. The very real
impact of this mismatch of resources is apparent in interviews during criminal
18
The probability calculation is based on numbers presented in Figure 5.1 on page 77 and does not give
weight to the fact that audit selection is weighted toward larger companies which tends to lower the
probability of audit for those companies most likely to be involved in evasion.
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prosecutions of accountants and bookkeepers that occurred over the past several years. In
reviewing the files, I found where one such accountant very candidly stated that he
advised his clients to always file a return on time and claim some level of sales. The
amount claimed does not matter, but should be somewhat consistent from month to
month. He further advised them to remit whatever tax they claimed they collected, and
make sure the check does not bounce. He advised his clients that if they follow these
directions, they will never have a problem with the Department of Revenue, because the
Department focuses on delinquencies. If you are not delinquent, you will “fly below the
radar.” The client that ultimately got him into trouble reported almost $6.7 million in
gross sales and more than $400,000 in sales tax collected over an eighteen month period.
On the surface, there did not appear to be anything wrong with the amounts being
reported. But suspicion of money laundering attracted the attention of a Florida
Department of Law Enforcement Special Agent who had previously worked for DOR.
He brought DOR into the case and it was ultimately found that the business had more
than $48 million in gross sales and had stolen more than $2.3 million in sales tax during
that 18-month period. This case illustrates that raw numbers without context are
meaningless. The reporting of $6.7 million in gross sales was substantial enough for a
small business not to raise suspicion, but was less than 14 percent of the actual gross
sales.
My review of some accounts yielded shocking revelations. It is relatively easy
to find accounts where the business reports exactly the same amount of gross sales every
month, even though they are a retail store and the odds of the sales in any two months
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being the same are microscopically small. Many stay in operation for many years and
never once have monthly sales that exceed the amount of their rent.
With convenience stores it is common to see high amounts of exempt sales,
much higher than supermarkets, even though their primary sales items are beer, soft
drinks, and cigarettes, all taxable items. It is also not uncommon to see them claim the
exact same percentage of exempt sales every single month. Sales may vary but the
exempt portion is always exactly 82.00 percent, for example, each and every month.
These types of anomalies are not within the purview of the collection staff.
Auditors and investigators will review only a tiny fraction of the tax filings for a given
year. There are dedicated staff members who review data to identify audit or
investigative leads from the data, but there are so few performing this function and so few
employees investigating the leads provided that the advice of the prosecuted accountant
still works quite well for the vast majority of sales tax filers. In essence, no one is
looking at the information filed because most resources are devoted to delinquencies or
other non-verification tasks such as taxpayer services and tax processing.
It is not the intention in the present study to indicate that delinquencies are
unimportant: they represent hundreds of millions of dollars annually in lost revenue that
collectors recover or secure by filing liens against estimated amounts due. My study
instead asserts that delinquencies are the tip of the tax fraud iceberg. In the next chapter,
192 dealers are examined with potentially $21,421,312 or more in theft of sales tax
collected from their customers. Those 192 dealers had delinquencies booked of just over
$300,000 and most had no delinquencies. When tax filers fail to file a return, collections
personnel can only estimate the amount of tax due. If the tax filer never reports the
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correct amount of tax collected, then the estimates will always be wrong. Working
delinquencies recovers funds but because of the assumption that nobody steals, sales tax
theft cannot be uncovered through collection activity alone.
Personnel assigned to “discovery” operations or those who develop leads for
audit take a higher level look at those filing returns. They look for indicators of fraud not
only in the data compiled by the Department, but by combining those data with data from
other sources, such as from returns filed with the IRS, customs declarations, property
records, business license filings, and similar records. Analysis of this type yields
actionable results and helps to produce hundreds of millions of dollars in audit and
discovery assessments every year. My study holds that the discovery model must be
devolved to the local level and adapted for more widespread use if sales tax enforcement
is to become more effective and efficient.
Using the data accumulated on car dealers involved in sales tax theft (next
chapter), I undertook an exercise to predict sales tax theft on the basis of observation,
filing data, and a minimal amount of additional information provided by public
information available online. Since all of the dealers in this group were likely involved in
sales tax theft, the group was supplemented with a random sample taken from the
population of dealers located in Miami-Dade County. Since this random sample was
chosen from the entire pool of dealers there was some overlap with the dealers already
included in the theft group. Some dealers from both groups had to be excluded from this
test because they had gone out of business and were no longer available for observation.
The end result was a total of 369 observable dealers.
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I prepared a survey to be completed for each dealer. Survey questions were
divided into three major categories: cost structure, profit structure, and management. A
copy of the survey is included in Appendix 2. The idea behind the survey is to formally
conceptualize a high-level review of an account by an agent supplemented by observation
and readily available public data. Table 7.1 lists the categories and questions or
observations included in the survey.
Each section of the survey also includes space for additional observations. The
completion of a survey requires a site visit or access to pictures of the site, reference to
the Miami-Dade County property records website, and reference to the Florida
Department of State, Division of Corporations website. In reality, DOR employees also
have access to other non-public databases for additional information but these were not
used for this study. 19 A single observer collected the survey data.
The results of the specific survey responses were used to make judgments and
assign fraud flags to the three categories covered by the survey. The purpose was not to
use the survey answers as variables, but for the answers to guide intuition about whether
the answers taken as a whole raised red flags about the tax filer. For example, company
number nine was a large dealer with a very large inventory of moderately expensive cars.
The cars were well maintained, the premises were clean, and the business was located in
a high traffic, high rent area. The average monthly sales reported meant that the business
would have difficulty carrying such a large inventory and other high costs associated with
the location and status of the business. Intuition led to a determination that the company
19

The non-public databases could have been used for the companies suspected of sales tax theft, but could
not be legally used for the companies with no theft. Therefore, these databases could not be used for any of
the companies in this study.
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Table 7.1 Survey Questions and Observations
Category
Cost
Structure

Question or Observation
Surrounding neighborhood type – poor to
wealthy
Surrounding neighborhood type – industrial to
retail
Property appearance – appears low rent to
appears high rent
Rent analysis
Rent coverage
Type of dealer
Size of operation

Profit
Structure

Management

Condition and type of cars – inexpensive to
expensive
Condition and type of cars
Condition and type of cars
Cleanliness and maintenance of facilities –
dirty to very clean
Cleanliness and maintenance of facilities –
poorly maintained to well maintained
Location – low traffic to high traffic
Location – difficult access and parking to easy
access and parking
Location – not meant for retail to meant for
retail
In-house financing provided?
Inventory size

Measurement
4-point Likert scale
4-point Likert scale
4-point Likert scale
Based on square footage from
property records and average rental
rates for area
Sales reported divided by rent
Other, office/warehouse, repair
shop, traditional
Small, medium, large, multilocation
4-point Likert scale
Disrepair, fair, good, excellent
General, mixed, luxury, specialty
4-point Likert scale
4-point Likert scale
4-point Likert scale
4-point Likert scale
4-point Likert scale
Yes or no
0–15 cars; 16–30 cars; 31–45 cars;
45 cars or more

Historical filing review – files returns with
round numbers
Historical filing review – files incomplete
returns

Yes or no

Historical filing review – late filing

Number of returns filed late and
number of months reviewed
Number of returned items (bounced
checks, failed EFT items)
Average exempt sales claimed
Whether or not registered for other
taxes for which they are obligated,
such as corporate or documentary
stamp tax
Yes or no.

Historical filing review – returned checks
Historical filing review – exempt sales
Registration status – other taxes

Churn – whether there has been a string of
corporations owned by the same owners or
related parties with corporate changes every
couple of years
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Yes or no

could not carry the cost structure observed with the sales reported so the company was
flagged for potential fraud with respect to the cost structure of the company. Developed
in this manner, the independent variables in this study are all based on observation and
available financial data. As such they provide a basis for determining whether intuition
informed by objective observation and data can be efficiently used to bolster compliance
enforcement efforts. The present study also assists in determining what types of
indicators are most useful in identifying potential fraud. The basis for this type of
analysis is simple: if a business is to stay in operation for a long period of time, it must
produce enough revenue to cover its costs and produce a profit to make operations
justifiable. Further, people who do not manage their filing obligations properly may be
more likely to be involved in tax evasion or fraud than those who do manage their
obligations properly.
The dichotomous dependent variable was computed and set on the basis of sales
tax collections not reported and remitted in excess of ten percent of the total sales tax
collected. Sales tax theft has been measured in this study by comparing sales tax
collections reported to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles on title
applications to the sales taxes reported to the Department of Revenue on sales tax returns.
Ten percent was chosen as the cutoff for theft because timing differences in reporting can
occur that create temporary but persistent differences that will not resolve until the
business closes. Additionally, as mentioned previously, the survey used in this part of the
study is a blunt instrument that would not be useful in identifying smaller amounts of
theft.
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Of the 369 companies in the survey, 216 had sales tax theft in excess of ten
percent of sales tax collected. Interestingly, only 190, or 51.5 percent, of the dealers were
traditional car lots. A high percentage, 31.7 percent, operated out of office/warehouse
facilities and carried little or no inventory. The remaining dealers were repair shops, used
part dealers, or other businesses where car sales were more of a sideline than the main
thrust of the business. Small- to medium-sized dealers accounted for 84 percent of the
companies in the survey. Eighty dealers, 21.7 percent of the total, offered financing of
cars directly with no lending institution involvement. These dealers are typically known
as “buy here, pay here” dealers. (See Appendix 3 for case frequencies).
From the review of the survey data, the fraud flags were set for the cost
structure, profit structure, and management variables. A classification table was prepared
comparing these flags to the theft status of each company indicating that 244 of the 369
companies were correctly classified (66.12 percent). Of these, 185 of the companies with
sales tax not remitted were identified out of 216 (85.65 percent). However, 94 companies
that had no unremitted sales tax were falsely flagged out of 153 (61.44 percent). The
survey flags successfully identified companies representing $15,331,235 in sales tax theft
out of the total $20,452,673 (74.96 percent).
These results were compared to the results of using only the chronic
delinquency flag to identify potential fraud. Using this greatly simplified method there
were fewer false positives, only 32 out of 153 (20.92 percent), but also only 87 out of 216
companies that had unremitted sales tax (40.28 percent) were identified. More
importantly, this simplified analysis only identified $6,216,452 of the total theft of
$20,452,673 (30.39 percent). This last statistic provides a critical insight: companies that
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steal the most file their returns on time and do not submit payments with insufficient
funds. Table 7.2 provides a summary of this data.
Binary logistic regression was used to further analyze the results of the survey.
The dichotomous indicator for sales tax theft in excess of ten percent was used as the
dependent variable. The three fraud flags for cost structure, profit structure, and
management were used as the independent variables. The flag for chronic delinquencies
was included as a component in the management variable. The results of this analysis are
presented in Table 7.3.
The results of the regression indicate that an analysis of the cost structure and
management practices of a business can provide results that are useful in identifying
companies involved in fraudulent activities. Further, the independent variables used in
this analysis represent value judgments by an agent rather than strict financial analysis,
which extends the conclusion to indicate that the analysis can be largely based on
intuition and experience. More specifically, companies that appear to have cost
structures that appear to be more expensive than what their reported revenues can support
are 2.64 times more likely to be involved in tax evasion than those with cost structures
supported by reported revenue. Likewise, companies that indicate poor control over their
operations, as identified through late reporting, writing insufficient funds checks, and not
properly registering for all taxes for which they are liable, are 3.541 times more likely to
be involved in tax evasion than those that are not. The profit structure variable was not
significant in this analysis.
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Table 7.2 Classification Table for Survey Fraud Flag to Theft Comparisons
USING SURVEY DATA
Total correctly classified
Total cases

Number
244
369

Theft
Amount
$15,231,235
$20,452.673

Percent
Companies
66.12%

Percent
Theft
74.96%

Total correctly identified as no theft
Total with no theft

59
153

N/A

38.56%

N/A

Total correctly identified with theft
Total with theft

185
216

$15,231,235
$20,452,673

85.65%

74.96%

94
31

$5,121,438

USING CHRONIC DELINQUENCY
AS INDICATOR
Total correctly classified
Total cases

208
369

$6,216,452
$20,452,673

56.37%

30.39%

Total correctly identified as no theft
Total with no theft

121
153

N/A

79.08%

N/A

Total correctly identified with theft
Total with theft

87
216

$6,216,452
$20,452,673

40.28%

30.39%

False positives
Theft not identified

32
129

$14,236,221

Sig
.002
.289
.000
.000

Exp (B)
(Odds
Ratio)
2.640
1.367
3.541
.477

False positives
Theft not identified

Table 7.3 Results of Logistic Regression – Tax Evasion Prediction

Variable
Cost Structure
Profit Structure
Management
Constant
N=369

B
.971
.313
1.264
-.741

SE
Wald
.308 9.960
.295 1.122
.303 17.362
.202 13.452

(a) Reference category is no theft.
(b) Nagelkerke R Square = .183
(c) See Table 8 for complete analysis of prediction results.
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df
1
1
1
1

The model provides a good fit to the data as evidenced by the Hosmer and
Lemeshow test results (x2 = 2.069, df = 4, p = .723), where a lack of significance, i.e.,
p>.05 is an indicator of model fit. However, the nonparametric correlations between the
dependent variable for sales tax theft and the independent variables were not strong as is
indicated in Table 7.4.
The weak correlations between the dependent and independent variables explain
the large number of false positives identified through the use of the three fraud flags. The
present study shows that intuitive analysis is likely to identify a large majority of sales
tax cheats, but it will also result in the false identification of many non-cheating
businesses as cheating businesses, leading to a waste of resources.

Table 7.4 Correlations among Theft and Fraud Flag Variables
Theft Indicator
Cost Structure

Theft Indicator

Cost Structure
.296**
N=369

Profit Structure
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Profit Structure
.246**
N=369
.653**
N=369

Management
.265**
N=369
.169**
N=369
.172**
N=369

It is therefore necessary to expand the analysis beyond intuition. Intuition is a
necessary, efficient, and effective first step (Gladwell, 2005), but cannot be the final step
in target selection unless resources are plentiful. Intuition can be used to identify
potential targets to subject to more detailed investigative techniques to narrow the field.
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It was also noted that profit structure and cost structure are moderately
correlated. This is to be expected since cost and profit are similar measures and profit is
to a large degree dependent on cost structure. The fact that cost structure is significant in
the analysis and profit structure is not indicates that cost constraints on a business are
more likely to create an environment where sales tax theft is likely than the simple desire
to make more profit (greed). It would therefore seem appropriate to fix intuitive efforts
on cost rather than profit factors.
The weak correlation between filing history and sales tax theft was expected. It
was previously noted that the 192 dealers in the targeted industry enforcement program
discussed in the next chapter were responsible for $21,421,312 of sales tax theft and
those same dealers had delinquencies booked of just over $300,000, and most had no
delinquencies. Most companies that are involved in the theft of large amounts of sales
tax will likely be filing on time, reporting a substantial amount of sales tax collected
every month, and remitting the tax without insufficient funds problems. In fact, the
correlation between sales tax theft and chronic delinquency (late filing or payment in
more than ten percent of filing periods) is only .204 (N = 369, p = .001). These data
indicate that companies most heavily involved in sales tax theft are aware of the theft and
make an effort to conceal it. As an additional test of this theory an additional binary
logistic regression model was developed including one additional variable identifying
those members of the sample who participated in the Florida amnesty program in 2003.
The results are presented in Table 7.5.
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Table 7.5 Results of Logistic Regression – Tax Evasion Prediction Flags and
Amnesty
Exp (B)
(Odds
Variable
B
SE
Wald
df
Sig
Ratio)
Cost Structure
1.103 .318 11.995
1 .001
3.012
Profit Structure
.224 .302
.549
1 .459
1.251
Management
1.280 .306 17.525
1 .000
3.598
Amnesty Participant in 2003
1.925 .805
5.723
1 .017
6.856
Constant
-.843 .209 16.257
1 .000
.477
N=369
(a) Reference category for the dependent variable is no theft.
(b) Nagelkerke R Square = .208
(c) Hosmer and Lemeshow (x2 = 1.868, df = 4, p=.760)
(d) Overall percentage correctly classified = 67.5%; no theft = 42.5% correct; theft = 85.2% correct

These results indicate that amnesty programs, while generally responsible for
raising a lot of money, do not result in more compliant behavior on the part of those who
participate. In this study, amnesty participants were 6.856 times more likely to be
involved in sales tax theft than those members who did not participate, which is the
largest indicator in the analysis by a wide margin. 20
The data and analysis from this portion of this study make it clear that simply
trusting businesses to remit the sales tax they collect is bad policy. My study indicates
that a large percentage of companies are involved in sales tax theft. Companies that steal
the most conceal the theft carefully, and may even participate in amnesty programs to
provide additional cover for their illegal activities or to deter the taxing authority from
taking a closer look at the business. Delinquent filers and payers, who currently receive
the majority of the attention and resources of DOR, account for a very small percentage
20

This statistic is problematic in that it suggests that amnesty participants should be singled out for audit or
investigation. But such a response would certainly dampen taxpayer enthusiasm for participating in
amnesty programs. In the author’s opinion, adding more resources to enforcement activities is preferable to
amnesty programs and, ultimately, more cost effective.
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of the theft of state funds that occurs. Intuitive analysis utilized at a lower level in the
compliance enforcement process can be a critical component of improved enforcement
efforts. As a result of this analysis, the alternative hypothesis set forth in chapter 3 is
accepted:
H2: Agent intuition applied to intelligence data yields effective identification of
candidates for targeted enforcement efforts.
But it has also been shown that such analyses can yield a large number of false
positives which have the potential to cause an enforcement agent to waste precious time
and resources on nonproductive endeavors. To realize the efficiency promised by this
type of analysis and minimize the waste caused by false positives, two additional
requirements are necessary:
1. The time-consuming process of proving compliance must be transferred to the
target by requiring the presentation of records required by law to be maintained in
support of the returns filed. Businesses that are in compliance with the
recordkeeping requirements of the law will be able to prove the veracity of the
returns filed with little effort.
2. Informal contacts and engagement with the target are substituted, at least initially,
for the more formal and structured approaches present in audits and criminal
investigations.
In the next chapter the author provides an analysis of how such a program can be
successfully implemented with minimal resources.
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CHAPTER 8
TARGETED INDUSTRY ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS:
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
On any given day an agent with the Florida Department of Revenue may interact
with owners of convenience stores, car rental companies, car sales lots, restaurants, bars,
secondhand dealers, consignment shops, 99 cent stores, gas stations and every other type
of business that can be imagined. Collection employees in the Service Centers are
assigned by zip codes, not by business type. Audits are conducted as a result of audit
case selection activities. Criminal investigations are initiated based on complaints or
other leads related to fraudulent activities. While there are industry experts within DOR,
none of the employees in the Service Centers specialize in any particular industry by
design. Periodically, DOR does initiate enforcement programs designed to increase
compliance in an industry where compliance is deemed to be low. An example of this
was the commercial rental enforcement program discussed in Chapter 4. Using the data
warehousing capabilities of the SUNTAX system DOR was able to identify a large
number of commercial landlords that were not registered to collect and remit sales tax.
This program resulted in the collection of more than $30 million in unreported sales tax
revenue. In addition, the registration of these entities provided an annuity of $10 million
per year in future revenues through the same effort. Discovery operations and campaigns
generate about $50 million on average per year. These enforcement programs are not
common at the local level in the Service Centers. When they are initiated, they have
largely been discovery-oriented projects run centrally out of Tallahassee with little, if
any, involvement at the local level. Additionally, they normally are of limited duration.
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An opportunity arose within Southern Region Criminal Investigations for me to
study the impact of targeted industry enforcement activities at the local level. As
mentioned in Chapters 5 and 7, for every used car sold in the state an application for title
is filed with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) to cause
the transfer of title from the dealer to the purchaser of the car. Car dealers are required to
include their sales tax number and the amount of sales tax collected with respect to the
transaction on the title application. Sales tax data from these title applications can be
accumulated and compared to amounts reported to DOR on monthly sales tax returns to
identify discrepancies that need to be reconciled. (See Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5 for a
diagram of this process). The data from the applications for title is provided to DOR on a
quarterly basis. 21 For purposes of the present study, this comparison was performed for
every dealer in Miami-Dade County. The initial comparisons yielded 192 used car
dealers in Miami-Dade County with potential sales tax theft of $21,421,312.22 over the
last five-year period.
On average, more than $357,000 of the sales tax theft identified would be lost to
the five-year statute of limitations for theft every month that passed. It was, therefore,
important that action be taken fairly quickly. Resource limitations dictated that 192
criminal investigations, more than doubling the current case load, could not be conducted
quickly enough so alternative treatments had to be found in order to address the identified

21

The comparison of sales tax collected as reflected on title transfer applications to amounts reported to the
Department of Revenue on monthly sales tax returns is a time-consuming, laborious task. An effort was
made to match the data statewide in 2001, but only about 60 percent of the data could be matched easily
because of difficulties in matching Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles licensees to
Department of Revenue tax accounts. As a result, no overall matching of data is performed on a regular
basis. When needed, investigators accumulate and compare the data manually.
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potential theft through a combination of full investigations and activities designed to
quickly identify those cases that did not involve criminal activity.

The Interventions
As noted in Chapter 4, the comparison of sales tax collected per the DHSMV title
applications to amounts reported to DOR yields potential sales tax theft. Explanations
other than theft are possible. Part of the difference is sometimes explained by timing
differences. Some dealers report the sales tax collected only after the title to the car is
issued, resulting in a one- or two-month delay in reporting the tax to DOR. It is not
correct to report in this manner, but over time, no theft occurs. Technically the dealer
owes a penalty and interest on the sales tax remitted late. Additionally, those dealers that
finance car sales internally, known as “buy here pay here” dealers, usually have high
numbers of repossessions, which result in credits against their sales tax liabilities. They
are required to report the entire amount of sales tax collected on the date of sale. If they
do not collect all the payments under a deferred payment arrangement, they are allowed a
credit essentially for the tax rate times the principal amount of the sales price not
collected. 22 The credits taken are required to be reported on the monthly sales tax
returns, but some dealers do not understand this requirement and simply report the
current month sales tax collected net of any repossession credits they are due. Therefore,
those companies with smaller discrepancies and those where the sales tax reported was a

22

The actual calculation as set forth on Form DR-95b seems significantly more complex to most small
dealers who have no training in accounting or finance. The calculation guides the dealer step by step
through the process of allocating payments between principal and interest to determine the principal
balance due at the date of repossession, which is simple enough conceptually, but most dealers struggle
with the calculation and many claim the entire amount of sales tax originally collected as the credit amount.
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high percentage of the total tax collected might be companies that are reporting the sales
tax when the title is actually issued and/or they may have claimed repossession credits
that were not formally reported that explain the differences. Therefore, it is reasonable to
handle those companies in a manner other than a full criminal investigation, and in a
manner that does not pull investigative resources away from those cases where they are
obviously required. It was decided to send these dealers a letter explaining the need for a
reconciliation of amounts reported to the DHSMV versus the amount reported to DOR.
In this manner, the companies with smaller amounts or percentages of possible theft
could be handled more quickly, and those where it appeared a civil rather than criminal
solution was warranted could be identified rapidly and referred to collections employees
within DOR.
A review of the accounts for classification purposes identified 34 companies that
could be classified in what was labeled the low-theft group, representing a total of
$606,016.10 in potential sales tax theft. Five companies were identified that were already
the subject of a separate investigation, audit, or other compliance enforcement activity
and were thus removed. These five companies represented $279,167.30 in potential sales
tax theft. Companies classified as having major theft probability totaled 43 and
represented $14,164,214.64 in potential sales tax theft. These companies would require
full investigation. This left 110 companies representing $6,371,914.18 in potential sales
tax theft to be initially contacted via letter and asked to provide reconciliation. Table 8.1
presents a summary of the companies as classified.
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Table 8.1 Classification of Dealers with Potential Sales Tax Theft
Revenues
Sales Tax
Potential
Collection
Number
Reported
Reported
Theft
Balance
Contact by
Letter
110
$486,633,327 $22,188,274
$6,371,914
$182,054
Criminal
Investigation
43
$339,418,780
$9,270,420
$14,164,215
$89,552
Low Theft
34
$164,670,689
$3,717,882
$606,016
$27,456
Removed
5
$27,323,885
$1,610,648
$279,167
$3,164
Totals
192 $1,018,046,681 $36,787,224
$21,421,312
$302,226
The “Revenues Reported” and “Sales Tax Reported” columns in Table 8.1 are the
amounts of gross sales and sales tax collected as reported on the Sales and Use Tax
Returns filed by the companies. The “Potential Theft” column reflects the additional
amount of sales tax reported to DHSMV on title applications over and above what was
reported on the returns filed with DOR. The “Collection Balance” is the amount of
delinquent taxes subject to DOR collection activities as reflected in SUNTAX and
included in DOR receivables.
Note from Table 8.1 that the collection balance associated with the dealers
included in this study was only $302,226. That is the amount that the local service center
collections personnel were attempting to collect from the 192 dealers included. Absent
this study or the generation of other leads or complaints that might have resulted in an
audit or criminal investigation of one or perhaps a few of these dealers, DOR would have
recovered $302,226 either through cash collection or through levy against a warrant or
lien at some point in the future. In reality, these businesses owed $21,421,312 in sales
tax, not $302,226. This comparison points to the very large hole in the compliance
umbrella previously discussed. With collections personnel concentrating solely on
delinquencies; audits or criminal investigations few and far between because of resource
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limitations; and no third-party verification of sales taxes collected by business agents of
the state, the vast majority of sales tax theft goes unnoticed and unchallenged.
To facilitate the handling of and allocation of resources to the accounts to be
contacted via letter, 64 dealers were selected for contact in the first mailing to gauge
response and determine if any changes in procedure were needed before contacting the
remainder. This mailing is designated as “Wave 1.” The letter simply requested that the
dealer review their records to determine why the amount of sales tax collected as reported
to DHSMV differed from the amount of sales tax collected reported to DOR on monthly
Sales and Use Tax Returns. To assist them with their reconciliation, the dealers were
provided with a schedule listing the differences in the amount of sales tax reported to
DHSMV versus the amount reported to DOR for each month over the last five years or
the time during which they were in business if shorter. The dealers were also supplied
with a listing of every transaction reported to DHSMV with the amount of tax reported
on the title application and sufficient detail to enable them to identify the car sold and the
customer to whom it was sold. With this information, the dealer could review their
records transaction by transaction to determine that each transaction was indeed a sale
consummated by their business and that the amount of tax reported to DHSMV was
correct. They were informed that if the transactions reported to DHSMV were found to
be correct, then the additional tax shown on the monthly comparison would be due and
payable to DOR. There was no indication in this letter that the reconciliation being asked
for was part of a criminal investigation.
Only 69 percent of the dealers contacted in the first mailing responded. Those
who responded did so quickly. Many asked for additional time to complete the
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reconciliation. Carrying the analysis back five years proved a problem for some,
highlighting a disconnect between the required period for maintaining records, three
years, and the statute of limitations for sales tax theft which is five years. The following
Table 8.2 presents the resolutions that followed the first mailing over a 12-month period
of time:

Table 8.2 Resolutions from the First Mailing – Wave 1
Resolution
Number of Dealers
Payment made or payment
arrangement made
9
Adjustments or credits verified for
those dealers making payments
N/A
Preliminary agreement with tax due,
but pending completion of review
4
Closed business
11
Provided documentary evidence that
filings were correct – received training
on proper reporting of repossession
8
credits
Certified correct, but no verification
provided
2
Already in prosecution
1
Moved to full criminal investigation
8
Total resolved
43
Total mailings
65
Percentages resolved
66.15%
Responded, but analysis is still
pending
6
Open dealers that did not respond
16
Percent of dealers who did not respond
(closed and open, 20 dealers, $906,828
in tax)
30.77%
Time required to date to achieve indicated resolution

Sales Tax Amount
$337,037
$83,595
$312,275
$543,816

$562,150
$175,388
$70,247
$634,372
$2,718,880
$4,129,232
65.84%
$705,064
$705,288
21.96%
12 months

The non-responsive dealers, those who closed their business after receiving the
inquiry and those who certified their returns were correct but provided no corroborating
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evidence will be subject to other enforcement efforts, including possible full criminal
investigation or referral for audit.
The second mailing was targeted to the remaining 46 dealers in the group
designated for the receipt of letters with a request for reconciliation of taxes reported to
DHSMV and DOR. This mailing was designated as “Wave 2.” Because of the low and
slow response rate to the first letter, the letter used for the second group mailing included
language making it clear that the request was being made as part of a criminal
investigation, but was similar in all other substantive respects. The change in response
was immediately noticeable: 85 percent of the recipients of the second letter responded
within 30 days of their receipt of the letter and 91 percent eventually responded within
the first four months. For the first mailing, only 57 percent responded within the first 30
days of receipt and only 69 percent responded in total over the following 12 months.
This result appears to provide empirical support for the assertion that whether or not the
consequences of tax evasion are criminal or not is important as per Varma and Doob
(1998).
Table 8.3 presents the resolutions that followed the second mailing over a 4month period of time:
It is striking that the results of the two mailings are similar, except that virtually
the same results were achieved in the second mailing in one-third of the time. The
percentage of dealers who failed to respond dropped from 31 percent in the first mailing
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Table 8.3 Resolutions from Second Mailing – Wave 2
Resolution
Payment made or payment
arrangement made
Adjustments or credits verified for
those dealers making payments
Preliminary agreement with tax due,
but pending completion of review
Closed business

Number of Dealers

Verified filings were correct –
received training in proper reporting
of repossession credits
Certified correct, but no verification
provided
Already in prosecution
Moved to full criminal investigation
Total resolved
Total mailings
Percentages resolved
Responded, but analysis is still
pending
Open dealers that did not respond
Percent of dealers who did not
respond
Time required to achieve indicated resolutions

Sales Tax Amount

9

$288,150

N/A

$94,449

4

$184,629

10

$520,720

5

$300,486

0
0
3
31
46
67.39%

$$$100,200
$1,488,634
$2,312,930
64.36%

11
4

$632,740
$191,556

8.70%

8.28%
4 months

to nine (9) percent in the second mailing. It appears that the threat of criminal
consequences is a potent enforcement tool if used judiciously. 23 These results show that
enforcement operations driven by intelligence data gathered from available resources can
be utilized to drive industry-wide enforcement campaigns at the local level to yield solid
results with the relatively small resource commitment of one individual working on the
project part time.

23

Note that all of the contacts were, in fact, in connection with a criminal investigation. However, the
mailings to the first wave of subjects did not stress that fact.
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The question now becomes: did the activities and contact with a large number of
dealers over a period of time produce improved compliance overall?

Tests of Compliance after Interventions
Some of the dealers targeted either closed their businesses or greatly scaled back
operations. It should be noted that causing a noncompliant business to close operations is
a compliance success because it causes the sales tax theft to cease. Assuming that
demand for used cars is not impacted by the closure of a dealership, it can be assumed
that the customer will patronize another dealer who is compliant and remains open. This
impact will be quantified in total later in this chapter.
To gauge the initial and continuing impact of the interventions, the average sales
tax theft for each company in Wave 1 (N = 64) was measured, prior to the intervention
and at three intervals after the intervention, as noted in Figure 8.1.
The first measurement occurred four months after the intervention; the second
three months later, just before the intervention on Wave 2; and the third five months later
at the first measurement date for Wave 2 interventions. Additional interventions were not
applied at each measurement interval so the analysis measures the length of time the
original intervention continued to have an impact on compliance.
Repeated-measures analysis of variance was used to evaluate the changes in
average sales tax theft per month and to test the null hypothesis:
H0: Any changes that occur in the mean monthly sales tax theft at the
measurement dates are due to chance and not to the intervention and such
differences will average to zero.
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05/01/09

09/30/09

Mail Date

Measure 1

01/31/09
Measure 1

04/30/09

09/30/08
Mail Date

Figure 8.1 Intervention Mailing and Measurement Timeline

Measure 3

Measure 2

1st mailing

2nd mailing

The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 8.4. The repeatedmeasures analysis of variance revealed that the intervention produced a significant
decrease in sales tax theft per month over the course of this study, F(2.219, 139.779) =
7.73, p = .000. The Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon estimate was used because the
assumption of sphericity was not met.

Table 8.4 Average Sales Tax Theft for Wave 1 Companies at Future Measurement
Dates
M
SD
Prior to intervention
1,296.61
1,046.87
Measurement at 4 months after intervention
711.96
1,109.76
Measurement at 7 months after intervention
965.67
1,541.77
Measurement at 12 months after intervention*
500.92
1,547.42
* The interventions for Wave 2 occurred at the beginning of this five-month period.
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The analysis of variance results in a rejection of the null hypothesis and
conclusion that at least one mean measured at the measurement dates is different and not
due to chance. A review of pairwise comparisons of the results between periods reveals
the following:

Table 8.5 Wave 1 Pairwise Comparisons of Average Sales Tax Theft at
Measurement Dates
Start Period
End Period
Mean Difference
Significance
Pre-intervention
01/31/09
-584.65
< .001
09/30/08
04/30/09
-330.94
.095
09/30/09
-795.69
< .001
The pairwise comparisons indicate that the Wave 1 interventions had a significant
impact on the amount of average sales tax theft during the four-month period following
the intervention. It also appears that the impact of the intervention began to wane at the
second measurement date, seven months after the intervention when there was no
significant difference in the amount of average sales tax theft compared to the periods
prior to the intervention. The results show that the mean difference between average
sales tax theft prior to the interventions and average sales tax theft one year after the
interventions was again significant. It is surmised that this “renewal” of impact occurred
due to the indirect impact of the interventions on Wave 2 and the effect of continued
follow up with respect to those companies that had responded slowly to the initial
inquiry.
In May 2009, the interventions emphasizing the connection to a criminal
investigation were applied to Wave 2. The means and standard deviations prior to
intervention and five months after the intervention are presented in Table 8.6. The
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average monthly sales tax theft for the companies in the second wave of interventions
decreased (M = 1,107.40, SD = 992.10) during the five months following the intervention
applied to this second wave. Applying a paired-samples t-test it was found that this
reduction was statistically significant, t(45) = 7.571, p < .001.

Table 8.6 Wave 2 Monthly Sales Tax Theft Means and Standard Deviations before
the Interventions and at the Five-Month Measurement Date
M
SD
Prior to intervention
1,105.53
717.63
Five months after intervention
-1.87
970.34
Recall that the intervention applied to the second wave emphasized that the
inquiry was in connection with a criminal investigation. A one-way ANOVA was
utilized to compare the impacts between the two types of interventions applied to the two
groups based on the mean tax theft per month at the first measurement date after the
application of the intervention. 24 The ANOVA revealed a significant difference between
the two treatments, F(1, 103) = 10.941, p = .001. Table 8.7 presents the means and
standard deviations for each intervention.

Table 8.7 Comparison of Mean Sales Tax Theft per Month between Waves 1 and 2
M
SD
Intervention 1 – Wave 1 (N = 64)
711.96
1,109.76
Intervention 2 – Wave 2 (N = 41)
-2.10
1,129.59
The comparison of mean sales tax theft per month between Waves 1 and 2
suggests that interventions that emphasize criminal consequences result in more
24

The first measurement date for each intervention was used in the comparison because that is the
measurement date when the intervention should have its maximum impact.
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compliance than interventions perceived as civil in nature in line with the findings of
Varma and Doob (1998).

The Indirect Impact of the Interventions
Did the interventions have an indirect impact on companies within the study that
were not directly targeted by a specific intervention? Again, monthly average sales tax
theft calculated for those companies which were not directly targeted by the specific
intervention was used in this analysis. With respect to the first intervention which
occurred in October 2008, companies that were not subject to an intervention until the
second wave in May 2009 were included in the indirect analysis along with companies
that were not subject to interventions at all (the Major Case and Low Theft groups). With
respect to the second intervention, only the Major Case and Low Theft groups were
evaluated for indirect impact. The measurement date with respect to the first intervention
was four months after the intervention, and for the second intervention, five months. A
paired samples t test was used to test the null hypothesis:
H0: Any changes that occur in the mean monthly sales tax theft of members of
groups not subject to direct intervention are due to chance and not to the indirect
effect of the intervention and such differences will average to zero.
Table 8.8 presents the means and standard deviations of the monthly tax theft
before and after the interventions for companies that might have been indirectly affected
by the interventions.
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Table 8.8 Monthly Sales Tax Theft Means and Standard Deviations for Indirect
Effects of Interventions
M
SD
N
Interventions – Wave 1 Prior to Intervention
2,713.85
5,861.50
94
After Intervention
2,486.70
8,253.97
94
Interventions – Wave 2 Prior to Intervention
3,496.19
7,019.28
53
After Intervention
1,973.85
4,164.90
53
With respect to the first set of interventions, monthly sales tax theft decreased (M
= 227.14, SD = 4,172.41) in companies that might have been indirectly impacted by the
intervention. The decrease was not statistically significant t(93) = .528, p = .599.
With respect to the second set of interventions, monthly sales tax theft decreased
(M = 1,522.34, SD = 4,449.48) in the companies that might have been indirectly
impacted by the intervention. The analysis indicates that the decrease was significantly
more than would be expected by chance, t(52) = 2.491, p = .016.
On the basis of these tests, it can be inferred that direct interventions have a
significant impact on monthly tax theft by the companies to which the interventions are
applied. The impact is significant regardless of whether the intervention implies
compliance failure will be subject to civil consequences or criminal consequences, but it
appears that the impact is stronger where the implied consequences are criminal in nature.
Additionally, criminal interventions have a significant indirect impact on compliance
while civil interventions do not.
The implication of these results is that to control sales tax theft, non-criminal
interventions must be continuous and direct. Further, interventions with implied or
clearly criminal consequences do result in some indirect or “spillover” effect on
companies not directly targeted by the intervention.

132

Enforcement and the “Major Case” Dealers
To this point the “Major Case” dealers, the 43 dealers responsible for potential
sales tax theft of $14,164,215, have been ignored. The amount of potential sales tax theft
by these dealers dictated that normal criminal investigations be carried out as opposed to
some lighter form of intervention. Chapter 6 described how the Southern Region
Investigations unit had increased participation in task forces with other federal, state and
local agencies on large, multi-company cases where other agencies had enforcement
interests that aligned with those of DOR. With respect to the Major Case car dealers, it
was decided that the same approach could be used with respect to a large group of similar
companies that were unrelated by ownership, but related by business type. The State
Attorney’s Office assigned a prosecutor to participate and provide legal assistance and
expedited review of search warrant affidavits. The Special Investigations Unit of the
Miami-Dade Police Department, Auto Theft Task Force, was approached for their
assistance with the execution of search warrants. They indicated they held
complementary interests in many of these dealers and agreed to a cooperative operation.
Fifteen of the 43 dealers in this class had closed during the months that elapsed
while search warrants were being drafted and approved; one was removed and referred to
another region because their operations actually existed in that other region; and five
were removed to be subjected to other types of interventions based on various other
criteria. This left 22 dealers to be investigated by the newly formed task force. In mid
October 2009 ten search warrants were executed in a single day with two alternates
executed a few days later. In early December 2009 the remaining search warrants were
executed, again in a single day. Executing ten search warrants per day in this manner
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required five teams of at least five people each with two additional people “floating” for
support. Each team was responsible for executing one search warrant in the morning and
one in the afternoon. Since DOR Southern Region Investigations has only four agents
and one support analyst to participate in search warrants, it would have been impossible
to execute these warrants in such a short period of time without the task force format.
The execution of DOR search warrants always requires the assistance of a law
enforcement agency because DOR agents are classified as regulatory and not law
enforcement. Without a task force, however, it is difficult to obtain support for multiple
search warrant executions in a single day. Under ordinary circumstances these 22 search
warrants would have likely been executed over the course of a year if executed singly as
separate cases. By conglomerating them into a single operation, DOR was able to obtain
the evidence required to document criminal cases against all 22 entities in a very
compressed period of time. By the end of December, two cases had already been
documented, approved, and submitted to the State Attorney’s Office for potential
prosecution. The State Attorney’s Office had also committed to expedite the handling of
all 22 cases to minimize any further losses because of expiration of the statute of
limitations.

Summary of the Impact of the Targeted Interventions
Over the course of 14 months targeted interventions were applied to the used car
industry in Miami-Dade County Florida. The interventions included substantial contact
with targeted dealers and the execution of search warrants on those with the largest
amounts of identified potential theft. The impact of these interventions is the
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identification and collection of a portion of the unremitted sales tax in the short term;
longer term additional annual collections of sales tax through increased compliance;
pending additional collections through continuing contact with dealers who have not
completed their analysis of DOR-provided data; potential restitution from dealers
identified for full investigation and potential prosecution; and reduced sales tax theft from
the closure of noncompliant businesses.
The short term impact of the interventions is measured by the amount of
unremitted sales tax collected, the amount under payment arrangements, plus the amount
of unremitted sales tax where the liability has been admitted but payment arrangements
are not complete. The short term impact measured in this manner is $1,122,090.41.
There is an additional $2,542,817.82 of unremitted sales tax pending at this time that will
likely be added to the short term impact.
The continuing monthly impact of the interventions with respect to open
businesses is measured by the additional amount of monthly sales tax being remitted
since the intervention by those companies that have become compliant. The monthly
increase in sales tax remitted since the interventions is $157,761.02, or $1,893,132.24 per
year. It will likely be necessary to maintain periodic contact with these businesses in
order to sustain these savings.
The continuing monthly impact of the interventions with respect to closed
businesses is measured by the monthly amount of sales tax no longer being stolen by
these businesses. Assuming the demand for used cars is not impacted by the closure of
these businesses, the closing of noncompliant businesses should result in sales being
transferred to compliant businesses that will remit the sales tax collected. Therefore, the
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closure of noncompliant businesses does increase future sales tax collections. The
increase in sales tax remittances by compliant businesses who inherit the sales volume of
closed noncompliant businesses is $133,745.08 per month or $1,604,940.96 per year.
Some businesses do close naturally, but the businesses in this study that closed had been
in operation for more than five years indicating the intervention was likely a trigger for
closing at this particular time.
There is $8,430,301.69 of potential criminal restitution that will be collected as a
result of these interventions. Of this amount, documentation supporting $7,269,212.70 of
unremitted sales tax has been obtained through the execution of search warrants.
Analysis of the evidence and drafting of the probable cause affidavits for bringing
criminal charges against these entities and owners is underway, with two cases already
complete and submitted to the State Attorney’s Office for charging. Criminal charges
related to the remaining $1,161,088.99 of potential restitution will be documented
through a combination of subpoenas and the use of title applications certified by
DHSMV. All criminal charges should be in place within four months of the execution of
the search warrants. The State Attorney’s Office has the option of negotiating payment
of these liabilities, plus interest, investigative costs, and a plea to lesser charges in lieu of
prosecution.
Dealers that closed during the course of the interventions owed $5,818,319.74,
with a single dealer owing $2,442,177.37 of that amount. These dealers will be subject to
a complete criminal investigation and referral for prosecution.
A total of 35 dealers have been identified for the next wave of interventions
representing $1,296,174.82 in unremitted sales tax.
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Table 8.9 summarizes the impact of these interventions at the time of this
writing.

Table 8.9 Summary of the Impact of Interventions
Category
Companies
Short term collections
26
Pending short-term collections
42
Continuing annual collections – open
compliant businesses
107
Continuing annual collections –
transferred from closed noncompliant
to open compliant businesses
37
Potential restitution – search warrants
executed
22
Potential restitution – alternate
documentation
13
Potential restitution – prosecutions of
closed businesses
35
Next wave of interventions
35
N/A due to overlaps
Totals

Amount
$1,122,090.40
$2,542,817.82
$1,893,132.24

$1,604,940.96
$7,269,212.70
$1,161,088.99
$5,818,319.74
$1,296,174.82
$22,707,777.67

As pending cases are resolved, full investigations and prosecutions proceed, and
the next wave of interventions take place, the analysis of the industry will continue in a
cycle designed to continuously identify potential theft and begin to intervene before the
amount of theft by any given dealer becomes large enough to require a full investigation
or prosecution.
You may recall the following hypothesis set forth in Chapter 3:
H1: The effectiveness of compliance enforcement efforts will be improved if
active, well-informed enforcement activities characterized by substantial contact
initiated by the agents of the state are substituted for passive or reactive activities.
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To test this hypothesis the above results were compared with the results that
would have been achieved without this project. Without the interventions, it is possible
that the collection balances because of delinquencies would have been recovered, even
though recovery from companies that closed would be unlikely. It is also possible that
audits would have been performed for those companies identified in the System for
Unified Taxation (SUNTAX) as audit leads, even though some of these leads had already
been rejected. To be conservative, it is assumed that all collection balances would
eventually be collected ($302,226.49) and that audits would be performed for all
identified audit leads and that such audits would result in identification of the unremitted
sales tax identified. There were 14 companies identified as audit leads representing
$1,946,053.89 in sales tax theft. Therefore, without the interventions it is possible that
DOR would have recovered a total of $2,248,280.38 of unremitted sales tax.
Amounts recovered as a result of the interventions are calculated excluding
additional monthly sales tax in future periods or sales tax theft avoided because of closed
companies and includes only theft balances that existed at the time the interventions
began. This total is $19,209,704.47. The means and standard deviations of the tax theft
amounts identified with and without the interventions are presented in Table 8.10.

Table 8.10 Means and Standard Deviations of Sales Tax Theft Identified and
Recoverable With and Without Interventions
M
SD
Identified and recoverable through interventions
100,050.54
220,100.00
Identifiable and recoverable without interventions
11,709.79
48,504.86
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Using a one-way ANOVA to compare means before and after (with and without)
the intervention, the interventions resulted in an increase (M = 88,340.75, SD = 218,997)
in sales tax theft identified. The Brown-Forsythe F-ratio is being reported because the
assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated. The increase in sales tax theft
identified and recoverable was statistically significant, F(1, 209.509) = 29.498, p < .001.
As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that the effectiveness of
compliance enforcement efforts are improved by active, well informed enforcement
activities characterized by substantial contact initiated by agents of the state.
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CHAPTER 9
EXPLAINING SALES TAX THEFT THROUGH THE
THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR AND CRESSEY’S FRAUD TRIANGLE
It is claimed that the U. S. income tax system is built on voluntary assessment
and payment (Flora v. United States, 1960). A review of the income tax return clearly
illustrates it is more a case of trust but verify. An Internal Revenue Service agent
reviewing an income tax return has enough financial data provided on the return itself to
visualize the financial position of the individual or company and make a preliminary
determination of the veracity of the income tax reported. Income tax returns provide a
frame of reference because deductions are reported along with revenues. One can readily
see that the amount of revenue reported supports the level of expenses claimed, or that it
does not. Corporate income tax returns also include a balance sheet with supporting
statements which allow a fuller financial analysis of the business. The sales tax return,
on the other hand, is all trust with no verification. The return, at least in Florida, provides
one line of data containing gross sales, exempt sales, taxable sales, and the sales tax
collected.
Perhaps one of the most important findings in this study is that trust is misplaced
in the tax environment. Remember that Martinez-Vazquez, Harwood, and Larkins (1992)
found in their experiments that given the safe opportunity to evade taxes, a near-majority
of people would take that chance and, if in an illiquid position, a significantly larger
proportion of people would choose to evade. The findings in this study support this
premise.
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The framework for this study seeks to explain sales tax theft utilizing the theory
of planned behavior for analysis of the decision to evade, incorporated into Cressey’s
fraud triangle, and to use this framework to set forth enhanced enforcement
methodologies to combat sales tax theft. My study has provided analysis to support
arguments for the adoption of new methods and empirical evidence that the proposed
methodology works. At this point a qualitative review of this study is appropriate to
match observations to the theory underlying this study.
The theory of planned behavior posits that for an individual to perform a given
behavior, it is necessary that the person be able to decide at will to perform or not
perform the behavior. The theory postulates three independent determinants of intention:
•

The person’s attitude toward the behavior, as in whether the person has a
favorable or unfavorable view of the behavior;

•

Perceived social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior; and

•

Perceived behavioral control: the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the
behavior based on past experience and anticipated obstacles (Ajzen, 1991).
Cressey’s fraud triangle adds the element of need to the analysis to account for

how the individual arrives at the point where the intention to steal is formed. Need is the
element that leads the individual to the decision point. Need pushes the individual into
the realm where intention to steal or not to steal is formed by the determinants of the
theory of planned behavior. The need arises; the individual forms an intention to steal to
satisfy that need.
This study provided the opportunity to meet and talk to more than 100 business
owners, all of whom were under investigation for theft of state funds. Nearly all of those

141

who received inquiry letters requiring a reconciliation of sales tax reported to DHSMV
versus DOR and responded were extremely concerned by the inquiry and desired to
resolve their tax issues expeditiously. All of them stated that if it were found they owed
the taxes, they would make arrangements to pay the amount due. Indeed, several
immediately paid the entire difference identified. It was clear from the responses that
most knew they owed the money. One stated that he had come upon hard times and held
back some of the taxes to subsidize his operations with the intention of making it up in
later months, but once behind on his payments it became difficult to make good on his
intentions, a Borrower in the typology of tax evaders. Twelve dealers claimed that errors
had been made by employees or accountants and ten pled misunderstanding of the rules
regarding the calculation and reporting of repossession credits (Incompetents in the
evader typology). Ten dealers identified other individuals utilizing their DHSMV dealer
number to sell cars without reporting the sales tax. Four dealers had allowed others to
use their dealer number and trusted them to properly report the sales tax. These fourteen
dealers were “Negligent Evaders” in the typology. Four had lost all their records and
could not perform an analysis to enable a response, potential “Proficient Evaders” using
the excuse of lost records to confound proving a theft case. Two dealers pointed to
illness as a cause of the problem, Incompetents of the subtype citing medical problems
afflicting the primarily responsible party. Ten dealers claimed to be victims of fraud
perpetrated by a partner, employee, or manager of the business, “Negligent Evaders” due
to lack of internal controls. One dealer was deceased and another was incarcerated in
another state, confounding proper classification. As predicted by Cressey’s fraud
triangle, some form of need requiring retention of the state funds existed in most cases as
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evidenced either by an admission during discussions, payment difficulties evidenced in
the records of DOR, or in difficulties in arranging down payments on payment plans to
resolve their tax issues. Few were able to repay the tax immediately. Most cited the
horrible downturn in the economy, although such excuses disregard the fact that the theft
began five years prior, when the economy was booming, and further ignores the fact that
sales of used cars actually increased because of the economic downturn as was evidenced
by their own increased sales. These excuses appeared to be rationalizations based on
generalized causes that, on the surface, made sense given the current state of the
economy, but were not grounded in fact.
Some of the business owners decided to close their businesses and fade from view
in order to avoid the repayment of the tax. There were 21 of these owing $1,064,536, and
these are of the “Hardcore Evader” typology progressing toward “Proficient Evader.” It
is curious that so many business owners would believe that closing their business would
solve their tax problem. To a great degree this is because they have learned this behavior.
In Chapter 6 a task force case was mentioned where 30 search warrants were
executed in a single day. One of these companies had been audited five years before and
had a $146,000 audit assessment outstanding. It had been outstanding for five years
because the company purportedly closed. However, the investigation determined that the
business had been transferred to a new corporation ostensibly owned by the daughter of
the owner of the predecessor company. In fact, the company had not closed for a single
day. It continued to operate as it had before and continued to steal sales tax during the
entire period from the audit assessment to the execution of the search warrant five years
hence. Failure to follow up the assessment and resulting lien with a levy and seizure of
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property resulted in the infrastructure for theft being left intact for the new straw owner.
Experience shows this to be a common occurrence in Florida because the state exercises
so much restraint in seizing property to satisfy levies that seizures essentially never occur.
Some business owners understand this and have come to accept and rely on the state’s
passivity in this area. This particular evader was a “Proficient Evader” but was caught
through association with “Hardcore Evader” companies who were identified through their
failure to cover all indicators of fraud.
One of the accountants representing two of the car dealers who had received
intervention letters mentioned that his clients had asked him what would happen if they
simply ignored the letter from DOR since they were aware that some companies that
received the letters were doing so, an indication that the dealers were talking among
themselves. The execution of the first set of search warrants on the “Major Case” group
had just been completed and a large number of boxes sealed with red evidence tape were
in the author’s office for review. The accountant was told that the boxes were from
search warrants executed on companies that chose to ignore the letters, a fact
communicated by the accountant to his clients. Not only did his clients no longer think
ignoring the letters was viable, but two additional companies that had not previously
responded to their letters contacted the author within 24 hours to seek guidance on how to
proceed with their review.
While this evidence is merely anecdotal, these two stories illustrate an important
fact that officials responsible for compliance enforcement need to understand: businesses
talk to each other. They know what is happening in their industry and analyze activities
to ascertain what they need to be concerned with and what can be ignored. A business
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owner is faced with a tax assessment; they close down and reopen under a relative’s
name; a lien is filed against the old business but the authorities never take any further
enforcement action against the owners to collect. The end result is that the owners have
learned how to avoid enforcement action and that knowledge is passed on to others in
their industry. The author has personally witnessed this pattern repeated many times. It
can be assumed that subsequent investigations of the car dealers that closed will reveal
that several are still in business at a new location with a new name and with a relative or
trusted associate listed as the owner. One of the dealers in the “Major Case” group has
owned four previous dealerships through which she stole more than $2 million in sales
tax collections. More than one year prior to this study she was served with a subpoena
for the business records of those four businesses. Her response was to close the current
business and ignore the subpoena. Being aware that she had opened yet another business
under her sister’s name, the new business was included in the “Major Case” search
warrants. Records obtained from the search warrant indicate she had stolen another
$250,000 through the new business in the course of a year. She is a prime example of a
“Hardcore Evader” struggling to become “Proficient” but stymied by her prior
identification as a “Hardcore Evader.” True “Proficient Evaders” must learn from others
before they are caught and marked, or they must be able to transfer their operations to an
individual who cannot be connected to them.
While participating in the execution of search warrants on two convenience stores
the author overheard a young lady outside one of the stores say “They’ll just change the
name,” as she watched the operation unfold. She had made the connection between
enforcement action and transfer of ownership. Subsequent review indicated that there
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had indeed been previous search warrants executed on companies with different names at
these same locations within the past few years and that the current owners of record were
related to the owners of the previous entities. 25 It is unknown whether this problem is
unique to Florida, but it is commonly recognized by DOR personnel as a significant
problem for Florida tax enforcement.
In the case of the car dealers who received intervention letters, it was observed
and heard from third parties that many of the dealers were watching and biding their time
to see if DOR would actually follow through on collecting the taxes due as reflected in
the letters. The execution of the search warrants on the Major Case group helped in this
regard. One of the owners of a business subjected to a search warrant commented that he
had received calls from “everyone I know and everybody I used to know” regarding the
search warrant. He stated that “bad news travels fast” and that everyone wanted to know
what he had done wrong. He stated that he had not heard from many of these people in
years (Anonymous, Personal communication, 2009). The speed at which information
travels in industry circles cannot be underestimated. Just as bad news travels fast, as this
dealer learned, news about how to beat the system travels fast as well. An accountant
who represents many car dealers was in DOR offices on another matter and mentioned to
one of the investigators that the “yellow envelopes,” (the mailed interventions), were now
famous with local used car dealers and his clients were dreading receiving one. There are
significant indications that the subjective social norms in the theory of planned behavior
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The owner was subsequently convicted on the strength of the evidence obtained in the final search
warrant and sentenced to four years in prison.
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are at work with respect to tax enforcement in this project and that these norms are
coloring individual attitudes toward compliance.
There was a distinct tendency for dealers to let deadlines slip. For example, a
dealer would call and request an additional 60 days to complete their analysis because
records had to be retrieved from storage. If a follow up call was not initiated at the end of
the 60 days, the dealer generally would not contact the Department once the additional
time granted had expired. In several cases the author waited for several weeks after the
deadline passed to see if the dealer would call and they did not. They appeared to be
testing their limits in their interaction with the state. Continuous and consistent follow up
is critical.
So why do people steal sales tax dollars? Sales tax theft can be explained within
the expanded theory of planned behavior framework presented in this study and evaders
can be categorized within the evader typology set forth herein. It was noted in this study
that dealers who failed to remit sales tax dollars had a need for the funds, a framework
component supplied by Cressey’s fraud triangle. The need was not necessarily one where
the company was faced with bankruptcy absent embezzlement of the tax funds, for most
of these dealers drove expensive cars, wore nice clothes and jewelry, operated wellmaintained business locations, and paid for extensive help at the car lots even though
they reported few, if any, employees. Their need was for the funds required to support
the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed or to which they aspired.
Information sharing between dealers with respect to this project was witnessed, as
discussed above, during this project and was confirmed in interviews with DOR
personnel and analysis of other DOR cases that provide evidence of the information
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sharing that occurs among industry peers specifically and taxpayers in general. This
information sharing is sophisticated enough that it has become a learning system where
taxpayer activities adjust constantly to enforcement efforts. Members of the
investigations unit noted that as they execute search warrants on, for example,
convenience store locations, which have historically low rates of compliance, and
complete criminal cases against stores based on certain types of evidence, they find that
the nature and quality of evidence obtained in subsequent search warrants tends to
deteriorate. Several years ago an investigator could prepare a case covering several years
with documentation obtained through the execution of a search warrant on a convenience
store. Currently, it is difficult to get more than a month’s worth of data on site because
owners have learned to remove the documentation from the store premises as soon as it is
no longer required there for business operations. The response was not one of becoming
more compliant, but one of destroying the evidence of noncompliance. These situations
constitute substantial evidence of the existence of social norms that support tax evasion
and tax theft activities. They are also examples of Proficient Evaders who adjust and
adapt as enforcement efforts progress, but never choose compliance as a response option.
Based on this study I conclude that businesses collecting sales tax perceive they
have a high level of behavioral control with respect to the decision to retain the sales tax.
They do not believe they will be caught and a shockingly high percentage of businesses
make the decision to retain taxpayer funds for their personal use. Even when they are
caught through audit activities many have learned that they can ignore the assessment and
avoid consequences fairly easily. Few of them actually own the property from which
their business is run, so a tax lien matters little.
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The final component of the theory of planned behavior as it relates to sales tax
theft is the business owner’s attitude toward sales tax theft. From interaction with
business owners during this study the author has developed the distinct impression that
most do not view their failure to remit the full amount of sales tax collected as theft of
state funds. Social norms help to explain this attitude. If the circles to which business
owners belong treat sales tax theft as just another governmental fee to be avoided; and if,
in fact, the circles to which they belong embrace avoidance of remitting sales taxes
collected and proactively share strategies that enable the businessman to avoid paying the
sales tax even when assessed; then the stigma of theft does not attach to the activity.
From this grows an attitude that sales tax theft is acceptable, commonplace, and not
immoral.
Just as the theory of planned behavior assists in understanding sales tax theft, it
can also provide the key for improved enforcement. Enforcement efforts must be brought
to bear simultaneously against the business owner’s perception of behavioral control and
the social norms that feed the attitude that sales tax theft is acceptable. This is most
readily achieved through the use of targeted industry enforcement activities informed by
strategic intelligence and data analysis that result in continuous and consistent
engagement with the businesses collecting taxes as an agent of the state.
It is important to make it clear that this approach is not merely better targeting of
the deterrence model to evasion, but an attempt to use engagement to educate taxpayers,
change attitudes, and ensure continued compliance in the future. It may appear that this
study is primarily focused on increasing compliance by targeting enforcement in such a
way as to preclude the assumption of behavioral control on the part of a potential evader.
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While that is certainly a major thrust of the approach, the intended impact of engagement
on attitudes and subjective norms is equally as important, but more difficult to illustrate
in a time-limited study. Such impacts can only be measured over time and, indeed,
require much time to take effect. A single encounter with a tax enforcement agent, no
matter how “pleasant” the agent attempts to make it, has little chance of completely
negating the repeated government bashing and tax hate that grips a substantial portion of
the population and is reinforced by some politicians. However, it is my belief that such
encounters do make a difference. All of the subjects in this study and the attorneys some
of them engaged indicated repeated and sometimes emotional gratitude for the
professional manner in which they were treated and for the reasonableness of the
approach. Most of them understood that the first encounter could have been much more
confrontational, accusatory, and might have included the drafting of a probable cause
affidavit for their arrest with only a single opportunity to consent to an interview, which
their attorney’s would have advised against anyway. All too often the first approach in
enforcement is a severe one, as dictated by the still influential but often misinterpreted
deterrence model, involving assessments, penalties, and fees equal to several times the
amount of the tax not remitted, and sometimes being charged with a felony tax crime
before any real effort is made to resolve the deficiencies. While the impact of this
approach on attitudes and social norms cannot be specifically illustrated using only
evidence from this study and statistical analysis, the author’s interactions with these
individuals provides an indication that the approach does indeed have an impact. Over
time it will be possible to measure this impact if the approach is adopted more
universally.
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CHAPTER 10
MAKING ENFORCEMENT WORK
The state of the compliance enforcement environment is not always as clear as it
may seem. Florida reports voluntary sales tax compliance rates based solely on
delinquent returns, late remittances, and audit assessments and these reported voluntary
compliance rates are generally around 98 percent (Florida Department of Revenue,
2007). Other states, Washington for example (Washington Department of Revenue,
2008), follow this procedure as well. Due (1975) estimated the sales tax gap at five
percent of actual collections. My study indicates these reported and estimated rates bear
little resemblance to reality. There is an enormous gap in the enforcement tools currently
in use that exists between the collection of delinquent taxes on one end of the spectrum
and audit and investigation activities on the other. The ability to fill this gap rests on the
realization that more collection efforts, more audits, and more investigations are not the
answer, although more of all three are indeed needed. Filling the gap requires a new type
of enforcement methodology focused on managing the principal-agent relationship
between the state and the businesses that collect sales tax on behalf of the state. It is not
sufficient to wait until a business is late filing a return to develop an enforcement-related
relationship with that business. That business must understand that they are an agent of
the state, collecting funds that become the property of the state at the moment of
collection, and that representatives of the state are there to manage that agency
relationship and protect the state’s interest in those funds. In the present study that
function was portrayed as “interventions” on the part of the state with respect to
businesses identified that had collected and failed to remit sales taxes collected from their
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customers. In this case “interventions” is probably an appropriate term to use because the
businesses identified had been involved in sales tax theft for five years or more. Moving
forward, I think it is more appropriate to describe this relationship as one of
“engagement” rather than “intervention.” Engagement is possible as long as enforcement
operations are proactive, as the author believes they must be.
This new enforcement methodology is based on current activities known as lead
development and discovery operations. Lead development is how companies are
identified for audit, the specifics of which are not well publicized, but involves analysis
of data and available information to identify anomalies in reporting habits of businesses.
Discovery operations are similar but are much more targeted. An industry or other
grouping of businesses is targeted for enforcement operations based on evidence of
noncompliance. The discovery operation is sometimes referred to as a “campaign.” The
targeted industry enforcement program described in Chapter 8 is similar to a discovery
operation based on leads generated from a lead development program. This specialized
type of discovery operation is precisely the type of enforcement operation that needs to
be made a permanent part of local enforcement activities, operating constantly rather than
only when a new “campaign” is deemed necessary. The targeted industry enforcement
program described in Chapter 8 is the first stage of such an operation. Moving forward, it
would involve constant monitoring of the industry and identification of new leads. As
new leads are identified, new waves of “interventions” would be rolled out. As the
industry becomes more compliant because of consistent and timely monitoring, the focus
would shift to engagement, with noncompliant activities quickly identified and
corrections initiated before the business finds itself mired in felonious activities far too
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deeply to be easily extracted. A relatively common comment heard from dealers during
the targeted enforcement portion of this study was that they wish the discrepancies had
been identified earlier instead of the problem being compounded over five years. It is far
easier for a dealer to become compliant again if they are faced with unremitted taxes for
three months totaling $6,000 rather than unremitted taxes for 60 months totaling
$120,000. In ten cases the owners of the businesses were not actively involved in the
day-to-day operations of the business but had a business manager or partner who handled
daily activities, a not uncommon situation in business. These owners (Negligent
Evaders) were shocked to learn that hundreds of thousands of dollars of sales taxes had
not been remitted by their businesses. State enforcement operations could have actually
provided these owners a benefit by identifying the theft earlier. Granted it is not the
state’s responsibility to do this, and there is no doubt that some of these absentee owners
understood that sales tax theft was occurring, but from the state’s standpoint, it is much
harder to collect unremitted taxes that have gone unnoticed for five years. You can
punish the owners at that point, but the liability has grown too large for the owners to
readily repay. It is better for the owner and the state to not allow the liability to reach that
level.
It may appear that this study advocates an enforcement approach that is
tantamount to auditing everyone. The point was made that there are nearly 1 million
businesses in Florida. How can you “engage” with all of them? Of course, you cannot.
That is where intuition and strategic lead development come to bear as was indicated in
Chapter 7. This study was designed to show that the solution is not as resource intensive
or expensive as it might intuitively appear to be. It has taken many months to mount and
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administer the targeted enforcement project that is the subject of this study, but that is a
result of having only one individual assigned to the project, part time. Additionally,
because the project covered a five-year period and records are only required by law to be
retained for three years, it has taken the dealers longer to analyze and reconcile their
records. If such a program were instituted where an individual in each region were
assigned full time to the used car dealer industry, for example, the results of this study
suggest that the industry could be analyzed and brought into compliance within two
years. Going forward, updating comparison data and maintaining contacts with the
dealers would require less time. An additional component of this plan would be
unannounced records inspections at the dealers similar to those already carried out by
inspectors from DHSMV. In fact, the revenue inspections could be carried out in
conjunction with those of the DHSMV.
Used auto dealers represent a fairly easy industry in which to enforce compliance.
Third-party data are available for comparison and the businesses in the industry are
selling fewer items at higher prices making the analysis easier to perform. Compliance
has not been enforced to the extent it should only because the resources required have not
been provided. The comparison of sales tax reported on title applications to DHSMV to
sales tax reported to DOR should be an automated process that immediately flags
problems for follow up before five years pass and dealers manage to retain $20 million in
state funds for their own use, and that from just one county. That a system has not been
put in place to automate this process is probably an indication of the difficulties in
obtaining approval and financing of interagency projects. The ease of identifying
potential sales tax theft in this industry, by comparing information supplied to two
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separate state agencies by the subject company, is the factor that made this industry ideal
for this type of project. In effect, the companies indicted themselves by supplying
conflicting information regarding the same sale to two different agencies of the state. But
how will such an investigative structure work in other industries?
Each industry has unique characteristics that can be used to define a fraud
signature. To implement a similar compliance enforcement project in other industries,
data from various sources is utilized to create the fraud signature for that industry. Data
specific to individual companies can be compared to this fraud signature to identify
potential targets for enforcement operations. Again, this is not unlike current lead
development activities, but involves an expansion of data sources and devolution to the
local level.
Simultaneous to carrying out the auto dealer project, Southern Region
Investigations began developing a database for identifying fraud in another industry in
Miami-Dade County that has long been known to be largely noncompliant. The industry
will not be identified herein because the project is ongoing. Data were accumulated from
SUNTAX and a variety of public and private databases to create a profile for every entity
within this industry within Miami-Dade County. Without disclosing the details of the
analysis, the data can be analyzed to, for example, look for companies reporting revenues
too low to support the rent applicable to the location or companies reporting exempt sales
that are out of line with standards. The database is designed to allow analysis of many
factors that might indicate fraud and the assignment of relative weights to each factor to
arrive at a score that functions as a fraud indicator. Using this data, 142 preliminary
targets have been identified with high fraud signatures representing an estimated $17
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million in sales tax evasion solely from Miami-Dade County, and the database is only
half complete.
The factors involved will vary industry-by-industry, but factors can be developed
for every industry where sales tax theft or fraud is known to be significant. One or more
individuals at the local Service Center level should be allocated to each targeted industry.
While a core group of individuals could be tasked with the projects across industry lines,
the author believes there is much to be gained by allowing those who perform these types
of tasks to specialize by industry because the interpretation of the data is enhanced by
familiarity with the industry and its standards.
From the standpoint of cost, this type of enforcement activity is low cost, high
return investment. Using the used auto industry that is the subject of this study and the
additional target industry mentioned above for example, the author estimates a minimum
requirement of two dedicated employees allocated to each industry at a fully-loaded cost
of $70,713 each (salary, benefits, taxes, specialized database access, travel expenses, and
annual training costs). This $282,850 investment has the potential to return more than
$53 million dollars in the year of inception and safeguard $10.6 million per year
thereafter in direct impact. The recovery per hour invested is $6,395 per hour in the
initial year and $1,279 per hour thereafter, which is a higher return than either audit or
criminal investigation activities. The indirect impact of highly visible enforcement
activities would augment this return. Such high returns are possible because the projects
move the burden of proving compliance to the dealer by requiring the dealer to justify
reporting that is out of range or not supported by known facts. The targeted enforcement
structure set forth in the present study effectively closes the large enforcement gap that
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exists between collections activities and audit/investigations activities in a very costeffective manner. More importantly, this type of activity maintains enforcement contact
between DOR and businesses that exhibit fraud indicators. Continuous contact attracts
notice and makes it appear that the risks of being caught stealing sales tax are higher than
they actually are. That continuous contact works can be seen by looking at another
example from the used car industry. As noted, the potential sales tax theft by the used car
dealers was identified by comparing sales tax collections reported on title applications
filed with DHSMV to monthly reporting to DOR. As noted, smarter thieves tend to make
sure they file the same amounts with both state agencies, but why do some dealers file
accurate information with DHSMV but are comfortable underreporting to DOR? The
answer involves continuous contact. Filing a false title application is a third-degree
felony and can easily lead to loss of the dealer’s license to sell cars. Most dealers are
very sensitive to this possibility and those who steal sales tax will generally file accurate
title applications even though they have no intention of remitting all the sales taxes
collected. Dealers understand that at least once per year inspectors from DHSMV will
perform a site inspection which will include review of randomly selected contracts for
compliance. If an inspector finds a fraudulently prepared title application, the dealer
understands that the loss of his or her license and livelihood is the likely outcome. The
probability of getting caught falsifying a title application is much greater than getting
caught underreporting sales tax. That must change. The ingredients for change have
been provided in this paper.
Chapter 7 provides evidence that intuition based on good data can be used to
identify fraud indicators within an industry. DOR certainly has access to sufficient data

157

to enable this process for any and every industry in the state. Since the process more than
pays for itself, there is little reason not to supply the resources and adopt the approach.
Chapter 8 provides a blueprint for initiating a targeted industry enforcement
program within a given industry. Time must be provided at the inception of the project to
properly analyze the industry and identify the initial group of companies for which
contact is required. It is important to adopt an approach that requires the business to
provide documentation and/or justifications in response to DOR generated concerns.
Auditing or investigation requires DOR employees to do the time-consuming work.
Responses to intervention-type inquiries require the business to do the time-consuming
work required to respond if they have not properly maintained their support for the
returns filed. It is important to understand that in all cases, the DOR representative will
be asking for documentation that is already required by law to exist. Some businesses
will have to put this documentation together after the fact because that is the way they
customarily operate. Some file returns with little organized support for the numbers they
write on the returns. For those that do get their documentation in order before filing, the
DOR inquiry will cause them little additional work. Those businesses that do not prepare
the documentation before filing will begin to do so after they learn that DOR does indeed
monitor their reporting and expects the law regarding maintenance of books and records
to support tax filings to be followed. For example, in the targeted industry enforcement
project in this study, some of the targeted companies contacted were able to explain the
differences between what they reported as sales tax collected to DHSMV and what they
reported to DOR by repossession credits. Those companies where repossession credits
explained the entire difference would not have been on the intervention list had they
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reported their repossession credits properly. Further, the law requires they maintain
proper documentation related to repossessions along with a detailed calculation of the
amount of the credit allowed with respect to each instance. Repossession documentation
is supposed to be available whenever requested by a DOR agent. While these companies
were cleared of suspicion and further action was not necessary, the contact provided the
opportunity to educate the taxpayer on the proper way to report the repossession credits
and the proper documentation to keep on hand supporting the credit claimed. This
educational aspect was an important additional benefit of the contact.
The targeted industry enforcement program should be the primary strategic
compliance enforcement tool utilized. Currently, audits are more strategic than random,
but the random component will need to be increased to identify Proficient Evaders who
have learned to elude strategic analysis based on fraud indicators.
The present study has concentrated on state sales tax only, but it is important to
mention that this study helped identify other violations as well. During the collection of
data for the survey the following additional leads were developed:
•

Of the dealer locations that were rented, the landlords for 123 of the locations
were found to be unregistered for commercial rental activities, representing an
estimated $626,399 in monthly rental proceeds and $43,848 in additional
monthly sales tax due to the state;

•

Nineteen of the dealers were not registered for corporate income tax;

•

185 dealers were not registered for unemployment tax; and

•

62 dealers who internally financed the sale of used cars were not registered for
the documentary stamp tax.
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Targeted enforcement efforts should be holistic and not be directed at a single
tax. The goal is to increase compliance with respect to every tax for which a business is
obligated. The identification of the unregistered commercial properties mentioned above
provides an example of how targeted enforcement programs can identify leads outside of
the targeted group.
Targeted enforcement projects will indentify some businesses where a full audit
or full criminal investigation will be required. In order to make the process work
effectively, audit and criminal investigations management must be prepared to allow
audits and criminal investigations to be assigned directly from the targeted enforcement
process rather than going through a centralized lead development and assignment
process. Alternatively, the centralized process can be utilized, but cases identified
through the targeted enforcement process must be given priority. In Florida, the ability to
immediately respond with a criminal investigation already exists since that process is
decentralized, but the audit process is not. Speed in response is critical.
It is also critical that those responsible for enforcement in any capacity be mindful
of the benefits of task force type approaches to enforcement as analyzed in Chapter 6.
The present study has dealt solely with task force utilization in the context of criminal
investigations, but it is possible to utilize this structure in civil compliance enforcement
efforts as well. In Florida, there are a number of other agencies that are involved with
regulation of businesses that have interests that are complementary to those of DOR, such
as the Division of Corporations, the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco,
numerous subunits of the Department of Professional Regulation, and, of course, the
Internal Revenue Service at the federal level. Further, Florida Statutes Section 212.19
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requires that other agencies provide any information required by DOR and needed in the
enforcement of revenue laws, and Florida Statutes Section 213.053 has sufficient
exceptions to the confidentiality rules to allow DOR to advise many other state regulatory
agencies of noncompliant status. While it is easier to envision task force operations in a
criminal investigation scenario, it is nevertheless possible to utilize this technique in civil
enforcement. For example, a business that refuses to comply with Florida tax laws
should not be able to register as a corporation in Florida or obtain a needed business
license from the Department of Professional Regulation, or be licensed as a Lotto retailer,
or be able to accept Electronic Benefit Payments (food stamps); yet noncompliant
businesses are allowed to do all of those things because coordination is lacking. A task
force approach to noncompliant taxpayers would make it easier to have all relevant
licenses revoked unless and until the company comes into compliance with all state
agencies.
The legislature has a crucial role as well. There needs to be recognition that
unenforceable laws and laws that simply are not enforced as they should be affect social
norms regarding sales tax compliance and help to spread a culture of noncompliance. It
is understandable that legislatures have a desire to make their revenue departments more
“taxpayer friendly,” but elected representatives must understand that the businesses
collecting sales taxes are not the taxpayer. If businesses fail to remit sales taxes collected
they are stealing from the actual taxpayers the legislators were elected to protect. They
are defrauding the citizens of the state by using the guise of sales tax collection to
enhance their own profitability. Citizens expect their tax dollars to be used by the state to
provide services, not to be redirected to the personal use of the owners of the business
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that collects the tax. If legislators truly want to be “taxpayer friendly,” they will provide
DOR with the tools required to enforce compliance by business agents of the state.
In summary, the tasks performed by collections personnel, auditors, and criminal
investigators are critical to the mission of a revenue agency, but there remains a gap in
the enforcement coverage that allows unacceptably large amounts of sales tax theft to
escape detection. This gap can be effectively and efficiently bridged through the use of
sustained targeted industry enforcement strategies that result in continuous engagement
between revenue agency employees and the business agents who collect sales tax for the
state.

162

CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Tax evasion has been the subject of much study over the last four decades.
Since Allingham and Sandmo (1972) proposed the application of a rational choice
approach to evasion many other researchers have proposed dozens of drivers of tax
evasion utilizing multiple decision, choice, and behavioral theories in an attempt to
explain evasion and isolate the ultimate trigger which could lead to the perfect antidote.
In the midst of this struggle it appears that most researchers, other than Watrin and
Ullmann (2008), assumed tax evasion was one-size-fits-all and that the solution for one
type of evasion would fit other types of evasion equally well. In fact, it appears that most
researchers labored under the mistaken belief that evasion does not exist with respect to
consumption taxes (Watrin & Ullmann, 2008). The present study has the distinction of
firmly and completely segregating the study of sales tax evasion and theft from the study
of income tax evasion and leaves little room for doubt that sales tax theft or evasion not
only exists, but is a much larger problem than revenue agencies will publicly admit. It is
the author’s hope that this study will stimulate the same level of interest in studying sales
tax theft that has existed with respect to income tax evasion. In 2008 the 45 states who
administer a sales tax collected more than $240 billion in sales tax, representing almost
31 percent of total state tax revenue (U. S. Census Bureau, 2008). The levels of sales tax
theft suggested in this study combined with these figures make it clear that sales tax theft
is a topic worthy of additional targeted research, particularly by state finance scholars and
practitioners who have access to real time data. This study has been limited to the State
of Florida but other state’s approaches to enforcement are worthy of study. Additionally,
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a wealth of potential information is available from comparative studies that could be
conducted. The author does not believe that Florida is unique in the enforcement
problems it faces primarily because the belief that consumption taxes are evasion free is
so widespread. The author particularly recommends much more quasi-experimental
research, which would likely require partnerships between practitioners and academicians
to maximize data access. It is critical that researchers move beyond the belief that
delinquencies and audit assessments are the universe of noncompliant activity in a sales
tax structure.
There are those who advocate a national retail sales tax to replace all other taxes
at the federal level. Some of those advocates attempt to “sell” the idea by playing to
populist anger and frustration with the income tax system generally and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) specifically. They argue that the IRS would no longer be
necessary in a sales tax regime. The author believes such arguments are disingenuous at
best. As discussed previously and illustrated with data, the income tax has significant
built-in protections against evasion that the sales tax does not. It is the author’s opinion
that a national sales tax with no enforcement body and a very high tax rate would simply
be disastrous. This study has illustrated why that is the case. At best, existing IRS
employees could be moved to the state level to bolster existing state tax agencies, but
enforcement would still be required, likely at much higher levels. But even then, unless
the enforcement paradigm is changed as indicated in this study, the result would be far
more evasion and theft than is currently present with an income tax. What is surprising is
that with 45 sales tax systems in existence in this country, no one advocating a national
sales tax has bothered to study sales tax theft and evasion at the level necessary to support
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some of the critical assumptions inherent in such a massive tax policy shift at the federal
level.
The opportunity to study sales tax theft in the field is an incredible opportunity
that the author is grateful to have had. It does, however, have its limitations. Since this
study involves interaction with individuals potentially facing harsh consequences and
punishment it was not possible to manipulate interventions and provide alternative
treatments to different groups within the study as could have been done with an
experimental design. It was critical that DOR policy be followed throughout the study
and that all businesses and individuals that came under scrutiny were treated similarly
and fairly throughout. As a result, this study was a bit less quantitative and experimental
than the author would have preferred. But the advantages of studying actual processes in
the field and the access to live data far outweighed the limitations. Access to data has
been a perennial problem for tax evasion researchers because of confidentiality issues and
the same holds true with respect to the retail sales tax. It is difficult to acquire data that
has not been summarized to the point of being useless as was noted by Alm (1991). In
fact, with respect to the sales tax, the data available to the taxing authority is already
summarized to the point of being useless. A state sales tax return in Florida has a single
line of data reporting gross sales, exempt sales, taxable sales and sales tax collected.
For this reason, even if raw sales tax data cleansed of personal and corporate identifiers
were provided to researchers, it would be virtually useless because it can only be
evaluated when it can be matched and compared to other data that is not available on the
tax return and therefore not available under any circumstances once the identifiers
required for matching are removed. This was the advantage obtained in this study and is
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the advantage of any researcher who can study from within the agency: they can match
the data to outside data sources and bring observation and interaction to bear.
Additional research is needed to identify innovative approaches to enforcement
adopted by other states. For example, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York are all
advanced users of data accumulated from a large number of databases in the development
of enforcement leads, and Georgia has begun cross-checking sales tax filings with
information obtained from outside databases. Comparative research into varying
approaches to intelligence generation is of great interest to the author who believes there
is much to be learned from such studies.
And finally, the author hopes that states will make a stronger effort to identify
the true tax gaps that exist with respect to the sales tax. It is easier to measure, and
certainly more politically expedient, to use delinquency and audit data as a measure of
voluntary compliance, but as this study has shown, such estimates are a poor indicator of
the true tax gap and tend to lead researchers and lawmakers to incorrect conclusions
regarding compliance. It will be difficult to convince legislatures to devote more
resources to enforcement efforts unless the true cost of sales tax evasion and theft is
identified and reported.
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Appendix 1 – Analysis of Income and Deduction Items on the Federal
Individual Income Tax Return for Verifiability
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Appendix 1
All returns, total
Income Items:
Salaries and Wages
Taxable Interest
Ordinary Dividends
State Income Tax Refunds
Alimony Received
Business or profession net income
Business or profession net loss
Capital Gain Distributions
Taxable Net Gain
Taxable Net Loss
Sales of property other than capital assets - net gain
Sales of property other than capital assets - net loss
Taxable IRA distributions
Pensions and annuities - taxable
Rent net income
Rent net loss, including nondeductible loss
Royalty net income
Royalty net loss
Farm rental net income
Farm rental net loss
Partnership and S Corporations net income
Partnership and S Corporations net loss
Estate and Trust net income
Estate and Trust net loss
Farm net income
Farm net loss
Unemployment compensation
Social Security Benefits - Taxable
Foreign earned income exclusion
Other income - net income
Other income - net loss
Net operating loss
Gambling earnings
Cancellation of debt

Total

Verifiable

5,842,269,820
268,058,182
237,052,127
27,046,648
8,759,334
334,585,650
-54,849,389
11,981,884
912,182,379
-16,508,394
15,112,589
-10,755,848
147,959,327
490,581,465
56,510,400
-74,090,927
17,875,464
-235,788
3,988,998
-587,605
547,401,480
-132,696,270
20,612,089
-2,505,195
9,931,284
-24,624,543
29,415,079
167,186,633
-19,888,233
41,578,697
-5,438,442
-86,369,141
30,139,091
1,881,848

5,842,269,820
268,058,182
237,052,127
27,046,648
8,759,334

Income Items Totals

8,793,560,693

7,262,331,438

Percentage of income verifiable

11,981,884

147,959,327
490,581,465

29,415,079
167,186,633

30,139,091
1,881,848

82.59%
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Appendix 1 (continued)
Deductions for AGI:

Total

IRA Payments
Student loan interest deduction
Educator expenses deduction
Tuition and fees deduction
Domestic production activities deduction
Health savings account deduction
One-half of deduction for self-employment tax
Moving expense adjustment
Payments to a KEOGH plan
Penalty on early withdrawal of savings
Alimony paid
Self-employed health insurance deduction
Medical savings account deduction
Certain business expenses of reservists, performing
artists, etc.
Other Adjustments

12,876,504
7,463,755
925,997
10,578,961
6,780,483
1,500,881
24,759,998
2,903,022
22,262,415
352,592
9,496,674
21,283,306
21,748

Deductions for AGI Totals

Verifiable
12,876,504
7,463,755
10,578,961
1,500,881
24,759,998
22,262,415
352,592
9,496,674
21,748

420,756
1,295,091
122,922,183

Percentage of adjustments for AGI subject to
verification

89,313,528
72.66%

Other Deductions:
Basic standard deduction
Additional standard deduction
Total itemized deductions
Exemptions

635,824,934
18,356,722
1,333,036,542
943,171,372

635,824,934
18,356,722

Other Deductions Totals

2,930,389,570

1,597,353,028

Percentage of other deductions subject to verification
Source: Internal Revenue Service. (2007). Internal
Revenue Service Source of Income Tax
Statistics, Table 1, Individual Income Tax, All
Returns: Sources of Income and Adjustments.
Internal Revenue Service.
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943,171,372

54.51%

Appendix 2 – Auto Dealer Survey Used in Chapter 6 – Predictors of Tax Evasion
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Auto Dealer Survey

Business Name:
Tax Number:
Address:
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Cost
Structure
1

Surrounding neighborhood type
1

2

3

4

Poor

Wealthy
1

2

3

4

Industrial

2

Retail

Property appearance
1

2

3

Appears low rent

3

4
Appears high rent

Rent Analysis (In-office analysis)
Approximate square footage (Property tax records)
Approximate rental value per sf (CBRE Survey)
Approximate monthly rent
Average Monthly Sales
Sales minus rents
Rent coverage (Sales divided by rent)
(Note: Rent can be used as a proxy for mortgage payments if owned or as a
proxy for asset use value.)

4

Type of dealer
1
Other

5

2

3

Office/Ware
house

Repair
Shop

2

3

Medium

Large

4
Traditional

Size of operation
1
Small

180

4
Multi-location

6

Observations

Profit Structure
1

Condition and type of cars
1

2

3

4

Inexpensive

Expensive

1
Disrepair

2

3

Fair

Good

2

3

Mixed

Luxury

1
General

2

Excellent
4
Specialty

Cleanliness and maintenance of facilities
1

2

3

Dirty

4
Very Clean

1

2

3

Poorly maintained

3

4

4
Well maintained

Location
1

2

3

Low traffic

4
High traffic

1

2

Difficult access and parking
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3

4
Easy access and
parking

1

2

3

Not meant for retail

Meant for retail

4

In-house financing? (Yes/No)

5

Inventory Size
1
0 - 15

4

1 = Y; 2 = N

2

3

16-30

31-45

4

Small

6

Large

Observations

Management
1

45-over

Historical filing review
Files round numbers? (Yes/No)
Files incomplete returns?
(Yes/No)
(Missing signature, only taxable sales - no gross and exempt, etc)
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Number of returns filed late
Out of how many months
reviewed?
Returned items? (#)
Average exempt sales

2

Not registered for other taxes they should be registered for?
(0 = Registered; 1 = Not registered)
Corporate
Doc Stamps (If they provide financing)
Unemployment
Solid Waste (Sec 403.718 - New Tire Fees)

3

Observations:

1

String of corporations owned by same or related people,

Churn

with ownership change or corporation change every few
years? (Yes/No)

183

Appendix 3 – Case Frequencies from Auto Dealer Survey
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Appendix 3
Frequency Table
Theft indicator
Frequency Percent
Valid No theft

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

153

41.5

41.5

41.5

Theft indicated - more
than 10% stolen

216

58.5

58.5

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0

Neighborhood classification
Frequency

Percent Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Valid Industrial

83

22.5

22.5

22.5

Moderate
industrial

282

76.4

76.4

98.9

4

1.1

1.1

100.0

369

100.0

100.0

Moderate retail
Total

Neighborhood type
Frequency
Valid

Poor

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

149

40.4

40.4

40.4

Moderate low

38

10.3

10.3

50.7

Moderate high

105

28.5

28.5

79.1

77

20.9

20.9

100.0

369

100.0

100.0

Wealthy
Total
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Appendix 3
Frequency Table (continued)
Neighborhood appearance
Frequency
Valid Appears low rent

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

79

21.4

21.4

21.4

Moderate low rent

162

43.9

43.9

65.3

Moderate high rent

107

29.0

29.0

94.3

21

5.7

5.7

100.0

369

100.0

100.0

High rent
Total

Dealer type
Frequency
Valid Other

Percent Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

38

10.3

10.3

10.3

117

31.7

31.7

42.0

24

6.5

6.5

48.5

Traditional sales lot

190

51.5

51.5

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0

Office/warehouse
Repair Shop

Size of dealer operation
Frequency
Valid

Small

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

228

61.8

61.8

61.8

Medium

82

22.2

22.2

84.0

Large

52

14.1

14.1

98.1

7

1.9

1.9

100.0

369

100.0

100.0

Multi-location
Total

186

Appendix 3
Frequency Table (continued)
Price range of cars on the lot
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Valid

Inexpensive

Cumulative
Percent

111

30.1

50.5

50.5

Moderate low

81

22.0

36.8

87.3

Moderate high

16

4.3

7.3

94.5

Expensive

12

3.3

5.5

100.0

220
149
369

59.6
40.4
100.0

100.0

Total
Missing 0
Total

State of cars on the lot
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Valid

Disrepair
Fair
Good
Excellent

Total
Missing 0
Total

Cumulative Percent

3

.8

1.4

1.4

34

9.2

15.5

16.9
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45.0

75.8

92.7

16

4.3

7.3

100.0

219
150
369

59.3
40.7
100.0

100.0

Type of cars sold
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Valid

Cumulative Percent

General

139

37.7

63.5

63.5

Mixed

54

14.6

24.7

88.1

Luxury

8

2.2

3.7

91.8

18

4.9

8.2

100.0

Total
Missing 0

219
150

59.3
40.7

100.0

Total

369

100.0

Specialty
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Appendix 3
Frequency Table (continued)
Cleanliness of premises
Frequency Percent
Valid Dirty

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

36

9.8

9.8

9.8

89

24.1

24.1

33.9

Clean

139

37.7

37.7

71.5

Very clean

105

28.5

28.5

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0

Fair

Maintenance status of premises
Frequency Percent
Valid Poorly maintained

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

29

7.9

7.9

7.9

Moderate low
maintenance

95

25.7

25.7

33.6

Moderate high
maintenance

140

37.9

37.9

71.5

Well maintained

105

28.5

28.5

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0

Customer traffic
Frequency Percent
Valid Low traffic

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

110

29.8

29.8

29.8

Moderately low traffic

45

12.2

12.2

42.0

Moderately high traffic

37

10.0

10.0

52.0

High traffic

177

48.0

48.0

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0
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Appendix 3
Frequency Table (continued)
Access to premises
Frequency Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Valid Difficult access and
parking

8

2.2

2.2

2.2

Moderately difficult
access and parking

54

14.6

14.6

16.8

Moderately easy access
and parking

149

40.4

40.4

57.2

Easy access and
parking

158

42.8

42.8

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0

Retail location indicator
Frequency Percent
Valid Not meant for retail

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

123

33.3

33.3

33.3

Retail possible but not
relied on

29

7.9

7.9

41.2

Retail encouraged

19

5.1

5.1

46.3

Full retail

198

53.7

53.7

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0

Buy Here Pay Here lot
Frequency Percent
Valid No

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

289

78.3

78.3

78.3

Yes

80

21.7

21.7

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0
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Appendix 3
Frequency Table (continued)
Inventory size
Frequency
Valid

Percent Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Small 0 to 15

68

18.4

31.8

31.8

Moderate 15 to 30

65

17.6

30.4

62.1

Moderate 31 to 45

42

11.4

19.6

81.8

Large over 45

39

10.6

18.2

100.0

Total
Missing 0

214
155

58.0
42.0

100.0

Total

369

100.0

Registered for corporate tax
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Yes

350

94.9

94.9

94.9

No

19

5.1

5.1

100.0

369

100.0

100.0

Total

In-house financing offered
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

No

289

78.3

78.3

78.3

Yes

80

21.7

21.7

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0
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Appendix 3
Frequency Table (continued)
Registered for documentary stamp tax
Frequency
Valid Yes

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

42

11.4

11.4

11.4

No

327

88.6

88.6

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0

Registered for unemployment compensation tax
Frequency
Valid Yes

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

184

49.9

49.9

49.9

No

185

50.1

50.1

100.0

Total

369

100.0

100.0
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